L'acquisition de compétences technologiques par les grandes entreprises industrielles chinoises : entre rattrapage et investissement des technologies émergentes by Oulion, Marina
HAL Id: tel-01483966
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01483966v2
Submitted on 8 Feb 2018
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
The acquisition of technological capabilities by large
Chinese industrial companies : between catch-up and
engagement in emerging technologies
Marina Oulion
To cite this version:
Marina Oulion. The acquisition of technological capabilities by large Chinese industrial companies :
between catch-up and engagement in emerging technologies. Economics and Finance. Université
Paris-Est, 2016. English. ￿NNT : 2016PESC0114￿. ￿tel-01483966v2￿
1 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITE PARIS-EST 
 
 
 
ECOLE DOCTORALE ORGANISATIONS, MARCHES, INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
Thèse de doctorat en Sciences de Gestion 
 
Menée au Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire Sciences Innovations Sociétés (LISIS) d’Université 
Paris-Est 
 
 
Soutenue par Marina OULION le 12 décembre 2016 
 
 
L’ACQUISITION DE COMPÉTENCES TECHNOLOGIQUES PAR LES 
GRANDES ENTREPRISES INDUSTRIELLES CHINOISES. 
Entre rattrapage et investissement des technologies émergentes 
 
 
Thèse dirigée par LARÉDO Philippe, professeur, UPEM et Université de Manchester 
 
 
Jury : 
 
ARVANITIS Rigas, directeur de recherche, IRD (rapporteur) 
KAHANE Bernard, professeur, ESIEE (président du jury) 
LLERÉNA Patrick, professeur, Université de Strasbourg 
MATT Mirelle, directrice de recherche, INRA (rapporteur) 
RUET Joël, chargé de recherche CNRS-CEPN, Université Paris 13 et chercheur associé, CRG, 
Ecole Polytechnique 
  
2 
L’acquisition de compétences technologiques par les grandes entreprises chinoises : entre 
rattrapage et investissement des technologies émergentes 
 
Résumé 
Parmi les 500 plus grandes entreprises mondiales, une sur cinq est chinoise. En 2014, 94 
entreprises chinoises figuraient parmi les leaders mondiaux en R&D. La Chine est, depuis 2016, le 
premier acquéreur d’entreprises étrangères et vise désormais des entreprises de haute-technologie.  
Ces éléments nous questionnent sur le positionnement technologique des entreprises 
chinoises. Penser ce thème nous oblige à revenir sur leurs conditions d’émergence. A la lecture du 
modèle dominant du rattrapage technologique (Kim, 1997), la Chine est passée par trois grandes 
phases: une période d’acquisition des technologies étrangères suite à l’ouverture du pays en 1978, 
une période d’assimilation des technologies et d’assemblage et manufacture de produits de plus en 
plus complexes, et une période d’intégration qui leur permet de faire de nouvelles propositions de 
produits grâce à la reconfiguration et amélioration des technologies existantes. 
L’hypothèse qui guide notre recherche est que les entreprises sont désormais dans la dernière 
phase du rattrapage et sont entrées dans une période de transition vers le leadership technologique. 
Cela nous amène à poser deux questions. A quoi fait-on référence lorsqu’on parle d’innovation en 
Chine aujourd’hui ? Ce thème renvoie de manière plus globale à celui de l’innovation par les pays 
émergents. Quel chemin reste-t-il à parcourir pour atteindre la frontière technologique ?  
Nous observons cette transition dans la manière dont les grandes entreprises chinoises 
s’engagent dans la recherche. L’intégration des technologies émergentes au sein de leurs stratégies 
de recherche reflète des dynamiques d’apprentissage qui, si elles ne sont pas encore visibles sur le 
marché, indiquent une dynamique de transition. Nos résultats montrent que la tendance est 
significative, la moitié des grandes entreprises (48 percent) s’engage en nanotechnologie. Cela reflète 
l’arrivée à la frontière technologique des entreprises chinoises, ce qui, nous le soulignons, n’implique 
pas nécessairement le passage à la frontière sur d’autres dimensions, notamment organisationnelles. 
Nous montrons également que les trajectoires d’engagement dans la recherche sont variées. Si une 
partie des entreprises s’engagent dans la recherche sur la base d’un modèle similaire à celui des 
entreprises américaines ou européennes, d’autres dynamiques sont également à l’œuvre, qui 
traduisent notamment un héritage historique et une inscription dans le territoire. 
 Pour obtenir ces résultats, nous avons construit une base de données de 325 grandes 
entreprises industrielles, et observé leurs prises de brevets en nanotechnologie, directement ou via 
leurs filiales, sur la base de sources en anglais et en chinois. 
 
Mots clés : entreprise chinoise, frontière technologique, nanotechnologie, brevets 
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The acquisition of technological capabilities by large Chinese industrial companies: 
Between catch-up and engagement in emerging technologies (English Title) 
 
Abstract  
Among the 500 world’s largest firms, one out of five is Chinese. In 2014, 94 Chinese firms 
were among the world leaders in R&D. Since 2016, China is the first acquirer of foreign firms, and 
is now targeting high-technology firms. 
These elements raise questions about the technological positioning of Chinese firms. Studying 
this topic requires looking at their conditions of emergence. We can look at China’s development 
under the perspective of the technological catch-up model (Kim, 1997). China has gone through three 
phases: a phase of acquisition of foreign technology following the country’s opening in 1978, a period 
of technological assimilation and production of increasingly complex products, and a period of 
technological integration characterized by technological improvement and the reconfiguration of 
existing technologies. 
The hypothesis we make is that firms are now in the last phase of catch-up, and have entered 
a period of transition to technology leadership. This leads to two questions. What is China’s 
innovation today? This topic broadly refers to innovation by emerging countries. How far are Chinese 
firms to reach the technological frontier? 
We observe the transition through the way major Chinese firms engage into research. The 
integration of emerging technologies into their research strategies reflect dynamics of technological 
learning which, if they are not yet visible in the market, indicate the transition. Our results show that 
the trend is significant, half of large firms (48 percent) engages in nanotechnology. This proportion 
reflects that Chinese firms have reached the technological frontier, which, however, does not mean 
they are at the frontier on other dimensions, such as the organizational dimension. We also show that 
there are several modalities of commitment into research. While some large Chinese firms do research 
by adopting a model similar to that of American or European firms, other dynamics are at work, which 
reflects in particular their historical legacy, and the impact of their localization. 
 To obtain these results, we have built a unique database of 325 large industrial enterprises, 
and have looked at their patenting activities in nanotechnology, directly or through their subsidiaries, 
based on the exploitation of sources in English and Chinese. 
 
Keywords: Chinese firm, technological frontier, nanotechnology, patent 
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Résumé long en français 
La question centrale de la thèse est celle de la frontière technologique en Chine. Cette question 
se déploie à deux niveaux. Tout d’abord, au niveau national, c’est la transformation du modèle 
industriel qui est en jeu ainsi que la place du pays dans le monde. La crise financière de 2008 a mis 
en évidence, par l’ampleur des faillites qu’elle a générées, les problèmes liés au modèle industriel 
chinois : notamment des problèmes environnementaux (qui a des impacts considérables sur la santé 
publique) et des problèmes structurels.  
La question de la frontière technologique se pose également au sujet des entreprises. Nous 
assistons, depuis une dizaine d’années, au repositionnement des grandes entreprises chinoises. En 
2015, environ 20 percent des 500 plus grandes entreprises mondiales vient de Chine, et le pays joue 
désormais un rôle moteur dans les fusions et acquisitions internationales. Certaines acquisitions ont 
certes été des tournants historiques de par la charge symbolique de la cible et la dimension 
technologique de l’acquisition. Mentionnons, entre autres, l’acquisition de la section PC d’IBM par 
Lenovo en 2005, la reprise de Volvo par Geely en 2010 et en 2016, l’acquisition de Syngenta (chimie 
et agroalimentaire) par l’entreprise d’état ChemChina. Mais fondamentalement le phénomène va au-
delà de ces cas emblématiques et concerne également l’absorption de petites entreprises 
technologiques.  
Ces éléments interrogent le positionnement des grandes entreprises chinoises en tant 
qu’acteurs technologiques. De plus, l’étendue de la tendance nous amène à nous questionner sur les 
conditions d’émergence des entreprises. Poser cette question nous oblige ainsi à nous replacer dans 
un temps plus long, même s’il reste relativement court au regard de l’histoire industrielle : deux 
entreprises parmi les leaders chinois, Huawei et Lenovo, ont respectivement été créés en 1988, et 
1984 et le premier investissement à l’étranger par une entreprise chinoise date de 1984 (Week in 
China, 2016, p. 6).  
 
Positionnement de la recherche  
L’analyse de la dimension technologique sur un temps historique nous renvoie aux études 
existantes sur le rattrapage technologique des pays en développement. La littérature sur ce thème est 
née du constat que les pays en retard sur le plan technique augmentent leur productivité plus 
rapidement que les pays plus avancés grâce à l’acquisition de technologies étrangères, ce qui assure 
leur rattrapage économique (Abramovitz, 1986). La dynamique d’apprentissage technologique a été 
centrale dans le développement des pays industrialisés en Asie, au Japon dans un premier temps, puis 
à Taiwan, Singapour, Hong-Kong ainsi qu’en Corée du Sud (Amsden, 2003; Kim and Nelson, 2000).  
A la lecture du modèle dominant du rattrapage technologique (Kim, 1997), pensé à l’origine 
dans le contexte coréen, la Chine est passée par trois grandes phases : une période d’acquisition de 
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technologies étrangères, suite à l’ouverture du pays en 1978 ; une période d’assimilation de ces 
technologies et de production de produits d’une complexité croissante ; et une période caractérisée 
par l’intégration et l’amélioration des technologies existantes dans le développement de nouveaux 
produits. Si le rattrapage technologique commence avec l’ouverture du pays, il serait erroné 
cependant, de considérer que l’histoire industrielle de la Chine démarre en 1978, avec l’arrivée de 
Deng Xiaoping au pouvoir. La première phase notable d’industrialisation date, en effet, du premier 
plan quinquennal qui a donné lieu à la construction d’usines et d’entreprises, dont certaines sont 
encore utilisées aujourd’hui, et remonte aux années 1950s. 
La mobilisation de la littérature sur le rattrapage technologique appelle deux questions. La 
première tient à la nature de l’innovation dans les pays émergents, en particulier lors de la phase la 
plus avancée du rattrapage technologique. De nombreux rapports ont montré la capacité à innover 
des entreprises chinoises (Strategy&, 2014, 2013). Cette innovation est le souvent fondée sur la 
compréhension des besoins spécifiques des grands marchés émergents (Radjou et al., 2012), ainsi que 
sur l’avantage compétitif que leur confère l’accès à un personnel qualifié relativement peu cher, et 
qui permet d’organiser la recherche comme un processus industriel au sein de grands départements 
(Williamson and Yin, 2014). L’innovation consiste ainsi essentiellement en nouveaux produits qui se 
basent sur l’amélioration des procédés de production, et sur la reconfiguration des technologies 
existantes (Zeng and Williamson, 2007). En revanche, comme le montrent de récentes études 
empiriques (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015), ces entreprises restent encore limitées pour utiliser la 
technologie avancée comme source d’innovation.  
Ce n’est donc pas tant l’innovation qui est en jeu que la capacité à utiliser la technologie 
comme source d’innovation. La deuxième question découle de ce constat, et concerne le passage vers 
un modèle d’innovation par les entreprises qui intègre les technologies. Faire l’hypothèse que les 
entreprises chinoises cherchent à se positionner comme leader technologique requiert de postuler une 
période de transition vers ce leadership. Le problème est théorique. Comment caractériser ce 
phénomène de transition ? L’intégration de technologies en tant que sources de nouveaux produits 
requiert le développement préalable de compétences technologiques. Tant que cette intégration n’est 
pas réalisée, les produits ne sont pas visibles sur le marché.  
En réalité, nous avons assez peu d’outils pour penser cette période de transition à la fin du 
rattrapage technologique. Cette période, bien que souvent mobilisée, n’a pas vraiment été 
caractérisée, à l’exception de deux études dans le cadre sud-coréen qui portent notamment sur la 
redéfinition des politiques d’innovation liée à la transition (Hwang and Choung, 2013) et sur la nature 
des activités d’innovation des entreprises (Choung et al., 2014). Une étude plus systématique de la 
littérature nous permet de mettre en évidence que cette transition s’articule autour de deux 
dynamiques : la transformation progressive du système national d’innovation et le passage au 
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leadership technologique des entreprises.  
 
Repositionnement de la problématique dans le contexte chinois et mise en œuvre  
Tout d’abord, est-ce raisonnable, au regard de l’avancement de la Chine dans le domaine des 
sciences et des technologies et du niveau de ses institutions, de formuler l’hypothèse d’une transition 
dans le contexte chinois ? Dans un chapitre consacré, nous montrons que les institutions chinoises 
présentent un certain nombre de faiblesse, notamment le système de gouvernance d’entreprise, mais 
que l’étendue des réformes et le développement des institutions justifient notre questionnement. Le 
système de propriété intellectuelle chinois s’est aligné avec les normes mondiales, ce qui était une 
condition de l’entrée du pays à l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce en 2001. En parallèle, le 
niveau de recherche s’est élevé, ce qui est visible dans la participation des équipes chinoises aux 
collaborations internationales, et le fait que le pays soit désormais le second en nombre de 
publications scientifiques. 
Les conditions de cette transition technologique s’inscrivent dans les particularités des 
entreprises en Chine, héritées en partie de l’histoire, et dans le contexte technologique contemporain. 
Le premier élément tient à la spécificité des grandes entreprises industrielles, que nous mettons en 
évidence par une analyse détaillée. Nous voyons en particulier que la diversification industrielle n’est 
pas un modèle dominant parmi les grandes entreprises. Au contraire, les conglomérats véritablement 
diversifiés représentent moins de 15 percent des grandes entreprises, avec la plupart des entreprises 
spécialisées sur un secteur industriel. En cela, la Chine présente un modèle qui contraste avec celui 
de la Corée du Sud, ou avec celui de l’Inde dans lesquels les conglomérats jouent un rôle important. 
Ensuite, le passage à la frontière technologique pour ces entreprises s’inscrit nécessairement 
dans des dynamiques technologiques contemporaines. Il est, comme nous le défendons en nous 
appuyant sur la littérature sur les general purpose technology ou technologies génériques (Bresnahan 
and Tratjenberg, 1995) impossible de penser la transition des entreprises chinoises sans la remettre 
dans le contexte actuel. Chaque époque est en effet caractérisée par un ensemble de technologies 
dominantes qui tirent la croissance économique : la machine à vapeur, l’électricité, la mécanisation 
des procédés industriels, ou, plus récemment internet. Ces technologies jouent le rôle de moteur, et 
ont un impact sur les structures industrielles comme sur la compétitivité des entreprises. Comme nous 
le défendons dans notre thèse, le passage à la frontière par les entreprises chinoises s’inscrit 
nécessairement par la maitrise des technologies émergentes, afin qu’elles puissent, dans le futur, 
utiliser ces technologies comme sources de nouveaux produits. 
Nous saisissons ainsi la transition vers le leadership technologique dans la manière dont les 
grandes entreprises chinoises déploient leur recherche en nanotechnologie, que l’on peut suivre grâce 
aux brevets qu’elles prennent dans ce domaine. Le choix de ces technologies émergentes est pertinent 
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pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, les nanotechnologies, qui englobent la manipulation et le contrôle 
de la matière à des dimensions nanométriques (soit un millionième de mètre) ont des applications 
industrielles potentielles qui s’étendent à l’ensemble des industries (Shea, 2005; Shea et al., 2011). 
L'innovation en nanotechnologie est « silencieuse » (Andersen, 2011) car elle consiste en 
l’incorporation de nanostructures ou nanomatériaux dans le produit final. Ainsi, le principal canal de 
diffusion des nanotechnologies dans l’industrie se fait via les départements de recherche des 
entreprises (Larédo et al., 2010).  
 
Cela montre l’importance de développer la capacité de recherche en nanotechnologie par les 
entreprises chinoises. Pour évaluer ce phénomène, nous avons donc centré notre recherche sur 
l’identification des plus grandes entreprises industrielles et observé leurs prises de brevets en 
nanotechnologies, directement ou via leurs filiales. Cela a requis la construction d’une base de 
données exclusive de 325 entreprises industrielles chinoises, à partir de sources diverses, en anglais 
et en chinois, et qui inclut, entre autres, des sources venant des marchés financiers, des informations 
données sur les sites du gouvernement chinois central, ainsi que des informations données par les 
sites des gouvernements locaux (provinces, municipalités).  
Nous avons également travaillé sur la base de données des brevets pris par la Chine dans les 
nanotechnologies, afin d’identifier parmi eux, ceux qui avaient été pris par les 325 entreprises, Nous 
avons utilisé la base de brevets développée au sein de l’IFRIS et, sur la base des numéros de 
publications des brevets, nous les avons extraits de nouveau en chinois à partir du site de l’office 
chinois de propriété intellectuelle (SIPO) afin d’obtenir des informations plus complètes. 
 
Principales contributions de la recherche 
Que peut-on dire des entreprises chinoises au regard de la frontière technologique ? Les 
résultats que nous obtenons nous permettent de donner deux réponses à cette question. La première 
tient à la réalité de la tendance. Environ la moitié des grandes entreprises brevètent en 
nanotechnologies, soit 157 grandes entreprises. Il convient de préciser ici nous observons les 
dynamiques de 325 grandes entreprises, qui forment un groupe très hétérogène, et que, à aucun 
moment nous n’avons utilisé de critères d’innovation pour les sélectionner. La prise en compte des 
nanotechnologies dans la recherche de la moitié de ces entreprises montre un engagement dans la 
recherche qui ne se limite pas à l’ingénierie mais inclut aussi de la recherche plus fondamentale. Elle 
suggère également que les entreprises ont atteint la frontière technologique, ce qui n’implique pas, 
cependant, que les grandes entreprises chinoises soient à la frontière sur d’autres dimensions, 
notamment la dimension organisationnelle. 
Notre seconde contribution tient au fait que nous avons mis en évidence, au sein de ces 157 
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firmes, différentes trajectoires d’engagement dans la recherche. Si un certain nombre d’entreprises 
chinoises se sont engagées dans la recherche selon des modèles similaires à ceux que l’on observe en 
Europe ou aux Etats-Unis, elles ne constituent pas un modèle unique. Il existe d’autres modalités 
d’engagement. Celles-ci dépendent de la nature de l’actionnariat et de l’industrie des entreprises, mais 
également de conditions transversales, à savoir l’importance de la localisation géographique et 
l’héritage du système de recherche maoïste qui structure, sous des formes diverses, la manière dont 
une partie des entreprises font de la recherche. 
Finalement, une des originalités de notre travail est de proposer un design de recherche fondé 
sur la théorie afin d’observer les dynamiques de transition technologique en œuvre. Plus 
spécifiquement, nous avons considéré les brevets en nanotechnologie non pas tant comme un 
indicateur de capacités technologiques, mais comme un indicateur des dynamiques d'apprentissage 
liées à la construction des capacités technologiques dans les technologies émergentes. Cela ouvre un 
champ intéressant d’étude sur la transition à la fin de la période du rattrapage technologique. Nous 
explorons à peine ce champ dans cette thèse, mais pensons qu’elle montre le besoin d'outils et 
d'indicateurs conçus pour suivre ces dynamiques de transition dans les pays émergents, au niveau de 
la recherche des entreprises mais également au niveau de leur production, voire de leur organisation. 
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from being able to compete on technological innovation? Answering requires looking more closely 
at the nature of innovative activities in China, and at the distance that remains till they reach the 
technological frontier. 
 
The second dimension is the national impact of the transition to technological leadership. This 
dimension encompasses two distinct aspects. The first one is the question of China’s global 
leadership. From that perspective, the technology is not only an economic but also a political and 
global strategic issue.1 The history of leadership of China in science and technology helps us 
understand this proclaimed willingness of China to become a world’s science and technology leader. 
“China should establish itself as one of the most innovative countries by 2020 and a leading innovator 
by 2030, before becoming a world-leading science and technology power by 2049” (President XI 
Jinping).2 
The second aspect is the articulation with the transformation of Chinese industries. Chinese 
officials emphasized the fact that China has entered into a “new normal” of slower but better quality 
growth (Xinhua, 2014). The idea of an “innovation imperative” has emerged as a key component of 
quality growth, and has become a topical issue among business actors (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2015). Indeed, the 2008 global financial crisis exposed the weaknesses of the industrial model that 
hitherto had driven the country’s rapid economic growth but which also faced important problems: 
dependence on foreign markets, which precipitated waves of bankruptcies, pollution, waste of 
resources, and labor shortage, to mention just a few specific issues (Lisbonne-de-Vergeron, 2012; 
Wu, 2013).  
 
The third dimension is the inscription of the current dynamics of Chinese firms in a wider 
historical perspective. Firms that compose the corporate landscape are those that survived or emerged 
in the last decades, either by being competitive or, for some of them, thanks to governmental support. 
Their conditions of emergence are of significance. It appears that most Chinese firms have a relatively 
short history that dates from the second half of the 20th century for the oldest ones. For example, 
Huawei Technologies and Lenovo were respectively created in 1988 and 1989. The first investment 
abroad by a Chinese firm occurred in 1984 when Citic Group invested in a US-based joint venture 
that shipped construction timber back to China for about $50 million (Week in China, 2016). Firms’ 
history is quite short in the light of the industrial history, if we compare with established American or 
European firms. It was also associated with rapid change and technological learning. This rapid 
                                                 
1 This topic is linked with a dimension that we do not mention in the dissertation, the development of science and 
technology in the military field. 
2 In 2016. Xinhua News Agency (liuxinyong, 2016).  
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The evolutionary economic theory is strongly inspired by Schumpeter’s idea of innovation as the 
driver of capitalism (Schumpeter, 1942) and sees the economy as a process of change based on the 
evolution of technology and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This line of research pays attention 
to catch-up dynamics themselves, because it aims at explaining economic growth by developing 
countries (Amann and Cantwell, 2012; Chao Chen and Toyama, 2006; Mike Hobday, 1995; Kim, 
1980, 1997; Lee and Lim, 2001; Mathews, 2002; Odagiri et al., 2010).  
Central in this line of thought is the role of learning, present in the notions of ‘technological 
accumulation’ (Bell and Pavitt, 1993) and ‘technological learning’: “the absorption of already-
existing techniques, i.e., the absorption of innovations produced elsewhere, and the generation of 
improvements in the vicinity of acquired techniques” (Viotti, 2002). The major assumption is that in 
developing nations, technological learning is the primary driver of economic development (Amsden, 
1992; Kim and Nelson, 2000). While this idea is now dominant, it was not always the case, as the 
debate between “accumulation” and “assimilation” theorists in the late 1990s on the nature of the 
“Asian Miracle” has demonstrated. Proponents of the accumulation theory considered that economic 
growth resulted from “perspiration rather than inspiration” and from the respective countries’ ability 
to mobilize national resources to increase production inputs such as cheap labor force (Krugman, 
1994; Young, 1994). 
 In contrast, for the proponents of the “assimilation theory,” the acquisition and integration of 
increasingly complex foreign technologies into their industrial production by firms in developing 
countries is the primary determinant of economic development. They rather emphasize the “learning 
dimension” behind Asia’s economic growth (Kim and Nelson, 2000). Technological learning is now 
recognized as the primary driver of economic catch-up in Asia and in particular of the “four dragons,” 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea (Chu, 2009; Mike Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997).  
2.1.1. A three-stage historical model of technological catch-up 
The dominant “catch-up model” that shapes our understanding of technological catch-up and 
technological learning was proposed by Linsu Kim, who was a Professor of Management at South 
Korea University and the Chairman of the Government Reform Council in South Korea. Trained in 
the United-States, he analysed the South Korean case and conceptualized technological catch-up as a 
three-stage historical process (Kim, 1980, 1997) with each stage associated with different learning 
mode, capabilities and relations to foreign companies (summarized in Table 2-1). To narrow the gap 
with leading countries and firms, countries go through three main stages of technological 
development (Lee et al., 1988). 1 
                                                 
1 Lee et al (1988)’s literature review shows that most authors consider catch-up as a three-stage development process, or, 
less frequently, as a four stage process. The authors propose a review of the literature on the different development stages 
through which developing countries go through in 1988. While they did this literature review in the 1980s, the general 
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Table 2-1: Development stages of the catch-up process 
 
Sources: author, adapted from Lee et al (1988) 
 
During the first stage, economic growth is driven by the entrance of firms into established 
industries through assemblage and production activities. This is possible because it meets the needs 
of technologically leading firms, as evidenced in the analysis of global value chains.1 Production in 
mature industries being capital intensive and requiring non-specialized skills; it is cost-effective for 
firms from developed economies to delocalize assemblage (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). This 
means that, in the first stage, firms in developing countries take a competitive advantage from their 
“latecomer status” (Mathews, 2002), and leverage their low-cost labor force (Kim and Nelson, 2000, 
p. 79). They do not need advanced technological knowledge from their workers to start assembling 
products for foreign clients; the key to entering the industry at this stage is rather the ability to 
establish new linkages with incumbents, generally foreign firms, with which they have 
complementary resources (Mathews, 2002).  
Firms are not passive actors (Bell and Albu, 1999; Romijn and Caniëls, 2011); technological 
development requires efforts (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Firms interact with the foreign companies with 
which they work and acquire knowledge on technologies and manufacturing processes (Arvanitis et 
al., 2006). This role of customer relationships is essential in the learning process and goes beyond 
technology licensing/collaborations or joint ventures with multinational enterprises (Kumaraswamy 
                                                 
framework has remained stable. 
1 See research on the global value chain perspective. As they catch-up, firms in developing countries progressively 
upgrade their position in the global value chain (Gereffi, 1999, 2008), and it is possible to match the different catch-up 
stages of a country with a change of the nature of its contribution to the global value chain. In the electronic technology, 
Hobday demonstrated it for the Asian dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore) . South Korea and Taiwan 
moved from being manufacturers to become original equipment manufacturers to original design manufacturer, and 
finally to original brand manufacturer (Michael Hobday, 1995).  
Authors Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
(Kim, 1980) Implementation 
 
Assimilation Improvement 
(Stewart, 
1979) 
Development of capacity 
for independent search & 
choice 
 
Minor technological 
change 
New technology development and export 
(Cortez, 1978) Copying 
 
Imitation Adaptation and Innovation 
(Katz, 1984) Product engineering Process engineering and 
production planning 
 
R&D 
(Lall, 1980) Elementary 
-Learning by doing 
-learning by adapting 
 
Intermediate 
-Learning by design 
-Learning by improved 
design 
 
Advanced 
-Learning by setting up complete production 
system 
-Learning by innovation 
(Lee et al., 
1988) 
Initiation Internalization Generation 
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et al., 2012). In the process, latecomers develop their production capabilities, but also their absorptive 
capacity i.e. the capability to absorb further knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
During the second stage of the model, the technological “assimilation” phase, firms internalize 
(Lee et al., 1988) or assimilate (Kim, 1980) existing technologies to manufacture increasingly 
complex products. Finally, the third stage is the “improvement” (Kim, 1980) or “adaptation” stage. 
Firms have internalized enough technologies to adapt them and propose new products. This period is 
characterized by technology improvements or new product developments by firms. Such trajectory is 
visible, for example, in the upgrading of the South Korean chip-industry (Kim, 1997; Mathews, 
2002). Firms like Samsung and Hyundai that manufactured chips in the eighties, managed to develop 
their technological competences for product development, manufacturing capacity, and mass 
production, by leveraging the product and process technologies they acquired to US firms (Micron, 
Intel, Texas Instrument…) and Japanese firms (Sharp), until challenging Japanin the memory chip 
market in the nineties.1 
These stages of technological development which developing countries go through (the 
“catch-up process”) are well understood and described in various settings: South Korea (Hobday, 
1998; Kim, 1997), Taiwan (Mike Hobday, 1995), China (Xiao et al., 2013). We know about 
technological learning modes (Arvanitis et al., 2006), capabilities (Amann and Cantwell, 2012; 
Dutrenit, 2000; Xiao et al., 2013) and strategies (Mathews, 2002; Xiao et al., 2013) associated with 
each stage. We also know about dynamic capability building (Dutrenit, 2000), and the development 
of absorptive capacity (Chung and Lee, 2015).  
2.1.2. The limits of the catch-up framework in three stages 
This three-stage model is consistent and successful in describing the trajectories of developing 
countries. Such a decomposition in different historical stages, however, leads to asking the question 
of what happens after the last stage. Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, for economists, catch-up 
is self-limiting and is not a sustainable driver of economic development, because as countries catch-
up, they reduce catch-up opportunities (Abramovitz, 1986). Further catch-up is no longer possible 
when they manufacture at the technological frontier or are close to doing so because economic growth 
is based on the increase in production efficiency by firms upgrade (Figueiredo, 2014).  
Therefore, what happens at the end of the period of technological catch-up is both a theoretical 
and empirical problem. This question ties into contemporary interrogations about emerging countries. 
Some behaviours of firms, notably in China or South Korea, cannot be explained by the catch-up 
                                                 
1 “A New Force in Chip Wars: South Korean Chip Exports Are Growing 35 percent a Year, and the U.S. and Japan Are 
Worried”, August 17, 1992, Los Angeles Times 
To conclude the case of the South Korean chip industry, the period of industrial upgrading was followed by a decrease of 
interest for this technology. In 2015, Samsung announced that it cut investments for chips (Korea Times, 2015) 
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literature (Choung et al., 2014). Also, the concept of catch-up is not simple. The term refers to the 
path during which a country or a firm builds skills at a more rapid pace than leading countries or firms 
and therefore narrow the gap with them. It might also refer to the situation of a country reaching 
technological leadership status i.e. a successful catch-up. A focus on the first dimension, the 
development of capabilities during the historical catch-up process, does not answer questions linked 
to the second dimension, the conditions of transitioning towards a “leadership position.”  
In addition, catch-up is a historical process that occurs over a limited period of time and is 
embedded within the broader process of technical change. Few elements exist on these questions. 
How long does the period last during which countries catch-up? How does it end? The first question 
– how long it lasts – has not been studied despite the concrete implications it has for policy makers, 
with some rare exceptions (Bell, 2006). Estimates on the basis of existing case studies in Brazil, 
Malaysia and in Asia suggest that it takes at least – when the process is successful - twenty years to 
be able to manufacture world class products, with considerable variations, and it can last a much 
longer time (Bell and Figueiredo, 2012).  
2.2. Questioning the end of technological catch-up 
Regarding the second question, how does catch-up end? From a theoretical perspective, the 
technological catch-up process ends, when developing countries reach the “technology frontier.” As 
a theoretical concept, the technology frontier refers to the latest technology available in the world.  
Empirically, technological catch-up is successful and thus ends, when a country takes global 
leadership.1 This success might encompass several dimensions. The technological frontier is indicated 
by products considered as the most technologically advanced available. A complementary approach 
is to focus on particular processes and to consider the most advanced firms in performing a 
technological process; this notion is somehow similar to manufacturing at the technological frontier 
(Figueiredo, 2014). Those dimensions are intertwined but not equivalent. A firm that produces the 
‘best’ product does not need to be leader in mastering all technological processes necessary for its 
development and production or even being the most advanced in terms of technology.  
Evidence would predict the need for a transition at the end of technological catch-up. There 
are many precedents of formerly catching up countries now contributing to push the technological 
frontier by proposing new innovations to the world . The technological supremacy has varied since 
the industrial revolution, with the successive leadership of England, Germany, and the United States. 
There are also historical cases of countries reaching technological leadership status and then declining 
such as Netherlands (Davids, 2008). Recent examples of successful catch-up include the economic 
                                                 
1 This by no mean suggests that all catching up trajectories are successful. Some fall behind. Another risk is to fall in the 
“middle income trap”, a risk for countries including China (Lewin et al., 2016) 
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development Japan in the post-war period (Morris-Suzuki, 1994), or more recently South Korea 
(Mahlich and Pascha, 2007).1  
We have limited tools to analyse this period. While there are many studies on the topic on 
innovation in developing countries, few specifically integrate the possibility of transition in the catch-
up framework. Some exceptions exist, mostly on South Korea (Choung et al., 2011a, 2014; Whang 
and Hobday, 2011), but also Brazil (Figueiredo, 2014) or Iran (Kiamehr et al., 2015).  
Also, one should emphasize that reaching the technological frontier is different from being 
able to manufacture at the technology frontier. Following the distinction between innovation and 
production capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 1993), firms can approach the technological frontier on these 
two levels (Figueiredo, 2014). The first path is to adopt and improve existing technologies in a way 
to produce world-class products, thus relying on incremental innovations: this includes manufacturing 
at the technology frontier and strategies based on incremental innovations. Industrial upgrading refers 
to the development of world-class manufacturing capacities and or catch-up in production 
capabilities.2 Gereffi, for example, showed how both Mexico and China managed a shift in the 
technology content of the export from primary and resource-based products towards high tech 
technology (Gereffi, 2008). However, such industrial upgrading does not automatically position them 
in a leadership position: a firm can produce world class products without advanced innovative 
capabilities (Bell and Figueiredo, 2012).  
To push the technology frontier forward requires making new technological propositions, even 
though the separation between the production and technological side is somehow more conceptual 
than real (Arvanitis et al., 2014). This refers to the capability by firms to propose radically new 
products, which, and this is the second dimension, can create new markets. Those new markets differ 
from the ones emphasized by research on frugal innovation (Radjou et al., 2012). Christensen and 
Raynor distinguish between low-end market disruptions and new market disruptions (Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003). Low-end disruptions benefit from low-cost business models to reach the least 
attractive customers – this is the idea behind frugal innovation. These, however, do not create new 
markets. This means that the innovation transition is characterized by the creation of new “high-end” 
markets.  
                                                 
1 In 2013, South Korea ranks 30th in terms of GDP per capita (ppp), and 14th in nominal GDP. China was at the time the 
second world economy, but it is 84th regarding its GDP per capita. As a matter of comparison, the first research studies 
on South Korea's transition date back from the beginning of the 2000s. We cannot resist to quote Kim Linsu in its 1997 
book: “… total South Korean R&D is merely about equal to that of a leading company in advanced economies. General 
Motors and Siemens alone spend as much for R&D as all of South Korea does. […] As a result, South Korea is squeezed 
between the advanced countries that have far stronger technological bases than it does and second-tier developing 
countries that are rapidly catching up with it. South Korea is indeed at a turning point of its modern history. What should 
the country do to sustain its growth?” (Kim, 1997, p234-235) 
2 Industrial upgrading refers to a general progress of existing firms in their product lines. It is the “process by which 
economic actors – nations, firms, and workers – move from low-value to relatively high value activities in global 
production networks” (Gereffi, 2015) 
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2.3. Characteristics of innovation during the last phase of technological catch-up 
Before addressing the issue of transition, we need to review the role of innovation in 
developing countries. Recent work has highlighted that it was wrong to consider that there was no 
innovation during the catch-up phase. Instead, innovation is of a very different nature, and not based 
on advanced technological knowledge. This section reviews their characteristics to better qualify the 
changes that take place during the transition phase. 
Three research streams are useful to characterizing innovation in developing countries: catch-
up studies, innovation studies in developed countries, and innovation management studies on 
emerging countries. Innovation management studies in emerging countries offer insights on strategies 
of firms and explain how they innovate (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; Zeng and Williamson, 2007). 
The two other perspectives – catch-up and innovation studies --, account for technological change but 
are somehow disconnected with each other as the innovations they study differ. The catch-up 
literature builds on the assumption that developing countries are followers, and, therefore, pays 
greater attention to dynamics of technological learning, understood as the absorption of already-
existing techniques, than to innovation (Viotti, 2002). Conversely, innovation studies based on the 
Schumpeterian idea of innovation driving economic development primarily focused on developed 
economies (ibid). 
This remains true despite an increase in the number of research on “innovation in developing 
countries.” A considerable proportion of them focuses not so much on new-to-the-world innovations, 
as on new-to-the-firm innovations which enter in the general framework of technological learning 
(technological improvement). It is easy to understand why. For a long period, it made no sense to 
focus on new-to-the-world innovations by developing countries. Moreover, considering new-to-the-
firm innovations is common. For instance, the Oslo Manual integrates new-to-the-firm innovations 
in its scope (OECD, 2005). This is also common when studies focus on firms’ internal processes (Bell 
and Figueiredo, 2012; Dutrenit, 2000), partly because it is arguable that learning processes do not 
substantially differ regarding whether firms innovate to the world or to the firm (Rosenberg, 1972).  
The reasons why this definition has been prevalent in most studies on developing countries 
are summarized by Richard Nelson: “For countries aiming to catch-up, the basic challenge is to learn 
to master new ways of doing things. … The innovation involved in catch-up is not what economists 
studying technological advance in countries at the frontier tend to mean by the term. The innovation 
in catching up involves bringing in and learning to master ways of doing things that may have been 
used for some time in the advanced economies of the world, even though they are new to the country 
or region catching up” (Nelson, 2008). Alternatively, “innovation in developing countries should not 
be defined just in terms of shifting global frontier technology but in terms of what is new to the 
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country” (Dahlman, 2010).  
We find the same distinction in the context of our discussion; innovation transition can be 
understood both under a national perspective and under the firm’s perspective. For instance, Gabriela 
Dutrénit has developed a comprehensive firm-level framework of the innovation transition 
accounting for both technological and organizational dimensions based on the study of the Mexican 
glass producer Vitro. She, however, does not focus on new-to the-world innovations but on new-to-
the-firms innovations (Dutrenit, 2000).  
Such a perspective, useful as it might be for understanding firms and national dynamics during 
technological catch-up, is not adapted to look at dynamics of countries advanced in terms of 
technological learning. Instead, for our purpose, we need to adopt another perspective on innovation 
and consider it in terms of “shifting global frontier technology,” to re-use Dahlman’s expression 
(Dahlman, 2010). This implies that we focus on new-to-the-world innovations, innovations that 
include technological products, production processes, and delivery processes (OECD, 2005).  
For this reason, in this dissertation, we focus on new-to-the-world innovations only, on what 
we refer to with the notion of global innovation. Developing countries participate in global innovation 
even during technological catch-up. The possibility of firms to make technological improvements 
characterize the last stage of the catch-up process (Kim, 1997). However, there is not a strict 
separation between technological improvements on one side and innovation in the other; most of the 
time, technological change is “a bit-by-bit, cumulative process” (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  
For a while, the consensus was that firms from developing countries did not innovate. It is 
only very recently that research, empirically grounded, led to temper this view and to show that the 
division between advanced and developing countries in terms of innovations was not definitive.1 The 
emergence of firms led to question their strategies (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009), and, in particular, 
their specific competitive advantage regarding innovations (Batra et al., 2012; Williamson et al., 
2013).  
These advantages include generic advantages, like the access to low-cost talents at all skills 
level and/or the access to local markets. Other advantages might be specific to the institutions of a 
                                                 
1 A first step was to recognize the role of emerging markets as “innovation users.” The popularized model of frugal or 
jugaad innovation refers to “good-enough” affordable products, often developed by multinational subsidiaries, and 
adapted to local markets (Radjou et al., 2012; Zeschky et al., 2011). In addition, these products could be used by firms in 
other advanced economies: the notion of reverse innovation comes from the fact that products developed first for 
developing countries had been adopted by developed markets (Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 2011; Immelt et al., 2009). 
In 2009, in an influential paper published in Harvard Business Review, Jeffery R. Immelt, CEO of General Electrics since 
2000, Vijay Govindarajam and Chris Timble qualified as “extraordinary” the fact that $1,000 handheld electrocardiogram 
devices and ultrasound machines had been developed for India and China before being sold in the United States (Immelt 
et al., 2009).  
The idea of “global reverse innovation” has rapidly expanded until recognizing the contribution of firms in developing 
countries at different phases of product development, not only as a result of market opportunities but during the different 
phases of market ideation, product development, and market introduction (von Zedtwitz et al., 2015).  
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nation: access to state assets and intellectual property, as well as management autonomy in the 
Chinese case (Zeng and Williamson, 2007). 
Firms in developing nations have to use their resources to develop new products and follow 
“cost innovation” models which do not require a strong technological base (Batra et al., 2012; Zeng 
and Williamson, 2007). They can do that by innovating on non-technologically related product 
features such as design (Forbes and Wield, 2000, 2006) and on inventing other ways of organizing 
R&D (Williamson and Yin, 2014). An alternative approach is to use architectural innovation (Zeng 
and Williamson, 2007) i.e. the reconfiguration of existing technologies into a new assemblage to form 
a new product (Henderson and Clark, 1990). An example is a high-performance line of washing 
machines by the Chinese firm Haier, based in Qingdao. This product line results from the integration 
of features of existing washing machines in Asia, Europe, and North America. These three nations 
had followed different paths with differences such as water consumption, electronic sensors, etc. In 
order to compensate for its technological lag, Haier made a machine that combined a single engine 
for two separate washing actions, respectively coming from the European and American models and 
electronics based on Japanese models. It resulted in a product that gained the gold medal at the 
International Invention Expo in 2004 (Zeng and Williamson, 2007). The use or the reconfiguration of 
existing components is far from being specific to developing countries but is often behind emblematic 
success-stories from developing countries such as the low-cost car TATA (Ray and Kanta Ray, 2011). 
When looking at these strategies, we can reach the following conclusions. Firms, in particular 
in identified countries like India or China innovate. However, in this innovation process, firms still 
often use as a competitive advantage their “latecomer” status (Mathews, 2002), even though the 
modalities may differ. Second, firms behind the technology frontier do innovate, through incremental 
and architectural innovations on already existing technologies. This implies, however, that they do 
not use technology as a source of innovations. The central issue in the innovation transition is 
therefore not about innovation itself, but about the capacity of using technology as a source of 
innovation. 
2.4. The state of the specific literature on the innovation transition 
The idea of a transition to innovation leadership at the end of the catch-up is recognized under 
concepts such as “innovation transition” (Altenburg et al., 2008; Choung et al., 2014; Hobday et al., 
2004; Whang and Hobday, 2011) or “post-catch-up phase” , the latter mostly used by South Korean 
researchers who adopt this prism to study South Korea (Choung et al., 2014; Hwang and Choung, 
2013).1 
                                                 
1 This expression “post catch-up” is ambiguous, as it is not clear whether it refers to the period of the transition itself or 
to the period posterior to it. 
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3.2. Firms: from latecomers to technological leaders 
3.2.1. A trend driven by domestic firms 
A first approach, that is adopted also in this dissertation, is the participation of firms in the 
transition. Until now, we indifferently included foreign and domestic firms under the scope of firms. 
Domestic firms are, however, central actors. Studies show the prominent role of domestic firms in the 
innovation transition in South Korea, notably the largest ones, Samsung, LG and Hyundai (Hobday 
et al., 2004; Kim, 1997). The studies are based on the South Korean case, though. The importance of 
large domestic firms – chaebols - is explained by South Korea’s industrial structure and model of 
development. Studies also show that foreign firms played a minor role. In the 1960s, South Korea 
was not particularly attractive for foreign firms to set up, and its development was based on the 
technological upgrading of domestic firms for domestic and export markets, supported by a 
developmental state (OECD, 2009). This also influenced their learning modes. South Korean personal 
computer firms started with assembly thanks to reverse engineering in the late 1970s because foreign 
firms were not interested in the South Korean market. Domestic firms had to use technology licenses 
when they were not able to develop the next generation of personal computers (Lee and Lim, 2001).  
But what happens to countries that follow alternative pathways? The role of foreign firms and 
foreign direct investment during catch-up is likely to have an impact on their role at the end of the 
catch-up period. China opened the country to foreign investment in 1978, with an acceleration since 
1992, notably from other East-Asian economies and in favor of manufacturing industries (Naughton, 
2007, p. 401). It was, therefore, a major channel of financing growth, by contrast with South Korea 
that rather emphasized economic independence and relied on long-term loans to finance industrial 
developments (OECD, 2009, p. 58). The country size is also important. China faced a very different 
situation than South Korea, as international companies were willing to enter the Chinese market when 
it opened, leading to massive diffusion of “market for technology” arrangements.  
 
Such variation among national trajectories suggests that the respective contributions of foreign 
and domestic firms during the transitional phase to leadership is likely to be a more complex topic in 
countries like China than it was in South Korea. This requires briefly considering the case of foreign 
firms. While economic growth during catch-up can be partly driven by foreign firms, the innovation 
transition requires the development of innovation capabilities by domestic firms. This is encapsulated 
in the notion of “indigenous innovation”, notably in the Chinese context (Tang, 2010). The concept 
emphasizes the prevalent role of domestic firms.  
The respective role of foreign technology and indigenous innovation in catch-up has been 
studied (Fu et al., 2011). Foreign firms have their own interests that are not necessarily aligned with 
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that of the host country. For instance, foreign equity is associated with lesser investment in R&D in 
India, even though it has a positive impact for firms created after 1985 (Sasidharan et al., 2015). In 
addition, when they do invest in R&D, innovation outcomes differ. When multinationals set up R&D 
in developing countries, most of the added value does not benefit local firms: Successful 
commercialization based on basic research benefits the country of origin of the firms that do it, 
because the gross profit is mostly used there (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2015).  
Foreign-invested firms or subsidiaries of multinationals sometimes are considered as 
latecomers. The underlying reason is that they follow technological catch-up strategies and are also 
engaged in technological process, with learning processes that are partly similar to that of domestic 
firms (Bell and Figueiredo, 2012; Forbes and Wield, 2000). For instance, Hewlett-Packard’s 
subsidiary in Singapore has started in the 1970s by stringing computer core memories, then moving 
from component manufacture to product manufacture (1973), setting up R&D operations (1983) that 
made possible process improvements (or process innovation), product development and design 
innovations starting from the end of the nineties (Forbes and Wield, 2000). However, these firms are 
integrated into the multinational firm’s network and do not share with latecomers two particular 
challenges: access to resources and market (Mike Hobday, 1995).  
The presence of foreign firms also impacts the level of knowledge and scientific capabilities 
of their host countries through spillovers effects such as reverse engineering, skilled labour turnovers, 
demonstration effects, and supplier–customer relationships (Cheung and Lin, 2004). The impacts 
have been shown to be mostly positive during catch-up. During technological catch-up, domestic 
firms have weak capabilities, and the strategies they implement are largely defined through the 
relationship they maintain with frontier firms, generally foreign (Xiao et al., 2013). As the gap closes, 
the situation changes. Local R&D in firms becomes more important in countries that succeed in the 
initial stages of catch-up (Kim and Nelson, 2000, p. 81). The nature of the impact of the presence of 
foreign firms on R&D performance of domestic firms is not as direct on the technological 
performance of domestic firms. Domestic firms only benefit from R&D spillovers if they have in-
house research and sufficient absorptive capacity (Fu 2008). 
3.2.2. Strategic options for firms that approach the technological frontier 
We focus on the role of domestic firms.1 At a country level, the national innovation transition 
is characterized by the fact that latecomers engage in the transition to leadership (see studies in table 
2-2). The literature explores the strategy of latecomers during catch-up (Mathews, 2002), but also 
when they approach the technology frontier (Hobday et al., 2004; Kiamehr et al., 2015; Xiao et al., 
                                                 
1 Of course, the frontier is not always very clear between foreign and domestic firms, as illustrates the case, among others, 
of international joint-ventures. 
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2013). These latecomers present specific features: they are neither “late entrants” (or new entrants) 
from an advanced economy nor “start-ups’ (Mathews, 2002). In contrast with new entrants from 
advanced economies, latecomers are mostly concerned with overcoming their “resource deficiencies” 
in technology and market access (Mike Hobday, 1995) by targeting resources from foreign firms that 
are the least rare, most transferable, and most imitable resources (Mathews, 2002).  
In other words, they want to escape from their condition of “latecomers” (ibid). However, as 
Kiamehr notes, at first, latecomers are not concerned with the technology frontier (and in some 
particular cases nor with overseas markets). For instance, “the senior management team of Mapna 
[an Iranian firm, in the thermal energy generation industry] did not initially intend to enter overseas 
markets or compete at the technology frontier with the most advanced firms. Instead, they had the 
limited ambition of replacing high-cost foreign imports of electricity plants by providing low-cost 
project management services, and sourcing complex capital goods and sophisticated engineering 
services from abroad.” (Kiamehr et al., 2015).  
As they go closer to the technology frontier, firms have broader strategic options. During 
catch-up, the range of strategies is narrow (Mathews, 2002), and is limited to dependent or imitative 
strategies (Xiao et al., 2013). Dependent strategies are based on technological dependence: latecomers 
initially focus on getting production capability through licenses or joint venture deals with the leading 
firms. Firms that adopt imitative strategies remain dependent on technological technologies, but they 
do not pay for it, and the learning process includes more unbundle and reverse engineering (Xiao et 
al., 2013). Additionally, Freeman proposes a third additional strategy, which is a defensive technology 
strategy: “in which the firm develops its own more-or-less innovative technology, not really novel but 
distinct enough to give Independent IP, and thus breaks through a ‘patent blockade’” (Freeman and 
Soete, 1997).  
As they approach the technology frontier, the range of strategic options broadens (Choung et 
al., 2014; Hobday et al., 2004; Xiao et al., 2013), leading to a new situation. For the Korean case, 
Hobday formulates it in these terms:  
As leading South Korean firms approached the innovation frontier and began to compete on 
the basis of new products supported by in-house research and development (R&D) they appear to be 
confronting a new and difficult strategic dilemma. Should they continue with their tried and tested 
formula of low cost ‘catch-up competitiveness’ relying on the global leaders to generate new products 
and new markets? Or should they try and compete as leaders on the international stage by deploying 
in-house R&D to develop their own leading edge products and systems? (Hobday et al., 2004). 
3.2.3. From the innovation dilemma to a diversification of technological strategies 
Indeed, if they adopt a technological leadership strategy, firms enter in competition with firms 
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from advanced economies that benefit from market and technological knowledge. The latter “hold a 
deep knowledge of the industry and have a sharper sense of the dynamics of technologies and the 
changing nature of markets (Kiamehr et al., 2015). Firms from developing countries, in addition to 
the lack of capabilities and smaller knowledge base, also suffer from their reputation. The last point 
is particularly important in industries that produce complex product systems such as aircraft, high-
speed trains or capital goods when firms have no “track record” that would help them win new 
contracts (Kiamehr et al., 2015).  
In response to these difficulties, scholars have proposed “design innovation” as a strategic 
alternative (Forbes and Wield, 2000, 2002). Firms that approach the technological frontier should 
focus on innovating on design features. Firms might benefit from putting their R&D efforts on 
following the technological frontier rather than aiming at going beyond it. However, design-based 
strategies, which are part of the “cost innovation” strategies, are still characteristics of the last stage 
of technological catch-up While empirically relevant, this approach is prescriptive and does not tackle 
the “innovation dilemma” between the cost of engaging in technological leadership and the erosion 
of latecomers’ competitive advantage (Hobday et al., 2004). 
The innovation dilemma is solved by the adoption of hybrid strategies by latecomers. The 
analysis of corporate strategies of South Korean firms shows that the proximity to the technology 
frontier is associated with a growing diversity and mixing of technological strategies (Hobday et al., 
2004) and a greater diversity in the nature of developed products (Choung et al., 2014). This 
corresponds to the idea that the relevant unit of analysis for technology product development within 
a large firm is not the firm anymore, but the division (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). In advanced 
economies, incremental innovations represent most innovative activities (Rosenberg, 1990). For 
instance, Bell and Figueiredo notice that “nearly two-thirds of Canadian firms had engaged only in 
the kinds of incremental innovative activity that have commonly been considered the reverse of firms 
in developing countries” (Bell and Figueiredo, 2012). Strategies are not mutually exclusive, and large 
firms can simultaneously combine offensive or frontier technologies with “followership” strategies 
(Hobday et al., 2004). Making new technological propositions is associated with a diversification of 
firms’ market propositions. The innovation transition requires a diversification of the nature of 
innovative activities by firms. The phase is associated with innovative activities of all types, and with 
the capacity of firms to engage in mature and immature technological markets (Choung et al., 2014), 
as well as to innovate through the creation of new “artefact” and knowledge than through architectural 
innovation (Hwang and Choung, 2013).  
 
The modality of technological leadership depends on the nature and maturity of the industries. 
Firms follow different transition paths regarding the degree of maturity of their industry (Choung et 
34 
al., 2014). A technology deepening pattern “occurs when latecomer firms enter the market at the 
product’s mature stage and advance all the way to introduce frontier products” (Choung et al., 2014). 
The second architectural innovation pattern “occurs when latecomers enter the product lifecycle 
immediately after the dominant design for a system is established.” Finally, a third path is available 
to firms, the radical innovation pattern, when “latecomers possess original technology and enter the 
life cycle at the fluid phase.” In their typology, the first two paths are two different types of 
incremental innovations that operate on markets more or less mature. During the transition, “the entry 
timing from the mature stage to the fluid stage becomes diverse” (Choung et al., 2014). This typology 
can be put in perspective with the nature of the technology used. Firms can follow different catch-up 
patterns (path-skipping, path-following, path-creating) depending on the degree of tacitness of the 
knowledge in the industry: the more knowledge is tacit, the more it is difficult to assimilate external 
knowledge, and thus to internalize existing technology for catch-up (Lee and Lim, 2001).  
3.3. Innovation system: From active “technological learning” to “innovation” 
3.3.1. The evolution of the institutional environment 
Innovation requires a different institutional environment than technological learning (Viotti, 
2002) and technological catch-up (Choung et al., 2014; Hwang and Choung, 2013). On the one hand, 
this transformation can be interpreted as a functional change of the innovation system: Innovation 
transition requires the reorientation of institutions from a ‘learning’ strategy aiming to master 
technology and absorb it into production, to a system that supports the development and 
commercialization of new products (Viotti, 2002). Indeed, the difference between national innovation 
systems led Viotti to develop the notion of “national learning system” (Viotti, 1997, 2002). He 
identifies three states of national systems of technical change: a national passive learning system 
(absorption of production capacity), a national active learning system (technology absorption) and a 
national innovation system (Viotti, 1997, 2002). National learning systems are in place during the 
catch-up period, and developing countries face a transition from a passive to an active learning 
system, a transition that not all countries achieve: Brazil failed while South Korea achieved it at the 
time.1 Shifting from a national active learning system to a national innovation system requires a 
second transition at the country level (which of course implies that the country was successful in the 
first transition).  
                                                 
1 Viotti’s article was published in 2002, based on his doctoral dissertation. The author used indicators in four categories: 
national patterns of education and training of the labour force; national patterns of technology acquisition (imports, 
license); national patterns of commitment to resources to technological learning (R&D), and indicators on the outcome 
of the national technological effort (patents, diffusion of robots, etc). This transition towards incremental innovation is a 
condition for being a candidate for innovation, as it is unlikely to develop and commercialize new products without being 
able to improve existing ones.  
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On the other hand, elements that compose the national innovation systems become not 
adapted: for instance, South Korea’s dirigist state and chaebols that allowed a rapid technological 
learning have become generator of rigidity, and associated with the lack of small technological firms 
(Kim, 2000) which requires a reconfiguration of the components of the innovation system, and the 
redefinition of national innovation policies (Hwang and Choung, 2013).The transition does not 
consist only in the improvement of existing institutions, but also in a redefinition of their functions. 
Hwang and Choung, have compiled several elements (Table 2-2) on the redefinition of innovation 
policies in South Korea (Hwang and Choung, 2013). A element they emphasize the changing nature 
of key innovation actors: they observe a shift from a catch-up based economy driven by a few large 
firms, towards a more diversified economic structure, which requires changes in the nature of 
interactions of these firms with other firms (ibid).  
Hwang and Choung's study illustrates that South Korea’s transition has been shaped by the 
specificity of the South Korean situation, the centralization of actors and the developmental state. It 
shows that the reconfiguration of the South Korean innovation system cannot be understood without 
reference to the modality of its development, and illustrates the necessity to consider national 
specificities when looking at the modalities of transition in other national settings. 
 
Table 2-2: Catch-up and post catch-up innovation system: case of South Korea 
System Component Catch-up system Post catch-up system 
Key 
innovation 
agent and 
capabilities 
Main innovation agent Selected large corporations Diversified economic actors 
Innovation capabilities 
and characteristics 
Shortened learning time, 
productivity, manufacturing 
capability, incremental innovation 
Fundamental knowledge 
production, utility value, radical 
innovation 
 Relationship among 
corporations 
Vertical integration Horizontal integration among 
specialized corporations 
 Private firm- public 
research relationship 
Coordination by  
public research  
institutes in system development 
and  
linkage of large  
chaebol firms supply firms 
Creating ripple effect from basic 
knowledge production, technical 
commercialization focused on 
technology-intensive SMEs 
Institution 
arrangement 
and its 
principles of 
operation 
Goal of innovation 
policy 
Short-term achievement of 
economies of scale, 
R&D efficiency 
Diversity creation by converging 
technology and knowledge, R&D 
effectiveness 
Regulation method Discipline by development state 
selective support and targeting 
strategy 
Ecological regulations between 
network state-innovation actors, 
trust and consensus 
Adjustment mechanism Government-centric top-down 
planning and control 
Consensus with various 
stakeholders, bottom-up planning 
Interaction 
with 
external 
environment 
Market environment Subordinate partner of global 
production network by export 
Securing external openness based 
on global frontier firm – internal 
resources 
Knowledge 
environment 
Fast-follower by adopting existing 
technology, 
Entry in growth period of techno-
economic paradigm 
Global knowledge producer, 
Entry in introduction phase of 
techno-economic paradigm 
Source: Reproduced from Hwang and Choung (Hwang and Choung, 2013) 
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3.3.2. The role of institutions in the transition to leadership 
We shall briefly describe the elements that are part of a reconfiguration of the institutional 
environment. The first category of institutions ensures that the scientific and knowledge bases provide 
firms with competences and skills they need, notably through their human resources. The second 
category brings together institutions that are part of the general business environment, and that create 
incentives (or barriers) to innovate. This section is voluntarily brief. It is not intended to provide a 
systematic discussion on institutional changes during the innovation transition, which is not the core 
question of this dissertation, but it rather aims at introducing a framework easy to operationalize in 
order to discuss the relevance of the innovation transition in the case of China. 
i. The development of skills and competences in the country 
How to ensure that firms have access to the technological skills they need in order to develop 
new products? A major disadvantage of latecomers is their lack of access to scientific and 
technological knowledge centers (Mike Hobday, 1995). As a way to develop capabilities, and meet 
their specific needs, developing countries need to develop their own scientific capabilities, through 
universities and higher education institutions (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007). 
People is the major channel of innovation in a country. The role of human resources is 
primordial for firms that want to innovate at the technology frontier, as they need engineers, and 
researchers to join their R&D teams if they want to extend their knowledge (Lee and Allen, 1982). 
The national educational system plays a primary role in providing skilled personnel. This includes 
people trained in management, and in science and technology. South Korea built its innovation 
transition on national and individual investments in education (Kim, 1997).1 Another major resource 
for a nation is the diaspora and people trained in universities abroad. Returnees have been, in 
particular, determinant in China (Welch and Hao, 2013).  
ii. The general institutional environment 
Engaging in the development of world-class products requires a change of technological 
strategy. This choice is conditioned by internal factors (Nelson, 1994). Strategic options are also 
constrained by institutional factors, especially in weak institutional environments (Wright et al., 
2005).  
Some institutions have a considerable impact on the readiness of firms to engage in innovative 
strategies. A determinant institution is the system of intellectual property rights. Its impact on catch-
up has been analysed in several countries that include Israel, South Korea, and China, Brazil or 
                                                 
1 Linsu Kim proposes a cultural explanation, and links the success of South Korea with the emphasis put on education in 
the Confucian value system (Kim, 1997, p. 204) 
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Argentina (Odagiri et al., 2010). The intellectual property rights system is important for catch-up 
(Odagiri et al., 2010; Xiao et al., 2013), but it plays a contrasted role. It has a differentiated impact 
regarding the degree of economic and technological advancements of a country (Kim, 2004). When 
the degree of technological advancement is low, strong IP protection constrains latecomers by 
providing barriers to the access of foreign technology, and to the commercialization of protected 
technologies even though they have manufacturing capabilities to do so (Xiao et al., 2013). The 
intellectual property rights system obeys to a different system of incentives in an innovation-oriented 
economy. Even though there is a debate on its impact on industrial development (Maskus, 2000), an 
adequate system for the protection of intellectual property rights is recognized to provide incentives 
for firms to invest in research and development, by ensuring that they will get the rewards from 
research and technology commercialization. By contrast, a weak intellectual property system reduces 
the incentives to develop in-house R&D (Liegsalz, 2010).  
The innovation dilemma that firms face further calls for intellectual property protection. 
Therefore, as countries engage into the innovation transition, and firms into the transition to 
leadership strategies, a strong system of intellectual property rights appears to be necessary to protect 
new technologies developed by firms. 
The second institution is corporate governance. Corporate governance refers to “elements of 
legislation, regulation, self-regulatory arrangements, voluntary commitment, and business practices” 
that impact on the way firms are administered and managed (OECD, 2015). The relation between 
corporate governance and firm performance is a well-developed topic (Maher and Andersson, 2000), 
but the impacts of deficient corporate governance on innovation are a less common topic (Cai and 
Tylecote, 2008; Liu and Tylecote, 2009; Xiao et al., 2013). Poor corporate governance, independently 
from the level of technological capabilities, negatively impacts on the willingness of firms to engage 
in technological leadership strategies (Xiao et al., 2013). This is an issue as poor corporate governance 
tends to characterize developing countries (Oman et al., 2004). 
3.4. Conclusion 
To sum up, we have characterized the transitional phase with three elements. The first is the 
importance of domestic firms in the transition to technological leadership. They are not the only actors 
of the transition; foreign firms, especially in a country like China where they played a great role 
during the period of catch-up, have an important role to play in the transition. However, the transition 
to technological leadership by domestic firms is a major condition of innovation transition. This has 
led us to the second section. As they approach the technological frontier, these domestic firms, which 
are latecomers in technology, have a series of strategic options before them. The way to solve the 
innovation dilemma they face at that time is through a diversification of their strategies towards 
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strategies including technological leadership. Finally, this transition operates at the firm level and is 
also systemic. The capacity to engage in innovation needs a supportive environment, which includes 
formal and informal institutions such as the intellectual property right systems, and corporate 
governance.  
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At first, firms from developing countries only engage in mature industries and do not enter 
emerging industries prior to the establishment of a dominant design. Hence, they enter industries in 
the “reverse” sense (Lee et al., 1988). Conversely, the reverse technological life cycle model predicts 
that as companies catch-up in technological capabilities and reduce the existing gap between them 
and the technological frontier, they become increasingly able to generate innovations and enter into 
the market when technologies are still in a fluid phase, with no dominant design and many 
uncertainties still unsolved.  
4.2. Linking innovation transition and contemporary patterns of technical change 
Conditions of transition to leadership depend on contemporary technological patterns, which 
we have not considered yet. Technological waves have a differentiated impact on industrial 
structures.1 At each historical period, a set of technologies acts as “engine of growth,” which is 
conceptualized under the notion of general purpose technology (Bresnahan and Tratjenberg, 1995; 
Helpman, 1998). The term encompasses “generic” knowledge and technologies that form a common 
core of techniques used in apparently unrelated products, and are sources of innovations for firms. 
Each period has a dominant general purpose technology (Bresnahan and Tratjenberg, 1995).  
In order to put this in historical perspective, we mention the successive driving economic roles 
of steam during the “age of steam” (Von Tunzelmannick, 1978), electricity machinery in the cutting 
and shaping of metals (Rosenberg, 1963) computers, the internet.2 Recently, information and 
communication technologies drove the economic growth of the USA in the mid-nineties (Liao et al., 
2016). The degree of pervasiveness varies: electrification was, for instance, more pervasive than 
information technologies (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005), but a common feature is an industrial 
impact across industries.3 
Structurally, each technological wave has its own characteristic and modality of technology 
diffusion (Larédo et al., 2010). General purpose technologies are as diverse as new equipment, the 
Corliss steam engine in the late 19th century (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2001), new utility 
companies like electricity or a new sector producing mass intermediary goods: information 
technologies and semiconductors. Understanding how a general purpose technology has an impact 
on industries is crucial for public policies (Larédo et al., 2010), and managerial decisions (Shea et al., 
                                                 
1 Of course, the impact of technology goes beyond the scope of our dissertation, industries and firms, and provokes 
“changes that transform both household life and the ways in which firms conduct business” (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2005). 
2 There was an acceleration after the industrial revolution. However, we can follow Lisney and consider the following 
technologies as general purpose technologies (Lipsey et al., 2005): the term refers to techniques as diverse as the 
domestication of plants, for the 20th century the automobile airplane, mass production, computer, lean production, the 
Internet or biotechnology, and for the recent period, nanotechnology (Lipsey et al., 2005). 
3 The categorisation of electricity as general purpose technology is questioned by the fact that they do not display the 
same patenting features (Moser and Nicholas, 2004). 
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2011). 
In each case, technology does not generate innovations according to the same channels. 
Sources of innovation vary, because the modalities of technological diffusion depend on the 
technology under considerations. Patterns of innovative activities vary with the nature of technologies 
(Pavitt, 1990). This is determined by a series of attributes, which is contained in the notion of 
technological regimes (Breschi et al., 2000; Winter, 1984). This means that technological leadership 
requires the mastering of skills linked to the dominant general purpose technology, and cannot be 
dissociated from the technological regime during the period.  
4.3. Impact of general purpose technology across a broad range of industries  
A second implication of the pervasiveness of a general technology is that it has an impact on 
all industries, and not only on those that drove technological catch-up. Innovation is a systematic and 
collective process (Lundvall, 2010). A systemic approach suggests that the innovation transition 
engages a larger diversity of actors. In that regard, we previously mentioned that the transitional phase 
was associated with a diversification of actors in South Korea (Hwang and Choung, 2013).  
This diversification can be also questioned at the industry level. The driving role of a few 
industries in technological catch-up, notably in Asia, is reflected in the focus of studies on mass-
production, export industries: automobile industry (Kim, 1997; Kumaraswamy et al., 2012; Zhao, 
2006) or China (Zhao, 2006), in electronics (Zhao, 2006), semiconductor (Chao Chen and Toyama, 
2006; Hwang and Choung, 2014), etc. In addition, two other types of industries form the industrial 
structure: “complex product system” industries, and resource-based industries. Complex product 
system industries are industries “where a small number of leading suppliers compete for a 
comparatively low volume global market … where complex capital goods are often customized to 
each client’s needs and are often delivered through projects, where design of a new complex system, 
such as a gas turbine requires inputs from several advanced technological fields…” (Kiamehr et al., 
2015). Examples include high-speed train, aircraft manufacturing, etc. Kiamehr identifies different 
stages of development in these industries (i) overcoming market entry barriers and building project 
capabilities; (ii) building manufacturing capabilities; and (iii) generation of engineering and design 
capabilities for market expansion. And possibly (iv) transition to leadership (Kiamehr et al., 2015). 
The nature of linkages with foreign and domestic firms and clients and how they leverage them differ 
from other industries: firms leverage the linkages they build with domestic firms to learn and, in the 
second time, contract with foreign clients. Besides and complex product system, and mass-production 
industries, resource-based industries also follow alternative catch-up patterns. This is the case of 
industries with continuous manufacturing processes such as resource processing because the catch-
up process is marked by discontinuous ruptures linked the replacement of machineries (Figueiredo, 
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2010). An example is the catch-up in the pulp and paper industry in Brazil (Figueiredo, 2014).  
 
These first sections on general purpose technologies and innovation transition aimed to 
emphasize two elements. The first one is that the transition to leadership by firms is contextual, and 
depends on the dominant technological trends. The second one is that general purpose technology has 
a pervasive impact on the industrial structure of countries, which might cover a more or less broad 
scope of industries. 
4.4. Current driving forces: knowledge-based technologies such as nanotechnology 
If we go back to our guiding question, the transition of China at the beginning of the 21st 
century requires paying attention to contemporary dynamics and to the current candidates to general 
purpose technologies.  
Which technology is likely to have a large impact on economic growth? In no previous time 
in the history were so many theories and frameworks available to analyze emerging technologies, 
anticipate their societal and economic impacts, and try to answer that question. Candidates include 
business visualization, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, interactive internet, etc. Emerging 
technologies are, by definition, characterized by their uncertainty (Rotolo et al., 2015). Uncertainties 
encompass a continuum of situations with go from total unpredictability to uncertainty within a 
delimited range of options (Courtney et al., 1997).  
It appears from this analytical framework that not all emerging technologies are totally 
unpredictable. Some of them have already been invested by a considerable number of actors. 
Nanotechnology, in particular, is expected to have an impact on industries. A majority of the world 
largest R&D players already did research in nano-related areas by 2008 (Larédo et al., 2010). 10 out 
of 13 manufacturing-related S&P industry sectors are involved in nanotechnology patenting, 
excluding service sectors, media retailing, and real estate (Shea et al., 2011). 1  
Born as a science-fiction concept (Modrea, 2014), and conceptualized before they became 
concrete (Drexler, 1987; Feynman, 1959), nanotechnology refers to the understanding and control of 
matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometres.2 The birth of nanotechnology is attributed to a 
speech of Richard P. Feynman, one of the most influential physicists of the twentieth century, which 
he delivered at the Annual meeting of the American Physical Society, and in which he predicted the 
emergence of a new whole field. Interestingly, Feynman, who was a researcher, emphasized the 
                                                 
1 Standard & Poor’s 
2 A nanometre is a unit of spatial measurement that is one billionth of a meter. Nanometre is “as small in relation to a 
metre as the diameter of a one cent piece in relation to the diameter of the Earth.” 
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“enormous number of technical applications” of nanotechnology. 12 
Nanotechnology became a reality in the eighties thanks to “inventions of a method of 
inventing” that drive technological waves (Darby and Zucker, 2003), in microscopy, and lithography 
(Bhushan, 2010). Two inventions are generally mentioned: the 1981’s Scanning Tunneling 
Microscope, and the Atomic Force Microscope in 1986 (Binnig et al., 1986), both inventions by IBM. 
In the absence of a consensus, 1986 can be considered as the starting date for nanotechnology.3 
(Zucker and Darby, 2005).  
 Even though the eventual scope of nanotechnology differs from Feynman’s vision, the 
importance of potential applications is still a crucial element of its definition. In 2010, 33 countries 
within ISO agreed on a definition for nanotechnology in ISO/TS 80004-1:2010, where nanotechnology is 
the “application of scientific knowledge to manipulate and control matter in the nanoscale in order to 
make use of size- and structure-dependent properties and phenomena, as distinct from those associated 
with individual atoms or molecules or with bulk materials”4. This is linked to nanotechnology’s 
specificities. The manipulation of the matter at the nanoscale allows the improvement or the 
modification of materials and structures, thus enhancing a vast range of products, such as “materials 
and manufacturing, nanoelectronics, medicine and healthcare, energy, biotechnology, information 
technology, and national security, leading some to mention nanotechnology” as the next “industrial 
revolution” (Bhushan, 2010). There is a considerable amount of studies on industrial applications in 
the textile industry (Noor-Evans et al., 2012), in medicine (Caruthers et al., 2007), etc.. A list of 
potential applications in industry is reproduced  below for illustrative purpose (table 2-4). 
Its characteristics led nanotechnology to be considered as the next general purpose technology 
(Graham and Iacopetta, 2009; Kreuchauff et al., 2014; Palmberg and Nikulainen, 2006; Shea, 2005; 
                                                 
1 “I would like to describe a field, in which little has been done, but in which an enormous amount can be done in 
principle. This field is not quite the same as the others in that it will not tell us much of fundamental physics (in the sense 
of, ``What are the strange particles?'') but it is more like solid-state physics in the sense that it might tell us much of great 
interest about the strange phenomena that occur in complex situations. Furthermore, a point that is most important is 
that it would have an enormous number of technical applications.What I want to talk about is the problem of manipulating 
and controlling things on a small scale.(Feynman, 1959) 
http://www.its.caltech.edu/~Feynman/plenty.html Accessed on 15/09/2016 
2 December 29, 1959 at the California Institute of Technology, “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”. 
3 There is a stronger consensus on the starting date of biotechnology, the year of the Cohen-Boyer invention of genetic 
engineering (recombinant DNA) in 1973. Or to take other general purpose technologies, the defining moment for 
electrification can be the startup of electrification the first hydro-electric facility at Niagara Falls in 1894. Another example 
is the arrival of IT with the invention of the key component of the personal computer, the 4004 micro-processor in 1971 
by Intel (Patel and Pavitt, 1991).  
4 Alternatively, Nanotechnology is defined as the “understanding and control of matter and processes at the nanoscale, 
typically, but not exclusively, below 100 nanometres in one or more dimensions, where the onset of size-dependent 
phenomena usually enables novel applications, by utilizing the properties of nanoscale materials that differ from the 
properties of individual atoms, molecules, and bulk matter to create improved materials, devices and systems that exploit 
these new properties” (ISO/TC 229 Nanotechnologies) 
 http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=381983. Accessed on 17/10/2016 
Or in the US national nanotechnology initiative, as“the understanding and control of matter at the scale of 
approximatively 1 to 100 nanometers where unique phenomena enable the design and production of materials, devices 
and systems which have novel applications.” (US National Nanotechnology Initiative) 
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developing research capacity in nanotechnology. 
This emphasis on research-based innovation or nanotechnology is part of a broader move, 
characterized by the increase of research activities as a modality of technology diffusion, and the 
generalization of science-based technologies. Science-based technologies are technologies that rely 
on the exploitation of scientific discovery and techniques by R&D labs (Mowery and Rosenberg, 
1989). Science has taken a major role in determining the competitiveness of firms across industries. 
It appears as a driver in the second half of the century, when “its main competitive advantage [of 
entrepreneurial activity] is … its ability to respond to international threats and opportunities 
emerging from changing tastes, technology, related prices, and competition. Essential features of this 
ability are capabilities in R&D and design, and the ability to couple them to developments in world 
markets” (Pavitt, 1979).  
To what extent is that a new phenomenon? The rise of research in industries is not new. Basic 
research was considered as the “pacemaker of industrial development” in the 1940s (Bush, 1945). 
However, in spite of appearances, Patel & Pavitt observe the persisting contribution of production-
related technologies, or mechanical technologies, as sources of innovations during the second half of 
the 20th century (Patel and Pavitt, 1994). Based on patent data, they estimate that around 40 percent 
of technical change was due to production-related technologies (ibid). They showed that the use of 
technological indicators such as R&D expenditures, and the fact that mechanical technologies are 
often secondary to the core “product” of a firm, led to underestimate production related technologies 
as identified by Mowery and Rosenberg, which include “non-electrical instruments, and machinery 
and components for cutting and shaping metal, specialised applications, treating fluids and gases, 
and heating”. (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Patel and Pavitt, 1994). This is in the continuity of 
dominant models in the previous century. Until the late 19th century, economic growth was driven by 
advances, mostly in mechanical technology, on the basis of “unassisted human observations” 
(Rosenberg, 1974). Newtonian science’s role in the British industrial revolution is not negligible 
(Bekar and Lipsey, 2002), but process improvements depended on skills that owed little to advances 
in science (Landes, 2003).  
As such, the breadth of the generalization of corporate research as a source of innovations, in 
which nanotechnology plays a major role, constitutes a new trend, which has implications on the 
mode of acquisition of capabilities in the new general purpose technology. 
5.2. Implications for latecomers from emerging countries 
The idea that nanotechnology can be used for catching up is not new and justifies financial 
and political support by emerging countries to its development (Huang and Wu, 2012). It also brought 
the attention of scholars on the opportunities linked to nanotechnology for development in emerging 
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countries, including China, India and Latin American countries Brazil and Mexico (Ramani, 2014).  
The opportunities created by emerging technology in general, and nanotechnology in 
particular, come from the possibility of technological leapfrog associated with them (Carlota Perez 
and Soete, 1988). Technological leapfrogging considers the opportunity to enter an industry at its 
infant stage when technologies are just emerging (Carlota Perez and Soete, 1988). Entering the 
process of technology development early in its cycle life lowers entry costs because the technology 
is new for everybody on the market (Carlota Perez and Soete, 1988). The idea of leapfrog comes from 
the observation that a country (or a firm) can directly position itself at the advanced level of 
technologies without going through intermediate stages (Sharif, 1989). Let us remind the reader that 
we consider technological leapfrog from a capability perspective. The alternative (and common) 
use of the term refers to technological leapfrogging in technology adoption: infrastructures, 
adoption by developing countries of the most recent generation of product generations, etc. A 
popular example includes the direct adoption of mobile telephony skipping the fixed-line 
technology of the 20th century (James, 2009; The Economist, 2008).  
In the perspective of this dissertation, technological leapfrog refers to the generation of 
products on the basis of advanced technology. Firms leapfrog with technological leaders by going 
directly to the next generation of technologies without going through the intermediate technological 
stage (Lee, 2016). At the firm level, it can follow different paths. Lee & Lim consider the case of 
the South Korean automobile company Hyundai. It developed a new electronic injection-based 
engine, rather than developing the standard carburetor based engine, dominant in the industry (Lee 
and Lim, 2001). This is an example of path-skipping “catching-up” type of leapfrog that can be 
distinguished from a more radical one, the creation of a new technological path (such as the mobile 
phones based on CDMA technology) (ibid). Technological leapfrogging is also understood at the 
product level: this encompasses mastering new generations of vehicles like electric vehicle (Howell 
et al., 2014). 
Nanotechnology provides with opportunities to leapfrog towards the next generation of “nano-
enhanced” products. However, latecomers need to prepare and develop capabilities in order to seize 
windows of opportunities (Niosi and Reid, 2007; Carlotta Perez and Soete, 1988). This requires 
investment in developing capabilities during the nascent period of the general purpose technology. 
Whatever the technology considered, the general purpose technology “does not deliver productivity 
gains immediately upon arrival” (David, 1991). For example, Paul David (1991) explains the surge 
in U.S. productivity during the 1920s as a delayed response to the introduction of the electric dynamo 
in the 1880s.  
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we need to focus on the acquisition of technological capabilities in technologies which have the 
potential to become general purpose technologies. In this chapter, we further argued for the relevance 
of focusing on nanotechnology as an indicator of this transition towards technological leadership. 
Nanotechnology appears as the major source of future industrial opportunities for firms in China 
because specific properties at the nanoscale enable improvements in materials, devices, and systems. 
The acquisition of competences in nanotechnology comes from the modalities of its diffusion across 
industries, and needs to be associated with the construction of a research capacity in nano-related 
areas by Chinese firms. 
We defended the importance of contextualizing the transition into contemporary dynamics. In 
the first section, we mentioned that national specificities condition the transition to technological 
leadership. The framework of the dissertation therefore needs to be repositioned within the Chinese 
context. We dedicate two chapters to that question. The next chapter, Chapter 3, briefly discusses the 
relevance of mobilizing the notion of transition in China; it also introduces the interest inherent in 
studying the Chinese case. Later in our dissertation, Chapter 5 pays attention to the specificities 
associated to large firms in China. 
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1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 49 
2. China’s innovation transition: A salient issue ............................................................... 49 
3. Mobilizing the innovation transition in the Chinese environment ................................ 52 
3.1. The role of China’s scientific and technological base ......................................... 53 
3.2. Are Chinese institutions supporting innovations? ............................................... 56 
4. Chinese firms and the technological frontier ................................................................ 58 
5. Conclusion: China’s specificities for the transition ...................................................... 60 
1. Introduction 
Our dissertation mobilizes the concept of innovation transition to question the contemporary 
role of Chinese firms in global innovation i.e. their participation to technological change and new-to-
the-world innovations. Addressing the latter question through the theoretical lens of “innovation 
transition” raises two related questions. First, why is the “innovation transition” concept relevant to 
understand the dynamics of Chinese firms? Second, is China a “good candidate” for “innovation 
transition”? There are three distinct aspects to be considered. This first aspect is whether China is 
sufficiently advanced in the process of technological catch-up for the mobilization of the innovation 
transition framework to be relevant. We deal with that aspect by introducing the level of advancement 
of China’s institutions. Also central to that question is the position of Chinese firms regarding 
innovation and technology. The second aspect relates to the interest of mobilizing the innovation 
transition framework in the Chinese context. We take some distance to question the specificity of 
China as a country of analysis.  
Finally, a contextual element justifies our choice. Our research question has become a topical 
issue. Innovation has become omnipresent in China’s official speeches and government policies. The 
idea of innovation transition is regularly mobilized (implicitly or not) and has an impact on innovation 
policies. It appears, therefore, necessary to dedicate a few paragraphs to this question. 
2. China’s innovation transition: A salient issue 
The innovation transition - not necessarily named this way by the actors who mobilize it - is 
of growing importance in China’s political agenda. In 2006, the Medium and Long Term plan for 
Science and Technology gives a clear indication of this trend and formulates China’s policy 
imperatives in the following terms:  
In our effort to build a well-to-do society, we are faced with both rare historic opportunities and 
grave challenges. The nation’s economic growth shows an excessive dependence on the 
consumption of energy and resources, with high associated environmental costs; the economic 
structure is irrational, characterized by a frail agricultural base and lagging high-tech industry 
and modern service industry; and firms lack core competitiveness and their economic returns are 
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yet to be improved as a result of weak indigenous innovation capability. There are a whole range 
of problems concerning employment, distribution, health care, and national security that need 
prompt solution … We must place the strengthening of innovative indigenous capability at the 
core of economic restructuring, growth model change, and national competitiveness 
enhancement. Building an innovation-oriented country is, therefore, a major strategic choice for 
China’s future development.  
Extract of the preface of the plan for Science and Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), 20061 
This extract of the preface of the plan for Science and Technology reflects China’s 
government’s awareness of the necessity of transitioning towards an innovation-oriented economy, 
and the technological dimension associated with it. Two themes are mobilized as responses to these 
challenges, namely, environmental issues as well as structural economic problems linked to social 
and strategic issues faced by the country.23 The first theme is the idea that China’s economic growth 
is no longer sustainable without a change from the current economic model to an innovation-oriented 
one. The theme, notably present in the previous years through the promotion of a Chinese national 
system of innovation since 1998, has become omnipresent since the 2008 global financial crisis 
destabilized the Chinese economy and exposed its weaknesses. A second theme is the role of 
technology in such a transition. As mentioned in the 2006 plan, “leading the future reflects a vision 
in deploying for frontier technologies and basic research, which will, in turn, create new market 
demands and new industries expected to lead the future economic growth and social development” 
(Preface MLP, 2006). This orientation was reinforced in 2010 by another specific policy document 
emphasizing seven Strategic Emerging Industries (energy efficient and environmental technologies, 
next-generation information technology, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new 
energy, new materials, and new-energy vehicles).4  
It is noteworthy to mention that the 2006 plan and the 2011 strategic emerging industries plan 
mark the victory of a “bureaucratic” or a “techno-industrial” approach of innovation policies (Chen 
and Naughton, 2011). Technologies to develop and to finance are selected and supported through a 
policy mix implemented to direct funds and subsidies towards selected projects or entities.5 Indeed, 
                                                 
1 Compiled by Sydney University 
2 See for example (Lisbonne-de-Vergeron, 2012) for a review of the weaknesses, and Wu Jinglian for a discussion of the 
impact of the financial crisis (Wu, 2013) 
3 Two other elements that are not in the scope of our topic shall be mentioned. A first one is the contribution of domestic 
demand. The second element is the importance given to the environment and to green economy. 
4 “the Decision on Accelerating the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries” October 2010, State Council 
5 An alternative channel for government intervention is the use of “certifications” or labels, at either national or local 
levels. It might concern an entire organization or some of its entities (technological centers, research labs, etc.), generally 
under the label of key labs, high-tech enterprises, etc. Objectives include channelling subventions towards particular 
projects and organizations. In addition, certifications often give fiscal or related advantages. For instance, Hi-Tech or 
Technology Enterprises have preferential corporate income tax rate of 15 percent for three consecutive years. 
51 
the Chinese State considers that fostering innovation is part of its duty, which is associated with a 
bureaucratic model of innovation policies. It fixes quantitative goals, such as the goals fixed for the 
overall level of R&D. The 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) targeted an increase in state funding for 
research and development from 1.75 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 2.20 percent in 
2015, a goal that has been achieved as anticipated.  
More recently, another set of innovation policies has taken a more general approach to 
technology by focusing on industrial upgrading at the firm and industrial levels. The 10-year plan 
“Made in China 2025” is concerned with the industrial upgrading of all industries, including high-
tech and medium-tech industries and with an emphasis on equipment and machinery industries. 
Targeted industries include new advanced information technology, automated machine tools & 
robotics, aerospace and aeronautical equipment; maritime equipment and high-tech shipping, modern 
rail transport equipment, new-energy vehicles and equipment, power equipment, agricultural 
equipment, new materials and biopharma and advanced medical products (Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, May 19, 2015).  
These programs can be however considered as the broad framework of innovation programs. 
In parallel to these general plans, there are national innovation programs targeted at firms in specific 
industries. The “National Guidelines for Development and Promotion of the Integrated Circuit (IC) 
Industry (State Council of China” June 2014) set targets for industry revenues, production volume, 
and technological advances.1 In addition, it shall be noted the role of local governments in 
implementing national programs. Innovation policies tend to be quite centralized in comparison with 
other types of policies, but they are still implemented at the provincial level by local governments 
(The US-China Business Council, 2013). Local modalities of implementation also vary. For instance, 
the existence of financial supports, the nature of the subsidies (e.g. subsidizing applications or granted 
patents), and subsidized amounts vary considerably between places (Dang and Motohashi, 2015). 
Policymaking has contained a large experimental dimension ("touching stones to cross the river") 
(Nolan, 1994). 
Innovation is among the keywords of Chinese politics.2 In that regard, Chinese policy makers 
                                                 
1 The government’s investment set a five-year investment target of about $19 billion for integrated circuits, puts a greater 
focus on creating segment winners, or national champions, through mergers and acquisitions and other consolidating 
moves, and has a more market-based investment approach by giving local private-equity firms responsibility for allocating 
public funds. 
2 For illustrative purpose only, we reproduce here a part of the Communique of the 5th Plenary Session of the 18th CPC 
Central Committee in 2015: Meeting participants stated that to persist in innovative development, there is a need to place 
innovation in the core position of the overall situation of national development, constantly promote theoretical innovation, 
systematic innovation, sci-tech innovation, cultural innovation, and in other areas of innovation, and let innovation run 
through all the work of the party and the state, and enable innovation to become a trend in society. We need to place the 
basic point of development onto innovation, give shape to and promote the system and framework of innovation, and 
bring about more pioneering type development that relies on innovation and that gives play to advantages. 
 Communique of the 5th Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 2015, Oct 29th 
This (somehow extreme) example illustrates the importance of the mobilization of the theme of innovation. 
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were influenced by the notion of national innovation system (Lundvall, 2010), which was brought to 
them by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Tang, 2010). The reference to innovation is systematic 
since it was popularized under Hu Jintao – Wen Jiabao period (2002 – 2012), and innovation policies 
are part of a broader context of industrial and development policies. Governmental intervention for 
innovation, which has become part of industrial policies, is growing. The innovation and technology 
policy shifted in this direction in 2003 and has reached two new peaks with the already mentioned 
publication of the medium and long term plan in 2006, and the strategic emerging industries program 
in 2010 (Chen and Naughton, 2011).1  
3. Mobilizing the innovation transition in the Chinese environment 
In a 2015 report, the consulting firm McKinsey writes “China faces an innovation imperative. 
As two sources of growth—labour force expansion and heavy capital investment—fade, innovation 
(broadly defined) will need to contribute up to half of GDP growth by 2025, or $3 trillion to $5 trillion 
in value per year”.2 In the political world, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared in 2013: 
“China knows it will have to move quickly to exploit the Third Industrial Revolution, from 3D printing 
and digital design to nanotechnology, biotechnology and genetics, hence its one million research and 
development workers and its plans for 100 million more graduates”. 3 These two examples illustrate 
the emergence of a wider consensus that go beyond the emphasis given to innovation by China’s 
government: China needs to engage in the innovation transition to ensure social, economic (and 
political) stability.4 The transition towards an innovation-driven economic model is perceived as 
necessary to “save” the economic model. There remain many skeptics.  
Indeed, the innovation transition requires the country to be sufficiently advanced in the 
technological catch-up process, adapted institutions and the integration of innovation capabilities by 
domestic firms. In that regard, there are still a series of weaknesses. Recognizing that the transition 
is systemic, we nevertheless focus on two types of institutions determinant for innovation: higher-
education and research institutions, which constitute the scientific and technological knowledge base 
of the country, and general supporting institutions, which impact firms’ innovation strategies by 
creating or not incentives to innovate at the frontier.5  
                                                 
1 Industrial policies were characterized by alternating underlying models that include more or less government 
intervention: an emphasis on market force, a focus on economic planning and the importance of industrial policies – either 
national or cross-sectorial – closer to a neo-Keynesian approach of economic development (Heilmann and Shih, 2013).  
2 McKinsey (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015) 
3 Quoted by China Daily, 5 October 2013 
4 In that regard, the mobilization of economic success to legitimize political institutions in China shall be noted. The 
capacity of China Communist Party to promote economic development has legitimized its staying into power (Huchet, 
2006).  
5 We only briefly introduce the institutions. For a comprehensive review of China’s institutions linked to the innovation 
system, refer to the innovation policy review done by OECD in 2008 
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3.1. The role of China’s scientific and technological base1 
Three dimensions are central to China’s scientific and technological base. The first one is the 
training of qualified personnel. Higher-education figures reflect efforts made to increase the level of 
education in the country.2 They also reflect the transformation of the universities since 1978 and the 
efforts to catch-up with the disastrous state they were at the end of the Cultural Revolution, where 
formal academic and scientific had stopped (Simon & Rehn, 1988, p. 14). In 2014, 7 million of 
persons came out from Chinese universities, including Bachelors, Masters, and graduates from 
technical colleges.3 457 806 Master’s Degrees were awarded in 2013. The repartition between 
disciplines also shows the emphasis given to the training of engineers. In 2013, engineering degrees 
represented 34 percent of all Master’ Degrees (158 105 degrees), followed by Administration 
Master’s degrees (62 093 degrees, 14 percent of the total) and Medicine Master’s Degrees (50 322 
awarded degrees). The same year, high-education institutions delivered about 3000 master degrees in 
philosophy.  
The number of qualified people is difficult to estimate. For example, it is hard to determine 
how many Chinese engineers the country counts. By the mid-2000s, McKinsey estimated this number 
at 1,2 million persons, using national statistics as a source. This figure was questioned by two experts 
of China’s Science & Technology human resources. Based on a thorough analysis of sources, they 
considered the actual figure to be closer to 200 000 persons, which represents a considerable gap 
between the two figures (Simon and Cao, 2009). 
The employment situation reflects the difficulties of adjusting the demand and the supply. On 
the one hand, Chinese firms report lacking qualified people. Recruiting quality personnel is especially 
a major concern for large private firms (All-China Federation Of Industry & Commerce, 2014). The 
situation is expected to remain the same. It is estimated that in 2020, Chinese employers will need 
142 million more high-skilled workers (who went to the university or had vocational training), 24 
million more than the number of workers likely available (Chen et al., 2013). A particular issue is the 
lack of senior managers that are capable of supervising projects and transferring knowledge about 
technology aspect as well as management (Simon and Cao, 2009). Meanwhile, university graduates 
struggle to find job positions, and the unemployment rate is higher for educated personnel (Simon 
and Cao, 2009). This reflects the inability of university training to meet firms’ needs in terms of 
qualified personnel. It is notable that Korea met a similar problem of unemployment in the 1960s. 
This shortage of jobs appears early in the history of South Korea’s development. It was soon resorbed 
                                                 
1 A large part of our conclusions comes from the knowledgeable book on the topic: “China’s emerging technological edge: 
assessing the role of high-end talent” (Simon and Cao, 2009). 
2 We only briefly review this topic. For a more comprehensive introduction, see Simon & Cao, 2009 and OECD (2008) 
3 Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
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(Kim, 1997:64). Specialized personnel is also needed for their scientific and technological expertise 
in the context of the innovation transition. An indication of the level of advancement of China in that 
regard is the number of doctoral students and postgraduates. It has increased regularly reaching 53139 
Doctor’s Degrees awarded in 2013. The repartition among disciplines reflects the orientation of the 
Chinese education system towards science and engineering research at the doctoral level: about 70 
percent of the doctoral degrees are in engineering (18 331 doctoral degrees awarded in 2013), science 
(10 396 degrees in 2013), and medicine (8228 doctoral degrees).  
Besides scientists trained in China, a major role has been played by returnees trained abroad 
(Welch and Hao, 2013). Since the 1990s, the government has implemented measures to attract them, 
such as access to funding and better work conditions, while the country was renewing its 
attractiveness for graduates (Zweig, 2006). Returnees include both foreign-born Chinese as well as 
Chinese who went to study abroad and returned to work in China. They play a major role in Chinese 
innovation, and notably participated to the creation of start-ups in emerging fields nanotechnology 
(Cao et al., 2013, p. 57). To some extent, thee setup of R&D centers by multinationals (Bruche, 2009) 
has also contributed to training local personnel. By 2009, there were 1100 R&D centers established 
by 900 multinationals, among which more than the half employ more than 150 R&D personnel (Li 
and Cantwell, 2012). These dynamics have led to an increase in engineers and scientists. The should 
however be put in perspective with the size of the country. 
For instance, the number of researchers, “professionals engaged in the conception or creation 
of new knowledge, products, processes, methods and systems, as well as in the management of the 
projects concerned” (OECD) is now superior to 2 million people, which represents 1.9 researchers 
per 1000 employees. 2 million researchers is five times more than the number of researchers in South 
Korea. However, the proportion of researchers per employees is much lower than the proportion in 
South Korea (13 researchers per 1000 employees in South Korea) and in the United-States (9 
researchers per employees) in 2013.1 Current China’s proportion is also inferior to that of South Korea 
in the late 1990s (4.6 researchers per 1000 employees in 1998).  
 
Another element is the progress of China’s research system. Quantitative indicators show that 
China’s science and technology took off in the 2000s (Gao and Jefferson, 2007). National R&D 
expenditures indicate a significant increase in R&D.2 Investment in research and development by 
Chinese institutions, which include firms, government laboratories, and universities, has caught up 
with that of institutions from advanced economies. Since 2011, China is the second largest spender 
with $154 billion that year, and the share of expenditures devoted to research and development has 
                                                 
1 OECD Data. 2013 is the year of reference for South Korea, and 2012 for China. 
2 Source: Chinese Bureau of Statistics 
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reached European levels. Since 2014, China’s R&D intensity, the ratio of expenditure on R&D to 
GDP, with 2 percent that year, has become superior to that of the European Union (28 nations).1 This 
integrates the fact that the 28 EU nations have disparate economies. China is below leading European 
nations and is inferior to the average of the OCDE nations, whose performance is driven by South 
Korea (4.2 percent), Japan (3.5 percent) and the USA (2.8 percent). 
 
Another indication of China’ Science & Technology take-off is the increasing number of 
scientific publications. Scientometric studies show the emergence of China as a scientific power in 
the 2000s. China took the second place in numbers of scientific publications (Hvistendahl, 2013; 
Zhou and Leydesdorff, 2008), and has become one the most prolific countries in nanotechnology 
(Zhou and Leydesdorff, 2006). This reflects an increased contribution of Chinese institutions and 
individuals to global scientific production. The most prolific institutions are the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, and leading universities located in the eastern part of the country: Tsinghua University in 
Beijing, Zhejiang University, Peking University, Shanghai Jiaotong University, University of Science 
and Technology of China, Nanjing University, Fudan University, and Shandong University (Kostoff 
et al., 2006). Chinese scientists’ participation in international collaborations reflects the increase in 
the general scientific level and has contributed to an elevation of research quality by fostering 
exchanges. The increase in international collaborations does not follow the total increase in the 
number of scientific publications (Zhou and Glänzel, 2010). A momentum in the increase was reached 
in 2010, suggesting that all the researchers who have the scientific and language skills to engage in 
international collaborations have done so (Zhou, 2013) . 
The increase in China’s scientific productions does not go without problems. Indeed, many 
Chinese journals have low-impact factors. It shall also be noted the existence of a black market for 
publications, showed by the magazine Science. This market includes options as various as “paying 
for an author’s slot on a paper written by other scientists but also self-plagiarizing by translating a 
paper already published in Chinese and resubmitting it in English; hiring a ghost writer to compose a 
paper from faked or independently gathered data; or simply buying a paper from an online catalogue 
of manuscripts—often with a guarantee of publication” (Hvistendahl, 2013).  
 
Finally, a dimension associated to the scientific and technological base is its geographical 
distribution. Where are scientists and engineers localized? There are important disparities between 
regions. Chinese innovative activities are concentrated in the East and in the South, in the Guangdong 
                                                 
1 China’s R&D intensity grew from 0.6 percent in 1996 to 1.98 percent in 2012, to reach the level of the European Union 
(1,97 percent) and overtook over with 2,01 percent in 2013.  
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Province, Beijing, and Shanghai with relatively “empty” regions. Also, there is barely anything in 
some western and central provinces (Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia). In that regard, China is characteristic 
of the spatial structure of an “emerging” innovation system, by contrast with mature systems, such as 
those found in Western Europe or in the United States where the concentration of innovative activities 
in a few regional centres is associated with a moderate activity in other areas. (Crescenzi et al., 2012).  
3.2. Are Chinese institutions supporting innovations?  
The general environment also conditions technological strategies available to firms by 
providing weaker or stronger incentives for them to innovate. We made a choice to restrict this 
introduction to two institutions: intellectual property right systems, and corporate governance, which 
both involve formal and informal dimensions.1 Understanding formal Chinese institutions presents 
two difficulties. The first is they are relatively recent and posterior to 1979. The second difficulty is 
that they differ from those familiar to western scholars, which might be misleading. The issue seems 
sufficiently important for Jiang and Kim, who work on corporate governance in China, to mention 
that “… many papers seem to misunderstand (or are not aware of) important regulatory issues; the 
legal, financial, and institutional environments; and business customs and practices in China” (Jiang 
and Kim, 2014).  
 
A first element is the question of the intellectual property right system. There have been 
important improvements of that institution. Formally, the China’s system of intellectual property 
rights has reached world standards, thanks to a patent amendment in 2000 when China became a 
member of the World Trade Organization.2 The prescriptive requirements linked to the World Trade 
Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to which China agreed in 1999 
are considered as a decisive element for improving the intellectual property regime in China 
                                                 
1 We could have included the market and the financial system. It impacts the capacity of firms to finance their R&D for 
innovation. For incumbent firms, the political connections tremendously matter. State firms and large firms with political 
connections are privileged over smaller and medium firms (Schwab, 2015). The intensity of political connection is 
determinant. Similarly, private firms with political connections also have easier access to finance (Song et al., 2015). 
Another element is the market. Does China’s market environment provide incentives for Chinese firms to invest in 
science-based innovation? The marketization of China’s economy and the foundations to create a basic competitive 
environment are relatively recent. Institutions gradually evolved from socialism (1949 – 1978) into market mechanisms, 
generally encapsulated in a system of “socialist market economy.” Reforms focused on macroeconomic issues had a direct 
impact on science and technology. The “Decision on Some Issues in the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic 
System,” issued by CCPCC was central in 1993 (Liu et al., 2011). Other reforms include The Law on Anti-Unfair 
Competition (1993) and the Antimonopoly Law (2007).  
2 Deli Yang provides a complete account of the development of the intellectual property right system in its early days. 
China became a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization in 1980, the same year of the creation of the 
China’s Patent Office (the predecessor of SIPO). The Patent Law, first enacted in 1985, and amended in 1992, was 
modified as part of the Chinese application to WTO. The Law was further amended in 2010 and in 2013. It was the first 
Patent Law of Modern China after 1949. (Yang, 2003) 
57 
(Stoianoff, 2012). 1 The intellectual property right system is a popular theme when discussing the 
capacity of China to innovate. China’s intellectual property rights system is born from a dual 
constraint: the protection of the intellectual property of foreign firms, and the elaboration of a 
framework favorable to latecomers (Xue and Liang, 2010). Indeed, a strong intellectual property right 
system might prevent learning by latecomers (Kim, 1997). The worries generated by this institution 
are clearly related to the difficulties met by foreign firms when setting up in China, related to the 
enforcement of their property rights. However, as Chinese firms have become increasingly engaged 
in innovative activities, a strong intellectual property regime is of growing importance to them as 
well. 
 
Another institution appears of importance to us, corporate governance. Weak corporate 
governance has been a persistent issue in China (Jiang and Kim, 2014), and is believed to have a 
negative impact on innovation (Cai and Tylecote, 2008; Liu and Tylecote, 2009; Xiao et al., 2013). 
The reform of corporate governance institutions occurred later than that of the intellectual property 
regime. For instance, it is only in 2002 that the China Securities Regulatory Commission edited a 
corporate governance code for listed companies. 
There are several issues specific to the country.2 The governance structure of state firms raises 
questions. Firstly, state firms remain a tool for political objectives. Centrally state-owned firms 
depend on the State Council through a main organ, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). The commission is, therefore, the shareholder of these firms. 
A first problem associated to state firms is that they obey to non-corporate objectives. This might 
include social goals. The willingness to maintain employment explains the support to non-productive 
entities by the governments. State-owned firms are also at risk to be used for politician interests 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These are classic problems associated with state ownership in the 
literature. 
 In addition, a supplementary element in China is that state-owned firms are under a double 
institutional constraint. In parallel with the formal governance structure under SASAC, the enterprise 
decision-making process is also linked to the Chinese Communist Party’s decisions. The Party is 
present through party units in all state firms. 3 According to Wang, “the requirements turn the [state-
owned enterprises]’s decision-making body into a political assembly that adopts the practice of the 
Party-line vote for members of the CPC, where every Party member must vote the same way based 
                                                 
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was negotiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay 
Round. It introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time.” WTO website 
2 Here, we focus on corporate governance issues that are specific to the Chinese context. Of course, Chinese firms are 
concerned as well with issues raised in any settings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)  
3 And this trend is reinforced. A 2015 regulation obliges the presence of the Communist Party unit in private firms and in 
all government organizations (“China tells workplaces they must have Communist Party units,” 2015) 
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on the Party’s collective will. The explicit, naked requirements for incorporating the Party 
organization’s views into the decision-making of the company […] make the SOE an economic entity 
almost completely controlled by the CCP.” (Wang, 2014, pp. 657–658) p 657 – 658. Issues in China’s 
corporate governance are associated with little transparency from firms. Chinese firms were found to 
be the least transparent in terms or reporting on anti-corruption programs and organizational structure 
than firms from Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, with a few exceptions such as Huawei 
Technologies (Kowalczyk-Hoyer and Côté-Freemann, 2013).1 Finally, another element that is too 
complex to be analyzed here is the impact of corruption on firms. In the last Global Competitiveness 
Report, China ranks 67th for incidence in terms of bribery (Schwab, 2015). Corruption is associated 
to many corporate frauds that affect the performance of the firms in several ways, such as fund 
distorting from R&D subsidies, etc. A concern arises on how innovation policies could distort 
financial resources from truly innovative projects towards labeled projects. Other concern is the use 
of the funds. It is at risk that financed projects are disconnected from firm’s commercial strategy. 
These two concerns are reinforced by the fact that most funds tend to go to the same projects, causing 
over-supplies of funding in firms who are not the most performant (interview # 1).  
4. Chinese firms and the technological frontier 
Central to our dissertation is the question of technological leadership. What do we know on 
this topic? Firstly, some signs indicate that Chinese firms have reached the technological frontier in 
terms of manufacturing capabilities. This is reflected in a change in the industrial structure of Chinese 
production. The nature of exportations suggests they developed production capabilities at the 
technological frontier. The trade balance of China indicates that there was a shift of the content of 
imports and exports towards high tech products (Gereffi, 2008). In 2013, 27 percent of manufactured 
exports were high-tech products i.e. “high-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, 
such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.”2 
India offers a different perspective with high-tech products representing 8 percent of manufactured 
exports (World Bank Indicators). In contrast, the proportion of high-tech products in China falls in 
the same range than that of South Korea, Switzerland (27 percent), or France (26 percent). 
 
What about the capacity of Chinese firms to innovate at technological the frontier? Interest 
for innovation by Chinese firms is booming (Fu, 2015; McKinsey Global Institute, 2015; Strategy&, 
2013, 2014; Williamson and Yin, 2014; Zeng and Williamson, 2007). Previously, analysts working 
on Chinese innovation paid greater attention to the institutional perspective (Gu and Lundvall, 2006; 
                                                 
1 Based on the analysis of 33 Chinese firms based on the Boston Consulting Group list of Global Challengers 2011. 
Report done by Transparency International 
2 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS/countries Accessed on 10/05/2016 
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Liu and White, 2001; Tang, 2010) and to technological learning during catch-up (Arvanitis et al., 
2006; Huchet, 1995; Ruffier, 2012; Zhao, 2006; Zhao and Arvanitis, 2008). In fact, consultants and 
business actors were among the first to ask whether and how Chinese firms could innovate. Prof. 
Peter Williamson, author of the book “Dragons at your door” (Zeng and Williamson, 2007) started 
his career at the Boston Consulting Group and Merrill Lynch.1 On the consulting firm side, McKinsey 
published a major report in 2015; and Strategy& has published an annual report on China’ innovation 
since 2013.2 
Some of their observations contain very optimistic views. For instance, according to 
Strategy&, “there is little truth to the Western image of Chinese companies as followers of others, 
focusing on low-value-add activities such as copying technologies and products already available on 
the market. In fact, Chinese companies in mainland China outpace MNCs in high-value-add activities 
such as advanced and applied research, as well as emerging technologies and trend analyses” 
(Strategy&, 2014:6).  
This observation comes from the fact that some firms have been identified as being close to 
the technological leaders. Huawei Technologies have become an important firm of the 
telecommunication industries. It is also the largest filer of patent applications at the World Intellectual 
Property Office. Another example is SAIC Motor, based in Shanghai. In the automobile industry, 
according to Bernstein Research, SAIC is the only Chinese automaker with genuine product 
development capability and is benchmarked at 70 percent of Volkswagen (Nam, 2015).  
Indeed, the trend still needs to be nuanced. On whether Chinese firms are innovative, some 
analysts show as much enthusiasm as other ones or firms might fear or despise the innovative 
performance of Chinese firms. The idea that Chinese firms “outpace multinational corporations in 
high-value adds activities” (Strategy&, 2014) does not resist closer empirical scrutiny. Chinese firms 
are innovative when no strong scientific and engineering bases are required, and particularly 
productive in industries that depend on production process improvements such as commodity 
chemicals, textiles, electrical equipment or construction machinery (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2015). This is coherent with what we know from existing studies on technological catch-up in 
developing countries. Latecomer firms are better at design and cost innovations than at science-based 
innovations (Aulakh, 2007; Batra et al., 2012; Forbes and Wield, 2002).  
Indeed, Chinese firms innovate on the basis of other features such as architectural, design or 
incremental innovations. The nature of innovative activities in China reflects the capacity to leverage 
national specificities. A competitive advantage of Chinese companies is that they have access to a 
large pool of researchers, whose wages are competitive compared to world standards. This makes it 
                                                 
1 https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/faculty-a-z/peter-williamson/ Accessed on 10/10/2016 
2 Formely Bain Company 
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possible to industrialize the R&D process because there are plenty of “qualified but not so good” 
engineers who can be employed within R&D large organizations (Williamson and Yin, 2014). More 
specifically, this organization is associated with the “industrialization of R&D” that requires an 
organization of different teams conducting simultaneously different stages of the innovation 
processes. For example, Mindray, China’s largest medical manufacturer, divides its R&D process into 
eight steps to which are assigned dozens of persons each, and use SAP’s resource planning software 
adapted from a manufacturing assembly line to manage its innovation process (Williamson and Yin, 
2014).  
In addition, according to the authors, while there is a strong hierarchy and that the structure 
might appear bureaucratic, with a top-down and rigid approach of management this is associated with 
a high degree of horizontal flexibility, with a rapid flow of knowledge between people (ibid). An 
additional factor of innovation is the adoption of relatively short product development cycles. The 
reduction of the product development cycle makes it possible to test the market more frequently. 
Firms launch the products early in the development, and progressively adapt the products to customer 
demand (Williamson and Yin, 2014).  
Regarding the technological frontier, firms meet two difficulties. Chinese firms are less 
efficient when advanced knowledge is required. As already mentioned, an indication is that Chinese 
firms are not innovative in science-based industries, which require commercialization of basic 
research (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015).1 The main barrier is, however, not only the technological 
dimension but rather the lack of strategic and managerial capabilities to integrate it as part of the 
firms’ strategy (Zhao, 2016). 
5. Conclusion: China’s specificities for the transition 
Mobilizing the innovation transition is relevant for two main reasons that relate to China’s 
emphasis on innovation, and to the degree of advancements of China’s institutions. We mentioned 
persisting issues in corporate governance. There are however supportive elements such as China’s 
higher-education and research institutions as well as the progress in the intellectual property rights 
system. 
There is also an inherent interest to pay attention to the Chinese case. Historical examples of 
innovation transition include Japan and South Korea. Exploring a new case complements and 
questions the general character of the knowledge and pieces of understanding derived from previous 
historical experiences. China’s experience might be insightful for other countries as it offers an 
alternative to historical precedents in Asia.  
                                                 
1 McKinsey divides industries depending on the dominant level of innovations. Industries like semiconductor design, 
biotech or branded pharmaceuticals, depend heavily on science. 
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Two dimensions appear important to us. A first one is the nation’s size. While seemingly 
obvious, the size of the country has deep implications for the transition. Chinese provinces average 
40 million inhabitants, with great variations among them. The most populated Chinese province is 
also the richest. Guangdong Province, located in the south of the country, had 107 million inhabitants 
at the end of 2014. 98 million people inhabit Shandong Province. By contrast, the smaller one is Tibet 
(318 000). As a matter of comparison, Guangdong Province exports as much as South Korea ($362.4 
billion in 2009 versus $363.5 for South Korea). 1 
Another dimension is the degree of ‘decentralization’ of China’s model. To what extent China 
would adopt a model of innovation transition less centralized than what was observed in other 
countries? China’s economic actors are not articulated as closely with the national government as 
they were in the Korean and Japanese cases. This is linked to a series of factors. First, the absence of 
large actors equivalent to Korea’s Samsung shall be mentioned. The Korean or Japanese models of 
development were based on a limited number of firms, intimately close to the national government. 
A section of Chapter 4 shall be dedicated to defending the view of the particularities of large Chinese 
firms in that regard.  
Also related to that question is the nature of China’s capitalism. China has adopted a state 
capitalism (Bergère, 2013; Naughton & Tsai, 2015) whose major specificity is to be articulated around 
a diversity of local governments (Boyer, 2016). The importance of local state corporatism was 
associated with a decentralized development during the period of transition to the market economy 
(Oi, 1995). Paying attention to local governments is central. China was never governed on a 
centralized basis, and attempts of centralization during the Maoist period were a disaster as they 
resulted in a disconnection between local needs and national policies. The central government, in 
Beijing, gives broad strategic orientations through national outlines and plans, and local governments 
are in charge to implement them, at the different administrative level. Local governments have 
flexibility in making decisions as a necessity to respond to local needs.  
Regarding the technological frontier, two dynamics are at work. On the one hand, there is a 
top-down approach to innovation which tends to be associated with centralization of innovation 
policies. On the other hand, the role of local governments and local corporatism have allowed the 
emergence of firms that are not in the scope of the Central Government, and that are disconnected 
from one another. 
China’s innovation transition shall likely be conditioned by these dimensions. The size of the 
country and the articulation between local firms and local governments indicate the limits of previous 
historical experiences in explaining dynamics in the Chinese case. Indeed, they contrast strongly with 
                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence, The Economist, 2011 
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centralized models in a smaller environment with a central State such as South Korea.  
  
63 
Chapter 4: Research design and methods 
 
1. The general Research Design ....................................................................................... 63 
1.1. A need for a specific research design .................................................................. 63 
1.2. A review of previous research settings ................................................................ 64 
1.3. The investment by firms in emerging technologies as a marker of transition ..... 66 
1.4. Nanotechnology patent as an indicator of a transitional phase ............................ 67 
1.5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 68 
2. Implementation of the research design ......................................................................... 70 
2.1. The construction of a dataset of the large Chinese firms ..................................... 70 
2.2. Methods of delineation of patent applications in nanotechnology ....................... 71 
2.3. The organization of the database around the business groups ............................. 72 
2.4. Advantage and limitations of a patent-based selection of firms .......................... 72 
2.5. Sources of data on the firms ................................................................................ 73 
2.6. A few remarks on the use of data in the Chinese context .................................... 74 
3. Principles of selection of firms ..................................................................................... 75 
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 75 
3.2. What criteria to use to select firms?..................................................................... 75 
3.3. The diversity of data sources reflects the diversity of firms ................................ 78 
3.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 82 
 
This chapter describes our research design. It is organized into three main sections. In section 
1, we make a general argument to defend our research design. The originality of our research is to 
propose an integrated theoretical method and methodological framework to observe the dynamics of 
innovation transition.  
More specifically, we argue that our proposed research design is original compared to existing 
methods that are not appropriate to understand the innovation transition dynamics in emerging 
countries. The absence of studies on the topic is partly due to the lack of methodological and analytical 
tools. We propose hence an alternative approach with the introduction of nanotechnology patents as 
an indicator of the dynamics of acquisition of technological capabilities in emerging fields.  
Sections 2 and 3 present the methodology adopted in this work. Section 2 one explains how 
we have identified the 325 Chinese industrial firms we study. We discuss in this section the criteria 
used to select these firms. Section 3 details the methods used to select nanotechnology patents. We 
build herein the database on which all our analysis is based. The use of data from large scientific and 
technological database being a collective process, we pay attention to distinguish between our own 
work and the collective work done by the IFRIS’s team.1 
1. The general Research Design 
1.1. A need for a specific research design 
In our dissertation, we mobilize the concept of innovation transition to discuss the 
transformation of China's industrial model. Behind the concept of innovation transition, is the idea 
                                                 
1 IFRIS: Institute for Research and Innovation in Society - http://ifris.org/en/presentation/ 
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that a successful catch-up by a firm occurs if it manages to reach the technological level of its global 
competitors, the technological frontier. The transitional phase is the uncertain phase when firms have 
already been accumulating capabilities and get close to the technological frontier but before they 
effectively become technological leaders. We have further argued the need to contextualize this 
framework within contemporary technological dynamics and within China’s context. We concluded 
with the proposition that the transition to technological leadership by Chinese firms required the 
acquisition of technological capabilities in nanotechnology. 
There are two difficulties inherent in the analysis of dynamics of innovation transition. Firstly, 
the unique way to identify a successful technological catch-up is by identifying new products (or 
processes) that are developed by firms and position them among the market leaders. The transitional 
phase anticipates that moment. Regarding firms, the transition phase is therefore characterized by a 
triple uncertainty on whether it is a real trend, which firms participate in it, and on the future outputs 
of their current actions and investments.  
Understanding the innovation transition also raises the questions of how to articulate firms’ 
dynamics with the national innovation perspective, and go beyond the analysis of a limited number 
of large Chinese firms. We aim here to look at the firms’ individual modalities of engagement in 
nanotechnology. Because many researchers share this concern in the field of innovation studies, we 
already benefit from recent methodological and theoretical developments in the use of scientific and 
technological databases. 
We shall see that existing research settings do not provide satisfactory answers to these two 
conditions: articulating the firm and national levels, and looking at transition dynamics. 
1.2. A review of previous research settings 
We begin with a brief description of the methods used by scholars. The studies look at the end 
of the catch-up phase or at the transitional phase with a focus on firms. They deal with two series of 
questions on innovation transition: firms’ dynamics, which they study with case studies (Kim et al., 
2004) and national dynamics, when they observe an industry or a technology (Choung et al., 2014; 
Lee and Lim, 2001).  
Hence we first look at case studies. The first group of case studies deals with how firms have 
developed capabilities in order to commercialize new products and reach the technological frontier.1 
The question is to understand how researchers did select the firms for their analysis. The analysed 
firms in these studies were chosen because they have already reached (or are about to reach) the 
                                                 
1 That includes the analysis of firms in the semiconductor and automotive industry in South Korea (Choung et al., 2012), 
firms in resource-based industry: pulp and paper industry in Brazil (Figueiredo, 2014), or in a complex system industries 
(Kiamehr et al., 2015). 
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technological frontier. Sometimes, the method of selection is explicit: For instance, Choung et al. 
(2014) selected firms or organizations that introduced “world-class” products on the Korean market 
and, in a second time, conducted interviews with them. However, looking closely, our understanding 
is this way of firms’ selection is prevalent, even when it is not explicit. Researchers have identified 
this category of firms by relying on the following indicators: the use of firms' market shares, the 
export proportion of sales, or product rankings by a governmental agency to identify them. These 
indicators relate to the capacity of firms to have already commercialized products.  
Additionally, in these research settings, firms are selected based on the products they 
developed and/or they commercialized. Such criteria of selection is consistent with the objectives of 
many researchers, and is in particular, adapted for retrospective studies (Kim et al., 2004). However, 
these criteria are still not appropriate to our research context and, more specifically to the emerging 
countries context. Indeed, a proposition we make here is that large Chinese firms have entered into a 
transitional phase, which implies that part of these firms which are developing technological 
capabilities have not yet integrated them into commercialized products. In addition, this led to 
specifically study well-established industries.  
The second category of research designs derives from an alternative approach. That approach 
encompasses several methods used to assess the level of technological capabilities and strategies of 
some latecomers (Choung et al., 2014; Xiao et al., 2013). They differ from the previous ones as, to 
identify technological leadership, they use internal data from firms instead of market indicators. In 
most papers, data are collected through interviews (formal, informal discussion) with firms and 
related actors, and are combined with economic and S&T data (patent and scientific publications) 
(Hobday et al., 2004; Xiao et al., 2013). Because it is possible to use them to look at dynamics before 
products’ commercialization, these methods are more adapted to the study of a transitional phase by 
Chinese firms on that dimension.  
They require however pre-selecting a narrow group of firms based. Hobday and colleagues 
base their work on an existing framework to divide 25 pre-selected Korean companies by strategies 
(unaware and passive / reactive / strategic / creative) and consider that the two firms that adopt 
creative strategies may be at the technology frontier (2004). In the Chinese context, Xiao et al. in their 
paper on the barriers that appear when latecomers enter a transitional phase use informal interviews 
and heterogeneous sources of data to assess three previously selected firms (2013). Similarly, 
Figueiredo (2014) bases his research article on a five-year study about Brazilian pulp and paper firms 
during which he could identify relevant cases of transitional companies to investigate further.  
There are two ways of selecting or preselecting firms: on the basis of market information, 
which implies that firms have already developed technologies, and on the basis of in-depth knowledge 
of a sector. Regarding the second case, what these research settings allow is to make possible to 
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explore ongoing dynamics or to test a theoretical hypothesis about the innovation transition at the 
firm level (Yin, 2003) by focusing on the most advanced firms in emerging nations once “champion” 
firms have been identified.  
1.3. The investment by firms in emerging technologies as a marker of transition 
Previously developed methods are adapted to nations where technological leadership is 
already visible or identifiable, or to retrospective studies. In the present case, the transition framework 
needs a research design better adapted to China and other emerging nations, for which we cannot take 
a retrospective approach and study how firms have become leaders with the introduction of products 
to the market.  
Instead, we look at ongoing transformations. We, therefore, must make a step backward and 
investigate whether latecomer companies invest into new technologies before they managed to exploit 
them successfully in developing new products i.e. when they invest in basic knowledge regarding 
these technologies. This echoes with the literature, and the catch-up theory that predicts that as firms 
reduce the gap with the technological frontier, they become increasingly able to generate innovations 
and enter markets based on emerging technology (Choung et al., 2014; Kim, 1997).  
This requires looking at emerging technologies.1 In that regard, some studies focus on 
emerging technology in emerging countries, such as nanomedicine in China (Leung, 2013). These 
studies explain how firms invest, integrate, or shape the development of new technologies, but it is 
not possible to derive national trends from these studies. This echoes to Chapter 2 in which we 
introduced the existence of 'general purpose technologies’ characterized by their technological 
dynamism and their pervasiveness within industries (Bresnahan and Tratjenberg, 1995). 
Nanotechnology provides an interesting setting for our research for several reasons.2 Firstly, 
as we argued in chapter 2, we are at a stage when, in many countries, leading firms invest into new 
technologies but before they integrate these technologies into products. Those firms are focused on 
building capability and exploratory activities in the long-term perspective of product development. 
The research laboratories of these firms are central to the trend, which justifyies the importance of 
nanotechnology research for Chinese firms. In that regard, nanotechnology research in emerging 
                                                 
1 Choung et al. (2014) are among the rare authors to integrate emerging technologies in the scope of their research design: 
Wireless Broadband (WiBro) and Terrestrial Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (T-DMB), but they do not integrate in the 
scope of their study to identify the position of firms. The first reason is contextual, because technologies are developed 
by research institutes and not by firms. 
2 Nanotechnology was introduced in Chapter 2. Nanotechnologies gather a set of techniques involving works at the 
nanometre (one billionth of a meter): “nanotechnology is the understanding and control of matter at dimensions between 
approximately 1 and 100 nanometres (nm), where unique phenomena enable novel applications” (National 
Nanotechnology Initiative - Strategic Plan, 2014). Their emergence was triggered by the extension of the possibilities of 
exploratory and manipulatory instruments during the 1980s (microscopy, lithography). Rather than a simple technology, 
nanotechnology is based on the introduction of new processes or materials into existing products during the research 
phase. 
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countries could reflect the comitment of firms in the learning process. 
There are however additional elements. Nanotechnology research gives an indication on the 
nature of the technological strategies of Chinese firms. These firms follow models of innovation based 
on low-cost innovation or design innovation (Forbes and Wield, 2002; Zeng and Williamson, 2007), 
which allocates resources to exploitation rather than exploration activities. Nanotechnology research 
by Chinese firms would suggest that this is one part of the puzzle and that firms also invest in more 
fundamental research.1  
It results that nanotechnology research indicates both dynamics of acquisition of technological 
competences and signals firms’ technological strategies. Consequently, the combination of these two 
elements argues in favour of the idea that investment in nanotechnologies by firms in China is an 
indicator that they are, at least, entering into a transitional phase. 
1.4. Nanotechnology patent as an indicator of a transitional phase 
To observe nanotechnology research within firms, we examine their patents activity. This 
methodological choice is made possible by the modality of nanotechnology diffusion. The emergence 
of nanotechnology research has led to a considerable number of patents by actors such as universities, 
research institutes, and firms. A ‘surge’ in “nano-patents” has been observed both by researchers who 
noted the firms’ early patenting trend and by lawyers who saw in this surge a dysfunction of the 
patenting system (Bawa et al., 2005; Lacour, 2010).  
This ‘nano surge’ nevertheless gives us a visibility of the general tendency of nanotechnology 
research by firms. In that regard, nanotechnology patents make more visible nanotechnology research 
among firms. Andersen notices how firms in the construction sector in Denmark, including the largest 
ones, barely mention nanotechnology (Andersen, 2011). Andersen illustrates this with the example of 
a firm in the glass industry: “Pilkington does not officially refer to it as an application of 
nanotechnology.” The term “nanotechnology” is generally avoided and instead they use the 
traditional term of “coatings” … their low profile is due partly to the unsettled debate on 
nanotechnology risk issues and partly because of the considerable uncertainty as to what 
nanotechnology is and what it is not” (Andersen, 2011). Such “silence,” or invisibility, has two 
primary reasons. The first one is the nature of nanotechnology itself, as nanotechnology research 
leads to process innovation, discreet on the market. The second reason is the fear of the reaction of 
the market to nanotechnology perceived as insecure by the public, including in China  
 
The second particularity of nanotechnology patents is that it offers a way to articulate national 
                                                 
1 This is of course true for nanotechnology research in any firms from emerging countries 
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observations with observations at the firm level. Because of its generic character, nanotechnology has 
an impact on firms through industrial sectors. Looking at nanotechnology patents helps us obtain a 
transversal image of the country’s dynamics of acquisitions of capabilities by firms. In our discussion, 
nanotechnology patents are an indicator helping articulate the firm with the national levels under the 
assumption that we look to the nanotechnology patenting activities of a representative group of firms.1 
Consequently, we focus herein on the specific case of large Chinese firms.  
Based on that assumption it is then possible to make a comparison for instance between China 
and other emerging countries such as Brazil. Especially that the nanotechnology patenting activities 
have been researched in different settings including firms in Brazil (Kay et al., 2009), and Chinese 
firms in energy storage (Kay and Youtie, 2013). Furthermore, the availability of data about global 
firms in nanotechnology by industrial sector provides us elements to realize a comparison in which 
we can benchmark Chinese firms (Larédo et al., 2010). 
 
The choice of our methods belongs to a tradition of using science, technology and innovation 
indicators (Freeman and Soete, 2009). We use accordingly patent applications in nanotechnology as 
an indicator of dynamics of technological learning by Chinese firms. To our knowledge, this is not 
the most common use of patents that are generally considered as indicators of technological 
capabilities. It shall be noted that none of the previous studies about innovation transition has 
mentioned before the use of patents as a wat to pre-select or select firms. But many have used patents 
as a part of the heterogeneous set of data. They have mobilized patents to assess or to describe the 
evolution of technological capabilities. Choung et al. (2000) for instance use patent plus scientific 
publication data with the purpose to differentiate technological using capabilities and technological 
generating capabilities of firms in the Korean semiconductor sector. Our method considers also 
patents as an indicator of technological capabilities, with all the limits this implies (Griliches, 1990), 
but the limits are secondary in our study. 
1.5. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this section was to introduce the general framework of our research 
design: we look at nanotechnology patenting by firms. Here, we argue that nanotechnology patents 
taken by firms are a good indicator of innovation transition. In fact, patents can reflect the three 
following elements: the dynamics of acquisition of technological capabilities, the integration of 
research into firms’ strategies and the development of absorptive capacity.  
The relevant case of nanotechnology development in China justifies the implementing of our 
                                                 
1 This therefore requires firms that we study to be representative of national dynamics. 
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research design. China is engaged in the 'nanotechnology race” (Dong et al., 2016). Indeed, the 
Chinese State perceived the strategic interest of nanotechnologies for Chinese development early. As 
China has invested massively through direct and indirect support to research and innovation projects 
in the field since 2001. In addition, the composition of China’s industries makes the method relevant, 
because it gives an important place to the manufacturing industries (industries in which 
nanotechnology can be used as a source of innovation). In June 2016, 69 percent of the firms listed 
on Shenzhen Stock Exchange, one of China’s two stock exchanges, 1259 manufacturing firms on a 
total of 1818 firms, are categorized under “manufacturing.”1 Whether firms patent in nanotechnology 
and how that might be representative of particular sectors give additional elements about the 
technological development of China’s industrial actors.  
  
                                                 
1 http://www.szse.cn/main/en/MarketStatistics/BySectors/ These values were taken on 24/06/2016 
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2. Implementation of the research design 
Our research adopts a quantitative method. This method has consisted in the construction and 
analysis of a database of the 325 largest Chinese industrial firms to look at their patenting activity in 
nanotechnology. However, this quantitative work was interpreted in the light of our familiarity with 
China, through previous work experience and studies in Beijing. Our familiarity with the Chinese 
language made possible the direct access to some Chinese sources, and notably, the treatment of the 
patent database in Chinese. In addition, we spent a few months (June – August 2014) at the Centre 
for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology of Shanghai University, to meet actors of innovation and 
nanotechnology. While this work did not consist of formalized interviews, it certainly impacted the 
interpretation of data.1 
2.1. The construction of a dataset of the large Chinese firms 
Our doctoral research exploits a dataset made of the large Chinese firms performing research 
on nanotechnologies. That dataset was built in three steps: - the selection of a whole corpus of patent 
applications in nanotechnologies; - the identification of large Chinese firms among applicants; - and 
the collection of data on those firms. The first step, which we describe in this section, is grounded on 
the technical possibility to exploit large-scale scientific and technological databases. One major 
concern is to use firm-level data that can be aggregated in a way to interrogate data based on specific 
features of firms (ownership, industry, size, etc.). In order to obtain such aggregation of data, this 
requires to go beyond a statistical use of firm data and to keep their identities.  
It is thus necessary that we first identify firms. The use of patent databases is particularly 
adapted to that purpose because patents and information they contain (technological classifications, 
names of inventors and applicants) are public data, as well as the identity of the applicant. The 
research was largely facilitated by our institutional attachment to IFRIS, which provided us with 
privileged access to purposely developed databases.2 A database gathering patents taken globally in 
nanotechnology, developed on the basis of Patstat Database (2011), has been our starting point 
(NanoPatstat). The objectivity and relevance of the selection method are guaranteed by the delineation 
method that was used to delineate nanotechnologies. We briefly describe it in the next section. 
We restricted our selection to invention priority patents made by Chinese applicants: Invention 
                                                 
1 Access to firms is a difficulty to tackle in research on China. Difficulties might be associated with three factors: the 
distance with the field, especially for a foreign researcher, and the lack of “guanxi” or personal connections to access 
people within firms.  
However, we also believe that another institutional factor is at work and refers to the level of development of institutions 
such as the intellectual property regime and corporate governance, which do not favour trust. Finally, in the particular 
field of innovation studies, firms might be reluctant to share elements of strategies when these strategies are easily imitable 
(Ogsuz Aladagli and Oulion, 2015). 
2 IFRIS: Institute for Research and Innovation in Society - http://ifris.org/en/presentation/ 
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patents refer to what is commonly known as patents, in opposition to “utility” patents. Invention 
patents are attributed on the basis of three characteristics: the novel character, the non-evidence, and 
their application character. Priority invention patents are, as the term does not suggest, patent 
applications that do not have priorities i.e. that are not dependent on a family of patents that already 
exist. A priority is a prior patent application to which the concerned patent application is an extension. 
The restriction to selecting priority patents aims at only selecting patents that protect the original 
inventions, and not all posterior extensions. The selection of invention priority patents with Chinese 
applicants required basic SQL requests. This first step lets us with a corpus of 56 410 patent 
applications that cover the period 1990 – 2009.  
A major feature of our database is that, on the basis of the patent application numbers, we re-
extracted patent data from SIPO’s website in China. This allowed to obtain cleaner and more 
comprehensive data. First, the original version is more complete with the fields that are filed. This is 
necessary to obtain the address of each applicant. A second reason relates to the fact that it suppresses 
ambiguity that comes from the English translations of the Chinese name of the firms. 
2.2. Methods of delineation of patent applications in nanotechnology 
NanoPatstat is a database developed under SQL that gathers all patent applications in 
nanotechnologies. The selection of patent applications in nanotechnologies was based on the 
implementation of a robust delineation method within IFRIS. The delineation process took several 
steps. The starting point was the selection of a core of scientific publications in nanotechnology. Those 
publications were analyzed thanks to tools of lexical analysis (CorText) used to produce a list of 840 
keywords characteristics of nanotechnologies. Most of them are composed of multi-term expressions. 
Those keywords were used as the basis on which patents were selected if their abstracts contain the 
keywords. An important feature of this keyword-based delineation is its evolution over the years. 
Keywords used to select patents vary annually, making possible to reflect variations of technological 
trends themselves from year to year. Integrating such a dynamic aspect is necessary as 
nanotechnology is an emerging technology, and therefore associated with many novelties.  
Those developments are made by an IFRIS team skilled in the development of large scientific 
database and their exploitation. The team is specialized in such treatment as testifies publications on 
the methods used (Mogoutov and Kahane, 2007). For our research, this ensures accounting only for 
patents in nano-sciences, excluding other non-relevant scientific domains, and thus provides a 
relevant source for identifying Chinese firms that do research on nanotechnology.  
The second and third step are more directly concerned with completing information on firms. 
The second step was to identify among the whole corpus of patents those that were taken by the large 
Chinese firms, and the third step was to collect relevant data on those firms. This has required several 
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iterative steps in order to clean the data, identify and select our targeted companies. The type of data 
contained is described in more details in the following paragraphs. 
2.3. The organization of the database around the business groups 
Here one may wonder how to identify large firms? We have already observed that using 
criteria based on size (either number of employees, asset value) made difficult the analysis by the co-
existence of different organizational structures. At the exceptions of a few well-identified firms, large 
private firms tend to be smaller whereas some of the central state enterprises are giant groups. 
Therefore, we propose a combination of alternative methods that are based on a double approach: the 
size (number of employees) and the appreciation of the economic and political weight of the firms. 
This includes to pay a specific interest to the listed firms and to firms detained by “high-level” local 
governments (provinces and major provincial capitals, municipalities), as well as by the Central 
People’s Government. 
Several additional dimensions are attached to the organization of the database. An important 
feature of our research design is that we do not consider individual entities as the unit of our analysis, 
but the entire business group. That includes identifying groups by gathering their subsidiaries under 
the parent company even though they have an individual legal existence. This has several implications 
on the way we build our dataset of firms. Patents are taken by individual entities, and not necessarily 
–even though this is possible and largely depends on the organization of firms- by the mother 
company. This requires a preliminary work to research and reconstitute business groups by identifying 
their subsidiaries. Even though this work is time-consuming, it does not present as large 
methodological difficulties in the case of China as it would in nations with different organization of 
corporate ownership. Most Chinese business groups tend to have pyramidal structures (Fan et al., 
2005), with few crossed ownership and parent company easy to identify . In addition, subsidiaries of 
the Chinese groups tend to be wholly-owned by their parent company (Lee and Woo, 2001) which 
limits the number of trade-offs we must do when we attach subsidiaries to their patent companies.  
In addition, this provides a source of data on firms' history, and in particular on centrally state-
owned firms, whose research activities are not centralized. While we proceeded to the reconstitution 
of the business groups, we paid specific attention not to erase these data that can be exploited to 
describe intra-group dynamics. As a result, we keep in our database different levels of subsidiaries 
(parent group, subsidiary level 1). 
2.4. Advantage and limitations of a patent-based selection of firms 
We remind concerning firms that no authors have used before patents as an indicator of their 
innovation transition. Patents were often used as an indicator of technological capabilities of firms. 
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The general advantage and limits of patents are well documented by literature (Griliches, 1990; 
Nagaoka et al., 2010). For instance, Choung et al. have used later, as a complementary source of data, 
the patenting activities of firms related to the products they study (Choung et al., 2014).  
Moreover, patent analyses are widely used methods for the study of technological catch-up. 
Noticeable examples include a series of eleven research studies on the articulation of the 
technological catch-up, economic development, and intellectual property rights system in different 
nations including China, South Korea, and Taiwan (Odagiri et al., 2012). This shows how patenting 
activities can be used in longitudinal studies of dynamics of change. A change in patents reflects the 
change in the level of the technological capabilities of firms. In such case, changes in the patterns of 
patenting activities by firms indicate firm-level changes associated with their technological catch-up. 
Changes in patterns include the modification in the respective proportion of corporate and domestic, 
invention patents (compared to foreign patents, utility patents, and patents hold by universities or 
research institutes). To some extent, the use of invention patent in nanotechnology as a marker of 
transition follows a similar logic, as it is the study of another pattern in patent activities i.e. patenting 
inventions in emerging fields. 
This use we make of patents as an indicator for transition presents some weaknesses that need 
to be mentioned. One is the temporal discrepancy between the date of the patent applications and the 
period covered. We identified firms on the basis of a database that covers a period of more than 15 
years. In addition, the description of the reform of the intellectual property rights evidence that it is 
only recently, since the 2000s, that a patent system aligned to worldwide standard was implemented 
in China. Thus, there is an asymmetry in the value of data across time, and as a consequence, on the 
validity of our selection method, as it was “easier” to patent in the 1990s than in the last decades. A 
way to mitigate that problem while keeping the possibility to look at historical developments is to 
keep patent applications prior to 2000, but to separate them from the final dataset the firms.  
In addition, it shall be mentioned that the core focus, and the unit of analysis of our research, 
is not on patent applications themselves but on Chinese firms. The choice is therefore made to 
mobilize short case studies as a way to accompany the guiding discussion and argumentation of the 
doctoral research. Those “micro” case studies, based on data collected on the large firms that are 
constitutive of the database, aim at discussing the transformation of those firms. 
2.5. Sources of data on the firms 
A final dimension we have not yet mentioned is the data we need to collect about firms in 
order to be able to aggregate them and use our dataset of firms to answer research questions in relevant 
ways. With the progressive opening of China, the information environment has witnessed important 
improvement and data on Chinese firms have become increasingly available, in Chinese, but also to 
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some extent, in English as well. One major source of data on firms is firms’ stock exchange data. For 
non-listed firms, we have used official websites of central and local governments, and the institutional 
websites of companies. In addition, we have had access to the world-level database on firms, ORBIS.  
There are two grand types of data that we needed to collect. The first type of data we need 
derives from the understanding we have of the Chinese economy that led us to reformulate the 
question of the impact of ownership on innovation. This requires paying attention to the constitution 
of a database that identifies central state, local state, and private firms. One of the most systematic 
sources of data on firms ownership is the China Security Index we found, was borrowed from research 
in corporate finance (Pessarossi and Weill, 2013): The “CSI Central State-owned Enterprises 
Composite Index”, the “CSI Local State-owned Enterprises Composite Index” and “CSI Private-
owned Enterprises Composite Index” respectively include firms directly controlled by the central 
government or by a local government (Province or Municipalities) and private-owned enterprises 
traded at Shenzhen and Shanghai securities exchanges (including bonds, stocks and derivatives). 1  
The second set of data we collected is classic in most research that focuses on a population of 
firms. Finding sources of information on data on large firms are straightforward at the condition to 
have access to a corporate database. We need to mention though that this requires paying attention in 
attributing data to a firm or to one particular subsidiary. Data include industry data (industrial 
classification, industrial sector, and main activities), firm's size (number of employees). We manually 
collected these data from the database ORBIS whenever they were available, and from information 
directly provided by firms either directly on their corporate websites, annual reports or in some cases, 
in newspapers and reviews. We have also integrated geographic information on the localization of 
firms and of their subsidiaries thanks to data available in the original patent database, and complete 
it with external sources (corporate websites or official firm database). Finally, we have mobilised 
secondary data coming from existing case studies. 
2.6. A few remarks on the use of data in the Chinese context 
We mobilize along this doctoral research data on production, science, and technology 
activities, that include firm-level data as well as statistical data produced by the National Bureau of 
Statistics or its provincial counterparts; Therefore, we need to mention the problem of interpreting 
these data in China, as in many emerging nations. Caution ought to be paid to the fact that data has 
different intrinsic value than in OECD nations with a longer tradition of data collection.  
Chinese statistical data have been considered as a rich but non-trustable source of information, 
even though the recent reform undertaken since 2008 has aimed – to some extent – to correct the 
                                                 
1http://www.csindex.com.cn 
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major flaws of data such as the inadequate representation of the private sector not to mention 
falsification (Orlik, 2014). The validity of Chinese statistics is the object of many publications and 
discussions that go much beyond the academic circle.1 Statistics are often criticized for reflecting 
“manipulations made by actors, in a context of corruption, corporate accounting manipulation in both 
state and non-state enterprises and more broadly, weak information environment including for listed 
firms” (Piotroski and Wong, 2010). In addition, manipulations by local governments include debt 
reporting, inflation of measures of the production and performance.  
Strong concerns have also been expressed regarding the qualitative value of science and 
technology indicators that are used to analyze the Chinese Innovation System, including patents, 
publications, and R&D expenditures, which raises questions as those figures are used as the basis of 
innovation policy reports (OECD, 2008). In the research system, the emphasis given to publications 
in the career of scientists, combined with corruption, has led to many distortions and generated the 
emergence of an academic black market of scientific publications, in which the product is the 
authorship of papers in journals indexed by Thomson Reuters and Elsevier (Hvistendahl, 2013). 
Similar concerns are expressed regarding the reality of the increase in the global level of R&D 
expenditures, and their effective allocation to research projects. We are aware of those limitations. 
However, we consider that Chinese data provides relevant sources of information, provided it is 
carefully exploited.  
3. Principles of selection of firms 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this section is to explain how we proceed in selecting large Chinese firms. There 
are two conditions that need to be respected. A first constraint is to select a population of large firms 
representative of diverse industries, at the national level. The restriction to large firms creates some 
distortion we discuss in further detail in another chapter of the dissertation. The second condition is 
to remain neutral regarding the degree of innovativeness of a firm. We describe step by step the 
constitution of a group of 325 firms, and the sources we used for that purpose. We introduce our 
selection criteria, and the limits. In parallel, we detail the major sources we exploited to identify the 
large firms.  
3.2. What criteria to use to select firms? 
How to ensure that large firms we select are representative of the Chinese context? There are 
                                                 
1See for example the special section of China Economic Review on China's data and that contribute to clear the way for 
researchers on China, Volume 30, September 2014. 
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two main conditions. One is to avoid selection biases such as looking only at the most successful 
firms, which are likely to be more innovative than the average. Another concern is to have a 
population of firms whose size is still manageable in terms of analysis, to allow firm-level 
explorations. These concerns led us to make the following choice. Firms are selected thanks to three 
criteria: their size, their industry (in order to select firms engaged in manufacturing and production); 
and their country of origin to discriminate domestic companies from foreign-invested companies (i.e. 
we only want Chinese firms and not foreign invested firms). Based on these criteria, that we will 
introduce in more details, large Chinese firms are likely to form a group of firms diverse in terms of 
industry, strategic orientation (specialized or diversified), ownership, size and localization. This is 
precisely this diversity we are interested in to reach a broad perspective and obtain an adequate 
economic representation across industrial sectors. It is noticeable though that this diversity may cause 
some difficulties in comparing and interpreting data.  
i. Our definition of large firms: more than 10 000 employees 
Focusing on “large firms” requires a first categorization and definition of what a large firm is. 
Are we talking about global multinationals with hundreds of thousands of employees? Or are we 
referring to firms which are not classified as SMEs, and that can be more modest in size? Our choice 
is to adopt a broad view leaning towards the second option. Indeed, we use a simple size indicator, 
which is based on the level of employment. Our threshold is defined at 10 000 employees, which led 
us to select firms with more than 10 000 employees, and with no maximum, thus also including 
“giant” firms.  
Using employment figures is quite classic. The number of employees is a classic indicator of 
the size of a firm. However, firms can also be categorized as large based on other items such as their 
revenue or their financial value. For instance, Chinese official figures have for long been based on 
alternative selection criteria. The National Bureau of Statistics defines a large enterprise according to 
a combination of three criteria: its number of employees, operating revenues, and total assets. 
Thresholds vary across sectors. Following that definition, 9411 large enterprises operate in China in 
2013: this figure includes firms with less than 10 000 employees (it also does not account for whether 
they are independent or whether they belong to a business group, which is a problem we discuss later 
in this chapter). In our case, we choose the criteria of the level of employment for simplicity purpose, 
but also to avoid selection biases towards the most profitable or capital-intensive industries. The 
number of employees is the least ambiguous size item on which to select an enterprise (OECD, 2002).  
A classic categorization is proposed by OECD. The OECD classifies firms according to the 
following thresholds: 1-9 employees, 10-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000-4999, 5000 
employees and above. Large firms employ 5000 or more persons in that definition. It seems not 
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appropriate in the present case. The threshold is too low for our purpose, and not adapted to a 
country’s size like China, as it leads to select many firms. China still possesses a manufacturing base 
more extended than that of many OECD countries. Chinese firms, in proportion, rely more on labor 
force than on automatized production, which favors the adoption of a higher threshold for 
employment. In addition, this classification is thought to characterize individual enterprises, not entire 
firms with several subsidiaries. Adjusting the inferior limit at about 10 000 employees leads to select 
325 firms while representing most industries. 
ii. Focusing on industries with manufacturing or production capacity 
At this stage, we shall remind the purpose of the research. We aim at observing whether firms 
integrate new knowledge on nanotechnology as part of their R&D. This means that firms must have 
conception, production, industrial processes concerned by nanotechnology research and integration. 
We chose to adopt a broad view and to extend our scope to large firms engaged in mining, 
construction, and resource-processing activities.  
In other words, firms included in the scope of our research are those for which technological 
innovation represents a direct opportunity for their production or their products. And we exclude the 
other ones, independently on their contribution to the Chinese economy (for instance, innovation in 
the service industry). For similar reasons, we exclude software and Internet firms (Tencent, Baidu, 
Alibaba…). Excluding these firms presents a major limitation for the understanding of transition 
dynamics in China. It is, in particular, arguable that these firms are actively participating in the 
transition in emerging countries, and the software sector is particularly vivid in China (Jui, 2010). 
iii. The role of domestic firms in the innovation transition: selecting Chinese 
versus foreign firms 
We defended in the general framework of the dissertation the importance of domestic firms. 
Foreign-invested firms or foreign firms are outside our scope of analysis, regardless their impact on 
the Chinese economy. We make a few exceptions, though.1 This includes firms that are headquartered 
in other countries for legal or fiscal reasons but still maintain their operations in China: Chinese firms 
that are based in the Cayman Islands or in Bermuda. We also integrate some firms with their 
headquarters in Hong Kong: the ones that originated in Mainland China, where they operate and still 
have their management team. This is, for instance, the case of the PC maker Lenovo, a spin-off from 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, created in Beijing in 1988. By contrast, we do not integrate firms 
that were originally established in Hong Kong.  
                                                 
1 We integrate Shanghai Alcatel because it is one of the few joint-ventures under the scope and supervision of SASAC 
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3.3. The diversity of data sources reflects the diversity of firms 
A way to get a selection of firms of good quality is to cross several independent sources of 
data on Chinese firms, including primary and secondary sources. They include websites related to 
Chinese stock exchange and securities and websites and reports from local and central governments. 
In addition, various sources are mobilized in order to integrate companies that are neither listed nor 
held by an important governmental entity. We introduce them in the next paragraphs. 
i. Centralization of data on state firms 
112 centrally state-owned firms: Centrally state-owned firms are the most symbolic firms of 
what remains of the Chinese planned economic system. There are only one hundred firms under the 
direct supervision of the Central People's Government, in Zhongnanhai, Beijing. However, they 
employ millions of people. In addition, they are often granted monopolies in their market 
(petrochemical, communication, defence, etc.). 112 firms depend on the State Assets Supervision 
Administration Commission (SASAC), a ministry-level administrative organ established on purpose. 
SASAC, in turn, refers to the State Council, the highest executive instance in China. It was created 
in 2003.  
Previously, state firms were administered under different reference ministries. Its creation is 
one of the final steps aimed to provide a unified and legal framework to centrally state-owned firms. 
During the Maoist period, state firms were not formally separated from their administration. Many 
steps were, therefore, necessary to transform them into legal firms. Major steps had been the 
promulgation of the first company Law, in 1988 that gave firms a legal status. This was followed by 
the creation of a “shareholding status” in 1992. This status made it possible to incorporate state 
enterprises into legal corporate firms. These entities remained under the supervision of their original 
ministries till the creation of SASAC.  
A large majority of centrally state-owned firms is under this unique shareholder and 
supervision agency. There are however a few centrally state-owned firms that still depend on their 
ministries: China Tobacco (Ministry of Tobacco), CITIC and People’s Bank of China, under the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), and China Railway (Ministry of Transport).1 
The administration of centrally state-owned firms is centralized under SASAC’s leadership. 
Hence, establishing the list of centrally state-owned firms is straightforward as the 112centrally state-
owned firms are listed on the website of the administration.2  Other centrally state-owned firms 
consist of a few well-known firms, easy to identify. We base our selection on the number of employees 
                                                 
1 China Railway is a specific case, as the company has not been corporatized. It was established in 2013 on the basis of 
the Ministry of Railways. 
2 Number of firms listed in SASAC at the beginning of 2015 (there are ongoing mergers). The figure has been declining 
since the creation of SASAC. http://www.sasac.gov.cn 
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and discard the smaller ones1.  
A variety of locally state-owned firms: These 112 state firms (including their thousands of 
subsidiaries) constitute a large group of firms. They are however far from representing the totality of 
state firms. Most Chinese state firms do not depend on the Central State but on lower levels of 
government.2 This includes provincial, municipal, city-level and lower level governments.  
A small precision is required on the terminology and on the concept of ‘local governments.' 
The word (guoyou) translated as “state” refers to the idea of nation. In addition, the differentiation 
between “central” (zhongyang) and “local” (difang) state firms comes from the governmental level 
on which they depend. The central government (zhongyang zhengfu) is generally opposed to local 
governments (difang zhengfu). The latter refers to governments at levels below the centre. This 
includes levels that would hardly be qualified as “local” otherwise; local governments might be 
governments of provinces with population superior to that of France or Germany.  
The administrative system is reproduced at every level of governments, and governments 
emulate the organizational structure of the central government. Most of them reproduced the central 
SASAC’s model and established local state asset supervision and administration committees. These 
local SASACs (or equivalent entities) centralize the administration of local state assets.3 Local 
governments are transparent on that matter. Provincial, municipal, city-level and lower governments 
generally indicate the list of firms under their administration on the website of the local SASAC. They 
provide related information on their websites, on which they regularly publish news and trends about 
firms. There is, therefore, no major difficulty to identify locally state-owned firms for a given 
province, municipality or geographic city.4 Difficulties come from the number of local governments, 
and in turn, of the number of local SASACs. In turn, we focus on the largest firms are administrated 
at a higher level of governments.  
ii. The emergence of private firms 
Identifying provincial and centrally state-owned firms turns relatively easy. Such is not the 
case for private firms which, obviously, do not depend on any such entity. However, they are 
increasingly visible because they play a growing role in the economy. Therefore, to identify them, we 
crossed several sources of data. We relied on a combination of heterogeneous sources: stock 
exchanges, global database (Orbis database), Chinese industrial and national rankings, international 
                                                 
1 Most of the largest Chinese firms are centrally state-owned firms, but the reverse is not true. Not all centrally state-
owned firms are large. Some firms employ less than 10 000 employees. This is the case, among others, of central research 
institutes (CISRI, GRINM) and firms in specialized markets. 
2 Some firms depend on both central and local administrations (双管企业). 
3 This is representative of the double administrative system that is prevalent in the Chinese Administration. Local SASAC 
both depends on the local governments to which they are attached and to the national SASAC.  
4 Indeed, there is not so much opacity on this topic, and private and state assets are clearly identified. There are however 
a very important number of governments. 
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rankings, etc. These sources are detailed in the next section. 
iii. Other sources of data 
Stock exchanges and listed Chinese firms : The existence of developed stock exchanges in 
China facilitates the implementation of the research design. There are 2614 firms listed in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. Many of them are subsidiaries of larger groups. This provides an extensive base of 
information on large Chinese firms themselves, or on their listed entities. In addition, during the last 
25 years of existence of stock exchanges, all types of firms have gone public. Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange were established primarily to raise capital for the state sector, in 1990 and 1991. It 
was therefore aimed to support state firms that were not making profits, and many state firms have 
listed their entities. However, the private sector is also represented in Chinese stock exchanges, since 
private firms started to go public later.  
 
Information disclosure is a legal obligation for listed firms (in China or anywhere in the 
world). Their corporate annual reports provide comprehensive information. That includes general and 
financial information, the analysis of the activities of the year, as well as detailed items on R&D 
expenditures. They also give information on the ownership structure of the firm.  
Listed firms are required to provide detailed information on their shareholders in annual and 
quarterly reports. Some corporate databases conveniently centralize these annual data. Orbis 
database, for instance, does it. Orbis Database provides firm-level information that includes general, 
financial and ownership data, as well as indicators of independence, responding to a growing need 
for micro-level analysis in addition to macro-level data, making it possible to take into account the 
individual characteristics of firms (Ribeiro et al., 2010). It is an important source of information on 
corporate groups worldwide, and provides information on the number of entities in the group, and 
shareholding relations between entities. Is it noteworthy that requests on Orbis database give results 
more complete for China than for other major emerging countries. We performed the same request in 
China, India and Brazil, request that aimed to look at the head of the group with more than 5000 
employees.1 We found 349 Chinese industrial groups (145 for more than 10 000 employees), 22 
Brazilian and 50 Indian ones.2 
In addition, institutional websites also provide China-specific information on the nature of 
firms’ ownership. We mentioned in the previous section the role of local and central governments, as 
well as the private sector in the economy.  
The China Securities Index (CSI) Website provides lists of central state-owned, local state-
                                                 
1 Shareholding of more than 50, 01 percent. 
2 A similar request for South Korea gives no results. This probably reflects specificities of Korean firms (crossed-
ownership and size). 
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owned and private-owned enterprises indices. It indices include firms, which issued securities (mostly 
domestic shares) either in Shanghai or Shenzhen, and classifies firms as follows: (1) The company is 
a Central State-owned Enterprise if realistically controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of State Council (SASAC) and the Ministry of Finance; (2) Local 
State-owned Enterprises are companies finally controlled by local State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission, local municipal government and local state-owned enterprises; (3) 
Private-owned Enterprises are finally controlled by domestic natural persons (including HK, Macao, 
and Taiwan).  
This makes it possible to identify the nature of the shareholder of a listed entity and, in turn, 
that of its parent company. It also makes it possible to classify firms per ownership and to perform 
macro-level analysis that integrates this criterion. 
We cannot rely only on stock exchanges to identify private firms, though. Not all groups go 
public, including among the largest ones. For example, the telecommunication firm Huawei 
Technologies, a Chinese global leader in R&D, never went public to maintain control and not be 
subject to information disclosure.1  
 
Information from corporate and industry associations: Firms within industrial sectors are 
organized into industry associations. Industry associations centralize news and information and 
organize events. They also act as a medium for business lobbying on behalf of firms (Deng and 
Kennedy, 2010). This includes associations like China National Coal Association, China Association 
of Automobile Manufacturers, etc. There are 711 national associations, and most of them depend on 
the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission (42,9 percent), and on another 
ministry or commission (36,6 percent) (Deng and Kennedy, 2010). Nevertheless, their members are 
both private and state firms. They are therefore source of information to identify firms in each 
industry. The identity of the largest members is generally public. Otherwise, they also publish reports 
on the state of the industry.  
In addition, there are non-governmental and non-sectorial associations. The All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (created in 1953), China’s non-governmental chamber of 
commerce, is a large organization, with local and sectoral branches.2 It publishes the lists of the top 
500 private groups, and the top 500 Chinese firms. Firms that appear in these lists are ranked by their 
profits. Screening these rankings and select the ones that meet our criteria is a reliable way to identify 
firms. 
 
                                                 
1 Distinct from Huawei Technology Co Ltd (骅威科技股份有限公司), a listed toy manufacturer 
2 It is under the leadership of the United Front of the Communist Party of China.  
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Table 4-1: Source of data used to build the database of firms 
Sources  Available data Selection of firms in panel 
Identification of large Chinese firms 
   
Central SASAC List of state firms- 112 firms on SASAC 
 General news and trends 
 83 firms (including firms 
dependent on other 
ministries) 
Local SASACs and equivalent  136 large firms 
All-China Federation of Industry 
and Commerce  
List of Chinese firms  
500 top China, 500 top private firms 
General news and trends  
105 firms1 
Main sources of characterization of firms 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges 
 
Industry; market data: 
 
996 listed companies on 
SSE 
1618 companies on SZSE 
1557 manufacturing firms 
ORBIS database  
Global database of listed and 
unlisted firms, Bureau van Dijk 
General and financial information  
Ownership and shareholders for listed 
and non-listed firms 
 
R&D expenditures for 2013 
for 2380 listed firms (> to 0 
Yuan) 
Chinese Securities Index Co Ltd Industry; Ownership; Market Value  
 
Types of ownership: 
private, central state and 
local governments for 2442 
listed firms 
   
Corporate websites Diverse information : Organisation, 
history, products, technologies, etc. 
 
Industry associations 
 
Sectorial news and reports  
List of corporate members 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion  
In this section, we detailed the selection criteria and data sources we used to look at Chinese 
firms. This led us to select 325 large firms (Table 4-1). Such method of selecting the largest firms with 
no innovation-based criteria to observe their technological capabilities is not new. Patel & Pavitt 
selected the 400 largest firms in the world in order to look at their technological profiles over time 
(Patel and Pavitt, 1997). What is new is the fact that we did it by crossing several data sources, in the 
Chinese context. While it remains necessary to interpret data with caution, Chinese firms have 
become increasingly transparent. All large Chinese firms have their own websites. They give details, 
in Chinese and, often, in English. These corporate websites provide extensive information on the 
firms’ history, their industries and products, and their organizational structures. Firms also provide 
elements on their innovation strategies, and how their R&D is organized. Because of this increasing 
                                                 
1 There is in addition one collective firm, which presents very specific feature (Nanjiecun group), as Nanjiecun is the last 
collective farm. 
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transparency, firms that we have not integrated into our population of firms, are likely to be local 
firms at lower level governments, with local implantation and markets. 
A second remark can be made on the variety of sources used. While using various sources 
further ensures the relevance of our selection, it also creates disparities. Available data are either 
consolidated data (for the whole firm) or non-consolidated ones (only referring to one entity of the 
firm). This is the case for R&D expenditures or the number of employees. We do the best to harmonize 
data we use 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the specificities of large Chinese firms on the background of the 
historical, political and industrial factors which impacted their trajectories. Understanding these 
trajectories and their determinants is key for understanding China’s innovation transition.  
This chapter serves two purposes. The first one is to identify the main keys to understanding 
the trajectory of Chinese firms. Of course, there is diversity among individual firms, and each firm is 
different, but our aim is to focus on patterns that differentiate them from large firms in other countries. 
Focusing on such a population of firms is quite common : large Chinese firms are the topic of general 
studies (Jolly and Girard, 2011; Larcon, 2009), and of studies on narrower topics such as their 
globalization (Nolan, 2001a; Nolan and Zhang, 2002), global strategy (Peng, 2012), or, a topic 
discussed in this dissertation, their innovation strategies (Zeng and Williamson, 2007). The second 
purpose of this chapter is to show that understanding the transition to technological leadership 
requires articulating the firm level with the national level.  
In addition to describing individual trajectories, we shall try and discuss the specificities of 
Chinese firms from a broad perspective. Accounting for the geographical repartition of large Chinese 
firms, and the contribution and role they have in the economy as well as their contribution to it as a 
group, allows for a better understanding of China’s dynamics.  
To accomplish the two purposes, the chapter is organized into three sections. First, we shall 
identify the specific features of large firms in China. We do this essentially by questioning their 
proximity or difference with other firms, in Korea and emerging countries. The first section thus 
adopts a comparative country approach. In a second section, we look at the diversity among Chinese 
firms and identify the primary historical dynamics that explain it. We illustrate this diversity in the 
following section by describing the 325 large Chinese firms identified in the previous chapter 
(Chapter 4, Section 3, p. 75). Finally, we conclude the chapter on the specificities of the population 
of large industrial Chinese firms. 
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2. A comparative approach between large national firms 
The comparison between countries helps identify the specificities of national innovation 
transitions. Each country has its own history and development path. Specifically, we compare Chinese 
firms to three contextual frameworks: Korean firms, firms in advanced economies (USA, Japan, and 
Europe), and, firms from emerging large nations (India, Brazil…).  
2.1. Relevance and limits of comparing Korean and China’s innovation transitions 
South Korea was among the world poorest countries in the 1960s when Park came into power. 
In fifty years, the country has achieved the rank of “developed markets,” for investors represented by 
the FTSE or S&P (Johnson, 2016), ranks among the largest R&D spenders (OECD, 2014), and has 
witnessed the emergence of large Korean multinationals (Kim et al., 2004).1 In 2015, Korea was the 
11th country in terms of GDP in 2015 (IMF) and it is considered to be a successful case of innovation 
transition. It is, therefore, reasonable to use it for the comparison with China. In addition, the 
comparison between China and Korea comes from the geographic, and cultural proximities between 
the two countries. They are Asian countries with similar cultural traits – including Confucianism, 
language proximity (notably because of the familiarity of Koreans with Chinese characters) and 
common references (popular culture such as sitcoms, celebrities, etc.).  
In addition, both countries have witnessed a rapid economic growth based on technological 
progress and manufacturing of products of increased technological complexity.2 China’s economic 
situation at the end of the 2000s shares similarities with that of Korea in the 1990s. The 2008 global 
financial crisis accelerated China’s economic difficulties and increased the pressure on Chinese firms 
to innovate. In a similar way, the Korean economy was threatened by the 1997 Asian financial crisis.3 
In 1997, Linsu Kim concluded his book on Korea’s technological learning in terms that could be 
applicable to China today: “In conclusion, Korea has dynamically achieved phenomenal growth in 
technological learning in the past three decades. But Korea, facing many problems of its own, is being 
squeezed between advanced countries and second-tier newly industrializing countries. As a result, 
Korea may not be able to grow as fast as it did in the past. But by turning future crises into creative 
learning, it is Korea’s vision to join the industrially advanced community (G-7) by 2020.” (Kim, 
1997).  
The severity of the 1997 crisis marked the limits of Korea’s economic development: according 
to The Washington Post, 14 of the 30 largest Korean companies were “wiped out” during the 1997 
                                                 
1 Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index 
2 There are of course many points of dissemblance, notably the role of foreign investments, which was modest in Korea, 
and a primary factor for China. 
3 This was not the case of China. The 1997 Asian crisis had a moderate impact on the Chinese economy, because at the 
time, China’s economy was less open than its neighbors to the global economy.  
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Asian financial crisis (Harlan, 2012). However, the crisis contributed to foster investment in corporate 
R&D, because it weakened the performance of industrial strategies that firms previously followed 
and that were based on industrial diversification rather than specialization.1  
We can make a parallel between the two historical situations. The question of the innovation 
transition in China is related to its capacity to seize the risks and opportunities attached to the current 
economic situation. Scholars explored questions in the Korean context that are now raised in China. 
The validity of a theoretical framework derived from the Korean experience to China, therefore, 
depends on the examination of the two situations in a comparative perspective. In particular, research 
on innovation transition derives from studies on Korea. 
We have formulated the hypothesis that large Chinese firms develop their knowledge base on 
emerging technologies while they are catching up on other dimensions because the innovation 
transition is characterized by the implementation of different technological strategies across divisions 
/ subsidiaries within a firm (leadership, challenger, and catch-up). This hypothesis is built upon the 
Korean case (Hobday et al., 2004; OECD, 2009), and in particular the case of Samsung, which is 
considered as having achieved the transition to innovation (Kim et al. 2004). The organization of 
Korean large firms into large business groups has been favorable to this strategy, which is still visible 
in 2012. The largest Korean firm, Samsung sells key elements for Apple's iPhone while competing in 
the smartphone market (Harlan, 2012).  
This leads to putting in perspective the nature and features of Chinese firms with that of 
Korean firms. The comparison between the two countries, however, shows many differences in the 
contribution of large firms to the economy, in their organization, as well as their industrial strategies. 
The degree of dependence of a national economy on its large firms varies across countries and 
strongly differs between China and Korea. Large firms drove Korea’s transition (OECD, 2009). These 
firms, formed into chaebols, include Samsung, LG or Hyundai among the most famous ones.2 A few 
of them account for a dominant proportion of Korea’s GDP. Chaebols made 71 percent of Korean 
GDP in 1987 (Lee and Jin, 2009). This trend has persisted. Samsung alone accounted for 23 percent 
of Korean GDP in 2013 (Le Monde, 2014).3 Thus, understanding the development of these firms 
                                                 
1 However, by contrast with the Chinese case, this occurred despite a slow-down in terms of R&D investment “…the rate 
of growth of R&D spending overall fell immediately after the crisis from an average of 10 percent per annum in the period 
1992–1997 to 5 percent in 1999 … and R&D spending as a proportion of overall GDP] fell from 2.55 percent in 1998 to 
2.4 percent in 1999” (Hobday et al., 2004) 
2 The Korean ‘Chaebol” refers to South Korea’s large firms, mainly formed in the 1950s (Sig Choi et al., 2008). These 
firms that are horizontally and vertically constitute a unique model of conglomerates, that play a role during the period of 
economic growth. They are characterized by a series of distinctive features. The first one is their specific ownership 
structure, where founding family members keep control of firms through cross ownership. This ownership structure has 
helped chaebol firms to engage in internal market transactions (member firms purchase and sell intermediate goods in the 
group), while major firms guarantee bank loans and provide collaterals for others. One of the major feature of chaebol 
firm is therefore the internalization of market transactions. While they origin in Japanese zaibatzu, they differ in that 
regard because they were prohibited to held shares in commercial banks (Park and Yuhn, 2012). 
3 Samsung is by far the largest chaebol in Korea. While Samsung Electronics is well-known outside Korea, the group has 
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explain to a large extent Korea’s economic development.  
The configuration is different in China, where large firms have a much smaller weight in the 
economy. In 1995, the top 30 largest firms accounted for 1 percent of the Chinese GDP (Lee and Woo, 
2001). Even though the proportion might have varied since then, the smallness of this percentage 
clearly indicates a lower dependence of the economy on the largest firms.  
In the case of Korea, there is a direct impact of the development of innovative capabilities of 
a few large firms in the nation. In China, the persisting fragmentation has an impact on industrial 
transition. The innovation transition does not rely on the technological strategies of a few firms and 
is distributed among a greater number of smaller firms, with less individual impacts.  
Consistent with what was presented in the paragraph above, large Chinese firms are, on 
average, smaller than Korean ones. In 1995, the average asset size of the top 30 Chinese firms was 
seven times smaller than that of the average top 22 chaebols (Lee and Woo, 2001). What we observe 
in the population of the 325 industrial firms confirms this pattern. The average number of employees 
for each firm is about fifty thousand persons.1 There is, in addition, variety among Chinese firms 
themselves. The group of 325 includes firms of various sizes. 162 firms (50 percent) employ less than 
21 500 employees.2 On the other hand, there are 44 firms in the group (representing 14 percent of the 
group of 325 firms) which employ more than 100 000 persons.  
One explanation of this difference can be found in their respective national histories. We detail 
the trajectories of large firms in China in the next sections, but we can already draw attention to the 
fact that they have grown following other dynamics than those in Korea. The “octopus-like” growth 
strategy followed by Korean firms still explains the current organizational structure: Chaebols, which 
were created in the 1960s and 1970s, grew by diversifying and creating new entities in other 
industries, following opportunistic market strategies under the influence of a dominant family that 
aimed to keep control of the entities (OECD, 2009).3 This explains the complex ownership structure 
of Korean firms, with crossed ownership between subsidiaries (Lee and Jin, 2009). It results that 
some Korean firms under the same brand are not even legally related (OECD, 2009). The dominant 
model is the conglomerate: in 2010, they account for about 80 percent of the largest 50 Korean 
companies by revenue (Hirt et al., 2013). Chinese firms did not adopt such a diversification strategy 
even though it is clear that Chinese leaders have visited chaebols (and Japanese keiretsu), and were 
familiar with the model of these network-based groups (Ma and Lu, 2010).4 
                                                 
diversified activities through its subsidiaries. The omnipresence of the firm explains the nickname of Korea as “The 
Republic of Samsung” (Harlan, 2012) 
1 50 884 employees on average 
2 Median: 21 500 employees 
3 Control was notably kept thanks to personal connections. There is an intersection of business and family interests through 
marriages notably between different chaebol families. 
4 Alternatively, one can extend the comparison to Japan. There are important differences between the Korean and Japanese 
models. Differences are notably due to the fact that Korean firms are prohibited to hold share in commercial banks, which 
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2.2. Chinese large firms and other emerging nations 
Another reference framework, quite common, is that of “emerging countries.” One could 
consider that large Chinese firms belong to the broad group of emerging market multinationals 
(emerging multinationals or similar appellations). Emerging market firms, as a group, are the subject 
of general analysis (Batra et al., 2012; Huchet et al., 2015; Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; Williamson 
et al., 2013) or are studied regarding specific topics such as their internationalization (Bonaglia et al., 
2007) or the role of family firms (Fernández-Pérez and Fernández-Moya, 2011). This categorization 
implies that Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and other firms share common difficulties and opportunities, 
and adopt similar strategies in response to their environment. By default, it also implies that firms in 
emerging countries share with one another features that contrast with firms from advanced economies. 
Most global firms, especially leading industrial firms, come from the highest income countries. These 
firms, therefore, operate as an alternative model. The United States are home to the largest number of 
global firms in Fortune rankings (Fortune, 2014). In 2014, there are 613 American firms among the 
top 2500 global firms in R&D (EU R&D scoreboard, 2014).  
Since the 19th century and the generalization of large business corporations in the United-
States and in Europe, the organization of firms has become increasingly complex. In order to operate 
in several markets – either different geographical market or different product ranges - large firms 
organize their activities in divisions, entities that are bound together with links of coordination, 
subordination, etc. and organize in business groups. Business groups are defined as the “collections 
of firms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways characterized by an intermediate level 
of binding, namely neither bound merely by short term strategic alliances, nor legally consolidated 
into a single entity” (Granovetter, 1995). This classic definition emphasizes the diversity (or 
collections) of entities and links within large firms themselves. Large firms, or business groups, 
produce a range of products and services that are more or less diversified in terms of industries. Large 
business groups tend to operate with separate entities in diversified industries but are not equivalent. 
We encapsulate the way these different activities are organized under the notion of organizational 
structure.  
Organizations differ across countries. Diversified firms have been considered as a major driver 
of the economic growth of developing countries including Argentina, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). In developing 
countries, there is a stronger trend for industrial diversification by firms constituted in business 
                                                 
lead to alternative model of internal markets (Park and Yuhn, 2012). It is however arguable that Korean and Japanese 
large firms present more similarities with each other than they both do with Chinese firms. They originate in the same 
model. This is further illustrated by the vocabulary: 財閥 both refers to chaebols and zaibatsu (Chinese characters used 
in Japanese and in Hanja that respectively mean “wealth” and “clan”). Zaibatsu are Japanese pre-war business groups 
from which derived the present keiretsu (Mitsubishi, Nissan, etc.).  
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groups. Associated with diversification is the organization in conglomerates. Conglomerates are 
either business groups with a holding company and various listed and unlisted subsidiaries (Tata in 
India, Samsung in Korea, Bouygues in France, Mitsubishi in Japan, etc.), or a multidivisional 
corporation, which houses several industries within the same entity (e.g. Nestlé). Tata Group, for 
instance, is a large Indian conglomerate organized into a business group. Established in Mumbai as 
Tata in 1868, it has grown and now has leading subsidiaries in automobile, steel, tear, soda, 
communication (TATA, 2014).  
The basic argument that explains industrial diversification is when a firm with investment 
capability operates in a sector with lower demand and technological capability constraints.1 
Conglomerates exist everywhere, but they play a specific role in developing nations because a 
diversification strategy is appropriate in an environment with less developed market infrastructures 
and property rights. Deficiencies like the lack of information, the lack of infrastructures and poor 
institutional mechanisms complicate access to resources and to customer markets (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997). Being organized as a diversified business group mitigates the difficulties caused by 
market deficiencies such as difficult access to bank loans. The organization of business groups 
facilitates internal financing and the circulation of personnel between the different entities of the 
group and enables leverage on their unique corporate brand across industries (Khanna et al., 2005; 
Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  
The industrial diversification of firms is often analyzed as a strategic response to institutional 
constraints. In that perspective, firms adopt a diversified structure to fill the institutional voids of 
emerging markets, some of which we already mentioned in the previous section, or as an opportunistic 
approach to development. For instance, the dominant models among Indian firms are conglomerates. 
In 2008, the top ten Indian conglomerates accounted for 40 percent of the total market capitalization 
of the top 500 Indian firms (Business Today, 2014). This can largely be explained by economic 
planning under Jawaharlal Nehru in 1947 (Ruet, 2015), which limited some sectors of the economy 
to the private sector . In each industry, the government lets the private sector foster its initial 
development but after a while takes back the project. As a result, each time a firm was blocked from 
expanding into its industry, it was going into another sector in which he had the license to operate 
(Ruet, 2015). 
Each country has its particularities, and generalizations might be misleading. The debate over 
what terms are the most appropriate to categorize these countries, among emerging countries or 
markets, developing countries, middle-income range countries, etc. reflects the existing diversity 
                                                 
1 This is not limited to the developing countries. For instance, this argument explains, in the 1950s, the growth of American 
conglomerates coming from sectors like public utilities, transportation, textiles, mining, and food, as they use their 
available cash from prior investment to invest in other industries (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
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among these countries. The World Bank at the moment of writing distinguishes four groupings 
according to the level of incomes: low (31 countries in 2014), lower-middle (51 countries), upper-
middle (53 countries), and high income countries (80 countries).1 What we observe is that this 
categorization is not consistent with the acronym “BRIC” (or BRICS): China and Brazil are both 
categorized among the upper-middle income countries, Russia as a high-income country, and India 
as a lower-middle income country. This illustrates the limits, at least in the context of our research, 
of comparing China to other countries such as India (population 1,311 billion2) and Brazil (population 
208 million).  
The Chinese word for (large) business groups (da) qiye jituan appears for the first time in 1986 
in the State Council official documents (Ma and Lu, 2010). It is now commonly used to name large 
firms. The National Statistics Bureau of China defines them as “legally independent entities that are 
partly or wholly owned by a parent firm and registered as affiliated firms of that parent firm” (Ma 
and Lu, 2010)3. While Chinese firms are organized as business groups, there is no equivalent to Tata 
or to Samsung. 
Some of the largest firms are state-owned enterprises and are sometimes identified as 
conglomerates. They are however business groups that are vertically or horizontally integrated, and 
their core industry is easy to identify. China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) is such an 
example of a business group. The firm describes its activities as follows on its website:  
The scope of its business mainly covers oil and gas exploration and production, extraction, 
pipeline transmission and marketing; oil refining; production, marketing, storage and transportation 
of petrochemicals, chemical fibers, chemical fertilizers and other chemical products; import, export 
and import/export agency business of crude oil, natural gas, refined oil products, petrochemicals, 
chemicals, and other commodities and technologies; research, development and application of 
technology and information. The Company is China's largest producer and supplier of refined oil 
products (including gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, etc.) and major petrochemical products (including 
synthetic resin, synthetic fiber monomers and polymers, synthetic fiber, synthetic rubber, chemical 
fertilizer and petrochemical intermediates). It is also China's second largest crude oil producer 
(2006).4  
This description illustrates both the coherence of its core activities that are carried out within 
100 entities including wholly-owned, equity-holding and equity-sharing companies, and the 
                                                 
1 On 215 countries and territories (include islands) https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-
how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries 
2 Source: Estimates of the United Nations (Word Population Prospect). Data available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ 
China’s estimated population in 2015 is 1,376 billion people. See chapter 3. 
3 The core company should have a registered capital of over 50 million Yuan, at least 5 affiliated companies, and a total 
registered capital to be over 100 million Yuan in the definition of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. 
4 http://english.sinopec.com/about_sinopec/our_company/20100328/8532.shtml Accessed on 15/08/2015 
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horizontal diversification within industries, here from oil extraction to petrochemical products such 
as resins or synthetic fibers, and chemical products. 
 
The low diversification is illustrated by the sectoral distribution of the group of 325 large 
industrial firms. Most firms operate in well-determined sectors such as the metallurgical sector, the 
car industry, construction or electronics. This is coherent with other sources. Seven firms listed on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are classified as 'conglomerates,' compared to the 1640 firms listed in 
Shenzhen at the time.1 However, this figure only acts as an indicator. The difference in the proportion 
comes from the fact that conglomerates often list specialized entities, and data on listed firms, in turn, 
leads to underestimating the number of conglomerates in the economy.  
This is the reason why in the last section of this chapter we argue that conglomerates are not 
the driving forces of the Chinese economy. Altogether, 42 firms operate in diversified activities 
without any dominant core activity. They employ on average 39507 persons for a maximum of 
200 000 persons.  
On average, large Chinese firms have adopted industrial specialization strategies. It might be 
argued that these kinds of strategies are closer to that of firms in advanced economies. Their size is 
aligned with global average as well. Large Chinese firms in our data employ from 10 000 (the 
minimum thresholds we adopt) to 1,5 million employees, with an average level of employment of 50 
884 persons. It is difficult to obtain a relevant point of comparison, but these figures for Chinese large 
firms are in the magnitude of figures for large firms ranked in the 2014 European Innovation 
scoreboard.2 The average level of employment of the latter is 49 040 employees, with maximum 
580 000 employees. It appears that Chinese large firms tend to be relatively modest in size. Moreover, 
some of the centrally state-owned firms often seen as “giant” companies, including Sinopec and 
Petrochina, are not large according to global standards (Nolan and Zhang, 2002).  
We observed that three features are associated with firms in developing nations: the role of 
industrial diversification (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), the role and characteristic of conglomerates and 
business groups, notably in India, and the nature of ownership. State ownership is a feature commonly 
shared in developing nations. Large corporations around the world are mostly controlled either by 
one State or by one family, with ownership not widely dispersed and with pyramidal structures (Porta 
et al., 1999). Based on these three features, Chinese firms do not follow a model that would be 
“typical” of emerging nations, even though there are conglomerates and diversified business groups. 
As we mentioned above, some features are more similar to those of firms in advanced economies like 
size and industrial specialization.  
                                                 
1 http://www.szse.cn/main/en/MarketStatistics/BySectors/ 
2 only selecting firms with more than 10 000 employees in similar sectors 
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Similarly, firms in developing nations operate in a weaker institutional environment. Xu and 
Meyer list four identified features of emerging markets. Markets are less efficient; governments are 
not only setting the rules, but they are active players in the economy; network-based behaviours are 
common, because of less efficient markets and to some extent of social traditions; and high degree of 
risks and uncertainties make it more difficult for companies to design their strategic decisions 
{Citation}. To what extent does China also share these features? Market efficiency and the level of 
risk and uncertainties are difficult to assess. In these two dimensions, there are certainly roads for 
improvement. China has not yet reached the standards of developed nations regarding the level of its 
financial markets, and uncertainties remain high. The situation is, however, better than for other 
developing or emerging nations. By contrast, it is recognized that China shares the two other features: 
government intervention and intrapersonal network. Governments are active players in China, as is 
illustrated by the debates on the model of “state capitalism” proposed by China’s specialists (Bergère, 
2013; Naughton and Tsai, 2015). The second element, network-based behaviors, is also well 
documented. The concept of guanxi is often mobilized to explain China’s mode of intrapersonal 
relations; guanxi creates reciprocal obligations and impacts on varying aspects of business, including 
business performance (Chung, 2011; Yeung and Tung, 1996).  
Table 5-1: Comparison of Chinese large firms with other firms 
 Chinese groups Korean groups Emerging nations 
Companies 
Western firms 
Dominant growth 
strategy 
Specialization  Diversification 
(internal growth) 
Diversification 
(internal growth) 
Specialization (internal & 
external growth) 
Weight in national 
economy 
Low 
1 percent of GDP 
for 30 top groups 
 
Very heavy 
71 percent of GDP 
(Samsung = 17% of 
PIB ) 
Varied Varied 
Ownership type Concentrated 
ownership 
 
Crossed ownership 
Family behind 
‘chaebol.' 
State and family- 
owned groups 
Concentrated ownership 
(Porta et al., 1999) 
Governmental 
links 
State ownership 
Network 
Specific role of 
CCParty 
Network  State ownership 
Network 
State ownership 
Network 
 
Size  
 
Average 
Fragmented  
 
Very large Large  Average (source: EU 
scoreboard) 
2.3. Conclusion 
This introduction to the differences between China and other countries has evidenced two 
elements regarding Chinese firms. First, the South Korean case appears limited to explain the 
innovation transition in China. Chinese firms and Korean firms have adopted different organizational 
structures. Chinese firms are smaller and more diversified. Moreover, they do not have the same 
weight in the economy. We noticed in Chapter 3 that China was more decentralized because of the 
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importance of local governments. Then, China also presents very distinctive features from India. 
3. Histories and trajectories of today’s large Chinese firms 
I returned to mainland China in the early 1990s… the Chinese had no concept of what a 
company was, they only had enterprises. And, at that time, a state-owned enterprise was really just 
an arm of the state, and they fulfilled the designed role by the state for each of the enterprises. Which 
was, of course, a very different notion than what a company is all about. But, over time, many of the 
Chinese enterprises turned into companies. But, when they interact with multinationals they actually 
find out that, "Hey, there's actually another way of running a business. 
 Edward Tse, Chairman, Greater China, Booz & Company1 
3.1. Introduction 
The preceding section presented the specificities of large Chinese firms. These specificities 
can be explained by the way large firms have emerged and grown till today. Each corporate history 
is obviously unique but, in the Chinese context, we can identify two primary dynamics that are 
associated with the evolution of their organizational structure and industrial strategies. These 
dynamics are intertwined with the political decisions that led China’s transition to market economy, 
and the choice of a “state-led” transition. The first dynamic is the fact that large Chinese firms 
emerged along two paths: they were new entrants after 1978 or, they originated in the transformation 
and expansion of prior industrial capacities. The second dynamic is the evolution of the respective 
role of state and private firms in the course of years. 
3.2. Two primary growth paths 
Large enterprises emerged following two primary paths: the growth of traditional plants into 
bigger groups since 1978 and the construction of new plants; and the growth of new entrants during 
the reform and opening period (Nolan and Yeung, 2001). Let us emphasize the fact that these two 
paths do not coincide with the “state versus private” narrative, a topic we discuss in the following 
sections.  
The first growth path is the path followed by the firms created after 1978. Many international 
Chinese firms in consumer markets, mostly private firms or locally state-owned firms, fall into that 
category. Many firms were established in the 1980s and 1990s, and they do not only include private 
firms. The first administrative decentralization created incentives for local governments to develop 
                                                 
1 In interview of Edward Tse - China Boom Project Available on http://chinaboom.asiasociety.org/ 
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their local economy. Thus, many new entrants were state-owned, and their creation was supported by 
local governments. Local governments acted as entrepreneurs by establishing new firms, and/or by 
supporting them (Naughton, 2007).  
The importance of local ownership in China should not have us forget that the recent period 
witnesses the emergence of family businesses, especially in Zhejiang Province. The role of family 
ownership in China is very interesting. There has been a surge in the number of family owned firms 
since 1999. In particular, in 2008, there were more than 100 family-owned listed firms in China (Ding 
et al., 2008) out of a total of around 1600 firms listed in Chinese markets. Family-owned firms are 
firms with people from the founding family in a management position. Due to the recent history of 
the Chinese firms, which were created in the last thirty years, there may not be ‘dynasties’ like those 
that can be found in the United States, in Europe or in South Korea. The existence of family firms is 
often associated with a longer-term vision, greater investment in the firms by managers, as well as 
maintained control on business activities. Listed family-owned firms are smaller than state-owned 
firms. The largest ones are specialized in electronics, retail, and sectors of the car industry. Some of 
these firms are included in the 325 large firms, categorized by private ownership. The largest family 
firms in 2005 were Guangsha Group (Lou Family), Wanxiang Group (Lu family), Hengdian Group 
(Xu family), Youngor Group (Li family), Chint Group (Nan family), Hangzhou Wahaha (Zong 
Family), Jiangsu Sanfangxiang Industry (Bian family), Delixi Group (Hu family) and Nanshan Group 
(Song Family) (Lubinski et al., 2013, chap. 6).  
Most current large private firms were created after 1978. The emergence of private firms is 
not linked to the privatization of state firms during the transition towards the market economy, but to 
later creations. Few firms were privatized contrary to what happened during the market transition in 
the URSS where privatization was massive and rapid (Filatotchev et al., 1996). During the first period, 
the institutional change allowed private ventures to grow and develop, even though at first they 
represented a very marginal as an activity (Nee and Opper, 2012). Among the private firms that 
compose today’s industrial large firms and for which we have the year of creation, 89,5 percent of 
them were created after 1978. Among the nine private firms created before, there is a high proportion 
of family firm businesses. There are very few cases of private firms founded by individuals 
disconnected from local institutions or businesses.  
An alternative path has been the growth and expansion of the traditional plants, which existed 
before 1978. This is the path followed by an important proportion of the 83 centrally state-owned 
firms in our data. 36 percent of them (30 firms) were founded before 1949 (6 firms) or during the 
planned economy period (between 1949 and 1978).1 In a broad movement of restructuration and 
                                                 
1 For some firms, we use as data the year of the legal incorporation of state assets into the firm, which happened much 
later in the history.  
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corporatization of the soviet-style Chinese industrial system, centrally state-owned firms were 
incorporated as firms with industrial purpose and integrated state plants and facilities that depended 
on their former ministries in their scopes.1 The origin of these centrally state-owned firms can, 
therefore, be traced back to the 1950s and the first 5-years plan (1953-1957) modelled on the soviet 
planning system established since 1920s and 1930s in Russia and inspired by Marxist thinking as 
well. Many of them find their roots in the system that was first implemented in the 1950s, with the 
help of the Soviet Union. During the first 5-year plan, 156 large turnkey facilities were imported in 
heavy industry, power generation, mining, refining, chemicals and machine tools (Liu and White, 
2001, p. 1097).  
Because of central planning, the economy was organized in industrial sectors (or industrial 
bureaus), which encompassed, beyond manufacturing plants, research institutes, design bureaus, 
engineering research institutes and experimental facilities depending on branch ministries. However, 
one element that differentiated China from Russia was the deployment of the structure at the different 
administrative levels, with the fact that each governmental level adopts the same structure than the 
Central’ People Government. This basic organization remained unchanged until the 1990s. It is visible 
in the descriptions of the R&D organization of industrial firms in China (Fischer, 1983). 
The restructuration since the 1990s was not directed by market-based decisions. Instead, the 
integration or the growth of large state firms is coordinated and supervised by administrative 
authorities. There has been in particular repetitive attempts to consolidate the industry by grouping 
small actors (Huchet, 1999).2 In 2015, the railroad equipment manufacturing, the two large centrally 
state-owned firms China, CNR Corporation Limited and China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock 
Corporation Limited (CSR), were merged in 2015 to form a new firm.3 According to an official of 
the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), “the merger is an experiment 
by the government aimed at reforming state-backed firms”, and “the new company will help 
accomplish the government's 10-year plan for upgrading manufacturing capacity and help SOEs' 
expand abroad” (Caixin, 2015).  
Clearly, these two paths are schematic and there is not always a clear separation line between 
the two paths. Quite naturally, entrepreneurs have used existing facilities prior to 1978 to create and 
develop their business. For instance, Hisense grew out of Qingdao No.2 Radio Factory in 1969 and 
was incorporated as a company in 1992. In addition, there is also important variety within the group 
of centrally state-owned firms. There are also examples of large central state owned enterprises that 
                                                 
1 a few firms were not corporatized (China Railway) and are under the Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole 
People (1988) 
2 Huchet notes for example the importance of the fragmentation in the cement industry, with more than 8000 cement 
producers at the time. It is noteworthy that the problem has persisted. 
3 China North Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry (Group) Corporation 
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were originally created under the leadership of an entrepreneur. This is, for instance, the case of China 
National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina), whose official story goes back to the creation of a 
small solvents factory “Bluestar Company” by Ren Jianxin in 1984 with a 10,000-yuan loan, and 
which grew by integrating troubled state-owned factories while maintaining state ownership. 
ChemChina was created in 2004.1 
 
Their history, marked by several discontinuities and change in their trajectories (Ruet, 2015), 
has consequences on the level of industrial diversification of large Chinese firms. Conglomerates and 
diversified firms are a recent trend in China, compared to Korea or India. “According to McKinsey, 
China’s conglomerates (excluding state-owned enterprises) represented about 40 percent of its 
largest 50 companies in 2010, up from less than 20 percent a decade before” (Hirt et al., 2013). This 
shows an increase in the number of private conglomerates in the first decade of the 2000s. Moreover, 
many large state-owned “conglomerates” tend to maintain more specialization than their counterparts. 
Large firms that were restructured on the basis of traditional plants and institutes were created to 
cover the needs of the market for a particular industry. For instance, “Sinopec was under the direct 
supervision of the State Council and was tasked to operate downstream, including the formulation of 
policies for producing refined oil products and petrochemicals, supervision of the construction and 
operation of refining and petrochemical plants and the marketing of refined oil products and 
petrochemicals in China” (Zhang, 2008). The specialization that derives from their incorporation “for 
industrial purpose” suggests that when a business group diversified to other sectors, the 
diversification occurred later in the firms’ history.  
The organizational structure of large central firms results from the integration and 
restructuration of state assets, through mergers and acquisitions, in addition to the construction or 
extension of further production facilities. Therefore, the specialization towards core industries does 
not necessarily mean that a firm presents an integrated organizational structure. In some cases, there 
is barely any coordination between them. A former engineer of the centrally state-owned firm FAW 
(First Automobile Works), a fortune global 500 company (2015) mentions how separate entities, in 
the automotive industries, operate independently: You may better understand the FAW Group, when 
seeing it as a bundle of different firms rather than a whole. I spent my entire career in Changchun, 
where FAW’s matrix operations are located. During a long period of my career, many of FAW’s 
current affiliates, such as the Tianjin and Hainan Automotive, were independent firms controlled by 
different local governments, and had developed varied culture, conventions, and technology bases. 
Coordinating this historic legacy in favour of the centre’s strategy would be challenging.  
                                                 
1 https://www.pirelli.com/corporate/it/about_us/management/default_Ren-Jianxin.html Accessed on 12/10/2015 
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Former engineer of FAW, cited by (Nam, 2015, p. 267) 
3.3. The rebalancing between private and state firms 
State firms are over-represented among large firms in China. Chinese state has not disengaged 
from firms during the reform period, which explains the remaining importance of state ownership.  
This is reflected in the composition of the group of 325 firms we look at. Two-thirds of the 
firms are state firms. This includes central state ownership, but also ownership by local governments. 
In this regard, local governments played a double role in the formation of large firms. 25 firms (23 
percent of locally state-owned firms) originate from facilities existing prior to 1978. This shows that 
local governments also participated in the creation of new firms after the start of the reform period 
and that this pattern is not marginal. Locally state-owned firms account for 42 percent of the 
population of 325 large industrial firms, with 136 locally state-owned firms, which represent the 
largest category. We can note that among large firms, state ownership dominates private ownership, 
which is related to the role of local governments. The proportion - one-remaining third of private 
firms (32 percent) - is consistent with other sources of data. For instance, in 2011, China’s most 
profitable 500 firms included 194 private firms according to the survey realized by the All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (Shim, 2012). This represents 37 percent of the top 500 
Chinese firms in terms of profit.1  
This distribution is not representative of the entire Chinese economy, in which the private 
sector has become dominant. It represents 60 percent of the GDP in 2012 (All-China Federation of 
Industry & Commerce, 2012). Private firms have a lesser weight among large firms. There are less of 
them, and on average, they are smaller than large state firms. This can be explained by the top of the 
list and the size of very large central state owned firms. In 2011, total profits by the most profitable 
184 private enterprises were only half of the top 10 state-owned firms (Shim, 2012). Indeed, if we 
look at employment figures, private firms and locally state-owned firms belong to the same range, 
even though locally state-owned firms tend to be slightly larger: 28 000 employees for the private 
firms, and 31 000 for locally state-owned firms.23 The real contrast exists with centrally state-owned 
firms which employ an average of 86 500 employees. 
The convergence between state and private firms would depends on two features. The first 
one is the nature of the governance of state firms. State ownership is often associated with political 
costs for the firm. In theory “the SASAC was founded “on the principle of separating government 
administration from enterprise management and separating ownership from management” (Trade 
                                                 
1 37 percent of the top 500 Chinese firms 
2 27 737 employees 
3 30 977 employees 
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Policy Review, 2006). Many large state firms, especially centrally state-owned firms, are managed as 
administrations. Processes such as executives' careers advancements or allocation of financial profits 
follow administrative rules and depend on ministry-level decisions. For instance, the amount of 
dividends that Chinese centrally state-owned firms need to give its shareholders (SASAC or other 
ministries) is defined by law (and can be revised). State firms are likely to adopt strategies decided 
by the government, this included for example firms that are “required” to merge to acquire the assets 
of another one in the perspective of consolidating the industry (Huchet, 1999). 
The Chinese Communist Party still has a major role among Chinese firms, including listed 
firms (Yu, 2009) and state firms (Wang, 2014). These roles might overlap, the firm’s chairman being 
the Party Secretary. This raises questions about their managerial capabilities: there is some evidence 
that the party secretary “is likely to be a person with more political reliability (that is, connections) 
but less professionalism than other managers” (Yu, 2009). While the role of the party is not limited 
to state-owned firms, it is stronger in the case of state firms where they both ensure political decisions, 
and also impact corporate decisions notably through executive appointments (McNally, 2002). Private 
firms use the Party secretary as a channel with the government (i.e. political ties) (McNally, 2002).  
In addition to corporate governance issues specific to state firms (see p. 56, Are Chinese 
institutions supporting innovations?), another aspect is the difference of treatment between private 
and state firms. There has been an official and continuous support to the central large firms by the 
Chinese government, which if it did not exclude private firms, tended to favour the state-owned ones.  
The historical support to large state firms had varied across the years (Eaton, 2014). Large 
firms were not a driver of economic development at the beginning of the reform period. Smaller 
collective enterprises and town and village enterprises led the first waves of development (Naughton, 
2007, p. 271). They gained more importance from 1989, and the arrival of Li Peng.1 Since then, the 
importance of leading a “large enterprise strategy” has made consensus among political elites (Eaton, 
2014), and led to implement measures to promote large firms. It includes traditional mechanisms such 
as the implementation of financial supports (tax credits or subsidies), market control mechanisms 
(price controls, localization constraints, licenses). The support to large firms was largely oriented 
towards state firms, which were privileged in many aspects. They have easier access to bank loans. 
They can provide better employment conditions, social security or pension system than private firms 
(Venture Outsource, n.d.), which created competition for human resources by private firms.  
There has been a progressive harmonization in the treatment of private and state firms, 
however. In 2005, the Chinese government publicly announced equal treatment for private and public 
                                                 
1 Zhao Ziyang, premier till 1987 and general secretary of the central committee Party from 1987 to 1989  was criticized 
for giving too much support to smaller enterprises at the detriment of large enterprises. However, it seems that this political 
choice does not reflect a real opposition to supporting large and central enterprises, but was rather a pragmatic choice 
towards TVEs (Eaton, 2013). 
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sectors in terms of investments” that allow private investment into monopolistic industries.1 
Introducing market competition for state firms has also become a topical issue under Xi Jinping since 
2012. The harmonization of treatments was progressively extended to innovation policies, and 
notably on those regarding emerging technologies. In 2012, China’s National Development and 
Reform Commission expressed its commitment to providing private sectors with financial support 
for strategic emerging industries (Shim, 2012).2 There are however persisting worries of misallocation 
of resources towards state led innovation projects (Chen and Naughton, 2011). 
4. The description of the large Chinese firms 
 In the preceding sections, we have presented what we consider to be important features of 
Chinese firms, and have highlighted some elements that characterize their histories. It is now time to 
provide a more detailed and systematic description of the population of large industrial firms we 
study. In describing the large Chinese firms, we shall emphasize two main elements: their 
geographical location and their sectoral coverage.  
4.1. The geography of large firms 
Geographic localization is related to the trajectories of firms, and their specificities. The 
localization of the headquarters of the 325 large firms (Map 5-1) partly reflects the economic 
geography of China's economic development. Of course, firms do not base their operations close to 
their headquarters only, but rather operate through several entities among China. However, the 
headquarters’ localization still represents the administrative, historical localization, and the place for 
decision-making. 
4.1.1. Three dominant economic centres 
The geographical distribution of China’s economic development is illustrated by the 
localization of the headquarters of large industrial Chinese firms (Map 5-1: Localization of the 
headquarters of large firms). Two thirds of the whole population of large industrial firms, 215 firms 
(66 percent) have their headquarters in one the three most dynamic regions: The Bohai Bay, the Pearl 
River Delta area, and the Yangtze River Delta area. China’s economic growth after opening was based 
on rapid industrialization of a concentrated number of areas, mostly localized in eastern and coastal 
China. The three geographic areas previously mentioned, close to the sea or to the ocean, concentrate 
wealth and industries. They are respectively located around Beijing-Tianjin (Tianjin is located at 107 
                                                 
1 Known as the “Non-Public 36 articles (民间投资36条), 2005. It was followed in 2010 by the “New 36 articles” that 
stipulate subdivided areas. 
2 Opinions on the Implementation of Encouraging and Guiding Private Enterprises to Develop Strategic Emerging 
Industries, NDCR, July 2012, China 
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industrial reasons. A large part of the pattern is explained by administrative reasons, and by the status 
of Beijing as the capital city, where China’s Central Government is located. More specifically, the 
State Asset Supervision Administration Committee (SASAC) that supervises central state assets since 
2003 is in Beijing.1 Beijing tends to house the headquarters of many centrally state-owned firms, 
which are close to the government. This is further indicated by the distribution of Beijing-based firms 
among ownership types. 69 percent of Beijing-based firms (46 firms out of 67 Beijing-headquartered 
firms) are centrally state-owned firms administrated under SASAC or similar ministry-level 
organizations. This does not mean that of all their operations are located there, however. Besides 
Beijing, 50 other firms are headquartered in 22 cities of the Bohai Bay area. Other important cities 
include Tianjin, Jinan, Weifang, Qingdao. More specifically, seven locally state-owned firms are 
headquartered in Tianjin, all depending on the Tianjin government. There are also five firms in Jinan, 
the capital of Shandong Province, five firms in Weifang and four firms in Qingdao (only locally state-
owned firms); both Weifang and Qingdao are cities in Shandong Province.  
A second dynamic region in terms of industrial development is the Yangtze River Delta area, 
around Shanghai (Liu and Li, 2015). The Yangtze river flows into the East China sea in Shanghai. 
The area includes cities from Jiangsu Province at the North of the river (Nanjing), from Zhejiang 
Province at the South (Hangzhou, Jiangyin), and cities from the eastern part of the inland Anhui 
province. The dynamism of the region is reflected in the fact that 67 large Chinese firms are 
headquartered in the area (21 percent). The distribution of firms illustrates that the regional economy 
has other drivers than the Bohai Bay economic area. It relies more on the private sector. Private firms 
(39 firms) are the majority (58 percent) of firms in the entire region, which is a higher percentage 
than the national average (32 percent), and a much higher proportion than in the Bohai Bay (20 
percent with 23 firms). By comparison, the proportion of private firms among firms headquartered in 
Beijing is below 14 percent. 
 There are, however, disparities within the different locations of the Yangtze River Delta area, 
with profiles of firms headquartered in Shanghai that contrast with those from the adjacent provinces. 
The private sector is well represented with respectively 64 percent (14 out of 22 in Jiangsu) and 84 
percent of private firms (21 out of 25 in Zhejiang) in Jiangsu Province and Zhejiang provinces. The 
proportion illustrates the role of the private sector in developing these industrialized coastal regions: 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces are among the provinces with the highest provincial GDP. Zhejiang 
province, in particular, is home to the majority of the large family businesses in China, which are 
privately owned (Lubinski et al., 2013), including Geely Automobile, Wanxiang group in the 
                                                 
1 Not all central firms depend on SASAC. Some firms refer to other ministries or other institutions. Datang Telecom is 
the company sponsored by the China Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT) which is the controlling 
shareholder of the company.  
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automobile and parts sector. This prevalence of the private sector in the region reflects a sharp contrast 
with Shanghai (which is in the middle). Less than one-fourth (24 percent) of Shanghainese firms are 
private firms (i.e. 4 private firms out of a total of 17). The rest of the firms depend on the municipal 
government of Shanghai (6 state firms) and on the central state (7 state firms), illustrating the 
governmental influences, both at national and local levels, on Shanghai’s firms. 
By contrast, fewer firms have their headquarters in the southern part of Guangdong Province 
that forms the Pearl River Delta area, facing Hong Kong city. Guangdong Province is among the 
provinces with the highest provincial GDP of China (7 281 266 million yuan in 2015, accounting for 
11 percent of total Chinese GDP), along with Jiangsu (10 percent) and Zhejiang provinces (6 percent), 
and with Shandong Province (9 percent of Chinese GDP) in the Bohai Bay, and Henan Province (5 
percent).1  
Therefore, put in perspective with the contribution of the region to the economy, there are 
relatively few firms’ headquarters. More specifically, the region is home to 31 firm headquarters out 
of 325, which is less than 10 percent of the national total. The proportion is much lower than firms in 
Bohai Bay (36 percent) and Yangtze River area (21 percent). Several explanations come to mind. The 
first one is the low number of centrally state-owned firms' headquarters in the area. There are only 
four of them. Among the 31 firms headquartered there, 18 are privately owned, which represent 58 
percent of the firms in the region. Another explanation is the important foreign presence in the region 
(foreign firms are excluded from the scope of our analysis). For instance, the electronic manufacturer 
from Taiwanese origin, Foxconn, is a major player in Shenzhen since it opened its first manufacturing 
plant in 1988. 
4.1.2. The distribution of large Chinese firms in the territory 
Altogether, the three dominant regions, Bohai Bay, Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River delta, are 
home to two-thirds of the 325 firms (215 firms). The remaining 110 large firms, or about one-third of 
the population of large industrial firms, have their headquarters located in other areas, outside the 
three main dynamic economic regions. The location of these 110 firms reflects the distribution of 
firms in the territory and questions the role of second-tier cities in China’s development. Indeed, what 
we observe is the absence of other leading locations of firms. Instead, large firms are headquartered 
in 105 different county-level cities. The municipality of Chongqing homes the headquarters of 9 large 
firms (for a population of 32,8 million persons in 2010), and the adjacent Sichuan province 14 firms. 
These two areas represent the largest concentration of firms outside the three dominant economic 
regions we already presented. There are also 9 firms headquartered in Hubei province. In all other 
provinces, there are less than 8 firms (less than 3 percent of the total population of large firms). This 
                                                 
1 2015. Provinces which represent more than 5 percent of China GDP 
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further indicates that the location of large firms outside of the three dominant economic regions is 
highly dispersed across provinces: Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, 
Shaanxi, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan provinces.  
This is associated with local government initiatives that set up local firms in their own 
localities (or provinces). Local state-owned firms account for 59 percent of the large firms not 
localized in the major economic regions, against 23 percent for private firms and 17 percent for 
centrally state-owned firms.1 The proportion is higher than what they represent in the entire group 
(42 percent of the total) of firms. Locally state-owned firms are more represented in regions outside 
the three dominant economic areas (they account for respectively 36 percent of Bohai Bay firms, 29 
percent in the Pearl River Delta area, and 30 percent in the Yangtze Delta area). Moreover, one more 
fact must be emphasized: that central state owned firms are also in a higher proportion in this 
remaining group of 110 large firms than both in the Pearl River and Yangtze delta areas (17 percent 
against 13 percent and 12 percent). While the choice of location by a local government is quite 
straightforward (even if there are exceptions, they remain marginal), there are other determinant 
factors for centrally state-owned firms. Location might result from strategic choices of the central 
state government, or former strategic choices, not made under economic or practical considerations. 
The second automotive works (SAW), out of which emerged the current Dongfeng motor Group, was 
established by the central government in 1964, in Shiyan, a small town in Hubei Province. Shiyan 
was located in a mountainous area, with limited road and railway access, was not well suited for large 
scale production, but the location was chosen in a context of international political tensions in the 
1960s as a “natural fortress” (Nam, 2015). 
4.2. The coverage of most industrial sectors by large firms 
A striking element that appears when observing large industrial firms is the fact they operate 
in most industries. This is illustrated by the distribution of firms across sectors. In this chapter, as well 
as throughout this dissertation, we use the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) as a basis to 
classify firms’ industrial subsectors2. Each category then gathers one or several subsectors adapted 
from the ICB classification. Based on this categorization, we can highlight several features 
characteristic of the composition of a large firm. A first element is the importance of firms which tend 
to be specialized (167 firms, 51 percent of total), and the smaller proportion of diversified firms (42 
firms, 13 percent). Two other features correspond to characteristics of emerging economies: 72 firms 
(22 percent of total) are in resource-based industries, 29 firms (9 percent of total) are in the 
construction industry and only 15 firms (less than 5 percent of total) are conglomerates and/or 
                                                 
1 The remaining 1 percent is the sole collective firm of the entire population of large firms. 
2 This classification is useful because it is the one used by the EU R&D scoreboard that we use for comparison. 
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strategic firms.  
The composition of the group shows the role of manufacturing firms in the economic 
development of China. There are 167 large firms, which are rather specialized towards one industry. 
On average, they employ 31 002 employees. They might operate in other industries besides their core 
activity, but we classify firms in this category when they can be associated with a core industry. For 
instance, Zoomlion is a local state company created in 1999, whose controlling shareholder is 
Hunan’s SASAC.1 It originated in Changsha Construction Machinery Research Institute, previously 
under the former Ministry of Construction. The company is cross-listed in Hong Kong and in 
Shenzhen. Engaged in the machinery industry, it is an example of firms that are specialized in one 
business. This is seen in the operating segments in which the firm intervenes: Concrete machinery, 
17 million in revenue (44.60 percent), Crane machinery 12 million (32.38 percent), Environmental 
and sanitation machinery 3 million (8.52 percent), Road construction and pile foundation machinery 
2 million (4.49 percent), Earth working machinery 0.8 million (2.00 percent), Finance lease services 
1,5 million (3.79 percent) (source: Zoomlion’s annual report 2013).  
What needs to be emphasized is the diversity among specialized firms (table 5-1). Distribution 
among different ownership types is as follows: private firms represent 41 percent (68 firms) of 
“specialized” firms, which is slightly more than the national average where private firms represent 
32 percent. There are 61 locally state-owned firms (37 percent) and 37 centrally state-owned firms 
(22 percent). Firms in this group often operate in more than one industry, but they all have a dominant 
activity as is well illustrated by the case of BOE technology: display devices represent 89 percent of 
the operating revenues of BOE Technology in 2014 (annual report, 2014). The private 76 firms 
operate in eleven industrial subsectors, with three dominant sectors: personal goods (12 private firms), 
automobile and parts (11 private firms), and electronic and electric equipment (16 private firms). By 
contrast, locally state-owned firms, which form the largest group are dominated by automobiles and 
parts (12 percent), and chemicals (9 firms). Finally, centrally state-owned firms are the most 
numerous in industrial engineering (11 firms), and technology hardware and equipment (8 firms).  
 
 
 
Table 5-2: Details of firms in Specialized Manufacturer 
                                                 
1 Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and Technology Co Ltd 
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ICB 
classification 
Description of the industrial sector Firms 
Alternative 
energy 
Renewable energy equipment: firms that manufacture renewable energy 
equipment 
2 private firms 
Average size: 15 000 employees 
Automobile 
& Parts 
Automobile: Makers of motorcycles and passenger vehicles, including 
cars, sport utility vehicles, and light trucks 
Auto-parts: Manufacturers and distributors of new and replacement parts 
for motorcycles and automobiles 
Tires 
28 firms (12 locally state-owned firms; 
11 private firms; 5 centrally state-
owned firms) 
Average size: 34 028 employees 
Beverages Brewers; Distillers & Vintners; Soft drinks 5 locally state-owned firms in 5 
provinces 
Chemicals Commodity chemicals: producers of simple chemical products primarily 
used to formulate more complex chemicals or products, including plastics 
and rubber in their raw form, fiberglass, and synthetic fibre 
Specialty chemicals: producers of finished chemicals for industries or end 
users, including dyes, cellular polymers, coatings, special plastics and 
other chemicals for specialized applications. 
15 firms (9 locally state-owned firms; 
4 private firms s; 3 centrally state-
owned firms) 
Average size: 27 601 employees 
Electronic & 
Electrical 
Equipment 
Electrical components & Equipment; makers of electrical parts for 
finished products 
Electronic equipment: manufacturers of electronic products used in 
different industries 
23 firms (16 private firms; 4 locally 
state-owned firms; 5 centrally state-
owned firms) 
Average size: 27 794 employees 
Food 
producers 
Food products 16 firms (9 private firms; 5 locally 
state-owned firms; - 1 centrally state-
owned firm; 1 collective firm) 
Average size: 46 586 employees 
Forestry & 
Paper 
Paper: producer of all grades of paper 2 locally state-owned firms 
Average size: 11 547 employees 
Household 
goods & 
home 
Construction 
Durable household products; Non-durable household products; 
Furnishings; Home construction 
9 firms (4 locally state-owned firms; 5 
private firms) 
Average size: 27 794 
Industrial 
engineering 
Commercial vehicles & trucks: manufacturers of heavy agricultural and 
construction machinery 
Industrial machinery: manufacturers of industrial machinery and factory 
equipment 
21 firms (12 centrally state-owned 
firms; 6 locally state-owned firms; - 2 
private firms) 
Average size: 41 400 
Leisure goods Consumer electronics; Recreational products; Toys 1 centrally state-owned firm 
Average size: NA 
Personal 
goods 
Clothing & Accessories; Footwear 
Personal products: makers and distributors of cosmetics, toiletries and 
personal-care and hygiene products 
18 firms (12 private firms; 5 locally 
state-owned firms; 1 centrally state-
owned firm) 
Average size: 22 431 
Pharmaceutic
als & 
Biotechnolog
y 
Biotechnology: research into and development of biological substances 
for the purpose of drug discovery and diagnostic development 
Pharmaceuticals: manufacturers of prescription or OTC drugs 
6 firms (5 locally state-owned firms; 1 
centrally state-owned firm; - 1 private 
firm) 
Average size: 22 911 
Technology 
hardware & 
Equipment 
Computer hardware; Electronic office equipment 
Semiconductors: producers of semiconductors and other integrated chips 
Telecommunication equipment: makers of high-technology 
communication products, including satellites, mobile telephones, fibres 
optics, switching devices, local and wide-area networks, teleconferencing 
equipment and connectivity devices for computers 
18 firms (8 centrally state-owned 
firms; 6 private firms; 3 locally state-
owned firms) 
Source: author 
 
Another category of firms with importance for the transformation of the Chinese economy is 
the providers of resources and intermediate products. There are 72 ‘Resource’ companies located 
upstream in the industrial production chain. They constitute a significant part (22 percent) of China’s 
large firms. Are classified in this category firms that mine or extract resources (metals and other 
materials, oil and gas), as well as firms that process these resources and/or manufacture intermediate 
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products for use by other industries.  
Resource companies are often overlooked in innovation studies because scholars tend to study 
firms in discrete manufacturing processes (Figueiredo, 2010, pp. 1090–1091). However, these firms 
are interesting from several points of view. First, natural resources and materials play a specific role 
in the patterns of industrial progress and growth of nations with an important endowment. In addition, 
they can be leveraged as a strategic national resource. For instance, in Cleantech, China managed to 
leverage its abundant resources in rare earth to force technology transfers, notably restricting access 
to these resources to foreign industrial firms that enter into a minority joint-venture with Chinese 
firms in key sectors (Ruet, 2016). From another perspective, firms follow different patterns of 
capability accumulation than assembly-based industries (Figueiredo, 2010).  
The distribution of the large firms provides information on how national resources are 
managed. The state sector has the monopoly on the exploitation of most resources, and in most cases, 
local governments are granted the rights to exploit local resources. This explains the absence of large 
private firms and the leading role of locally state-owned firms in the mining sector and among oil and 
gas producers. Mining firms are both central and locally state-owned firms: 21 locally state-owned 
firms and 5 centrally state-owned firms are engaged in mining (mainly coal: engaged in the 
exploration for or mining of coal, in the exploration, extraction or refining of minerals not defined 
elsewhere).1 The oil and gas production is concentrated in the hand of three centrally state-owned 
firms (engaged in the exploration for and drilling, production, refining, and supply of oil and gas 
products). 
The metallurgical sector has the highest number of large firms. There are 43 firms classified 
under “industrial metal and mining.” It encompasses aluminium, non-ferrous metals, and iron and 
steel. Aluminum includes firms that “mine or process bauxite or manufacture aluminium bars, rods 
and other products for use by other industries.” Non-ferrous metals include producers of metals and 
primary metal products other than iron, aluminium, and steel. Finally, Iron & Steel include 
manufacturers and stockholders of primary iron and steel products such as pipes, wires, sheets and 
bars, encompassing all processes. The third group is particularly well represented among the large 
firms. The role of large steel groups in the transition of the Chinese economic model is explicitly 
stated, as they act as a support in the development of strategic emerging industries (The State Council, 
2012). As the secretary of the Chinese Steel & Iron Industry states it “… In developing the seven such 
industries designated by China, namely, energy conservation & environmental protection, new-
generation information technology, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energy, 
                                                 
1 Definition of Industry Classification Benchmark “The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is a definitive system 
categorizing over 70,000 companies and 75,000 securities worldwide, enabling the comparison of companies across four 
levels of classification and national boundaries”. www.icbenchmark.com 
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new materials and new energy vehicles, the iron and steel industry of China is expected to fulfil a new 
mission…: to produce and provide high-quality and new-material-based iron and steel products 
necessary for such strategic emerging industries.” This requires, in turn, these firms to innovate and 
to provide high quality iron and steel products “it is necessary for iron and steel companies to enhance 
their research and to develop high-performance products featuring high strength, corrosion 
resistance, long life and light weight, and improve their technological competence related to such 
products” (Zhang, 2012) 
 
The relatively low degree of industrial diversification of Chinese firms was mentioned and 
explained in the previous sections, and this is what we observe. The category 'Conglomerates and 
diversified industrials' include the 42 large Chinese firms that adopted diversification as part of their 
growth strategy. Conglomerates extend their activities across manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors through several entities. This includes firms that operate in real estate, finance, services, etc. 
in addition to manufacturing activities. Firms in general industrials, the second subcategory, are 
engaged in the production of different products that belong to different industries, and require 
different skills. Firms fall into this category when they are engaged in three or more classes of 
business. Private firms are more likely to adopt diversification strategies than state firms. 45 percent 
of Chinese “conglomerates” are private firms. And one is tempted to link this to the relative absence 
of diversification as a central strategy of centrally state-owned firms.  
 
The fourth significant group of firms is made of the 29 large firms in the construction and 
material sectors. The sectors include two categories “Building materials & fixtures”: producers of 
materials used in the construction and refurbishment of buildings and structures, including cement 
and other aggregates, and the Heavy construction sectors: companies engaged in the construction of 
buildings. Altogether, they represent 9 percent of the total population. This percentage reflects the 
need for infrastructures of an emerging nation like China, and the role of building and construction 
in the economy (wastes of resources). The construction sector acts as a driver for other industries. It 
accounted in 2011 for 54.4 percent of the total iron and steel consumption (Zhang, 2012). Ownership 
is quite balanced, as well as the geographic repartition. There are 8 centrally state-owned firms, 9 
private firms, and 12 locally state-owned firms, which are in fourteen different localities (provinces 
or municipalities). The largest location is Beijing, which is related to the importance of centrally state-
owned firms in this region. The construction industry is particularly fragmented. There were in 1999 
8000 independent cement manufacturers (against 1500 at a global scale). 
 
Finally, a special mention must be made of large firms, which are under the prerogative of the 
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Chinese state. This encompasses strategic sectors like aerospace and defense. Aerospace includes the 
manufacturers, assemblers, and distributors of aircraft and aircraft parts primarily used in commercial 
or private air transport. Defense includes producers of component and equipment for the defense 
industry, including military aircraft, radar equipment, and weapons. In addition, there are monopolies 
(salt, gold, etc.). All of them are centrally state-owned firms. 
5. Conclusion 
The population of the 325 largest Chinese firms we have presented is characterized by its 
diversity. The category "Large Chinese firms" includes very diverse entities, each relatively 
specialized and presenting a complex mix of private and state ownership. Their trajectories can be 
explained by dynamics associated with the economic and political transformations since the Third 
Plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the China Communist Party in 1978. Firms did not 
emerge out of nowhere, though. The preceding period between 1949 and 1978, which laid the 
foundations by setting up a soviet-style planned economy with plants and research institutes as part 
of the industrial production structure, has conditioned their emergence and influenced their 
specializations and localizations. 
The vice-premier Wu Bangguo emphasized in 1997 the importance of supporting large 
competitive firms by emphasizing international comparisons, with the United States of America, and 
with other Asian countries, Japan, and Korea. … international confrontations show that if a country 
has several large companies or groups it will be assured of maintaining a certain market share and 
a position in the international economic order. America, for example, relies on General Motors, 
Boeing, Du Pont and a batch of other multinational companies. Japan relies on six large enterprise 
groups and Korea relies on ten commercial groupings. In the same way now and in the next century, 
our nation’s position in the international economic order will be to a large extent determined by the 
position of our nation’s large enterprises and groups” Wu Bangguo, Vice-premier of China (1998). 1 
The composition of our sample of 325 large firms suggests that the idea that China’s economy relies 
on “several large firms” needs to be nuanced. Altogether, the population of large firms we selected 
employs about 16 million people, which is indeed a limited proportion of the total employment 
(around 700 million). 
  
                                                 
1 Borrowed from Nolan (Nolan, 2001b, p. 17) 
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expenditures. This does not create distortions, when entities are at a similar level in the corporate 
hierarchical structure (Tata Motor, Tata Steel, etc.) i.e. when there is not one that depends on the other. 
In the other case, the pyramidal structure of large groups sometimes leads to counting R&D 
expenditures twice in the European Union’s Innovation Scoreboard. For instance, the Chinese 
conglomerate Fosun appears twice: once as Shanghai Fosun Pharma and once as Fosun International. 
Fosun International declares 60 million euros in R&D and Shanghai Fosun 53 million euros. 
However, Fosun International is the controlling shareholder of Shanghai Fosun and holds 48 percent 
of its shares, and integrates it into its consolidation scope (Dec 2014).1 Thus, R&D expenditures are 
counted twice (the 60 million euros include the 53 million euros). The description of research 
activities in the 2014 annual report of Fosun International confirms this: Shanghai Fosun Pharma 
represents the core of its R&D activities. We try to avoid such problems when possible, and the 
distortion that is generated remains marginal when looking at historical trends.  
2.1.2. Historical increase in China’s contribution 
The historical evolution of the number of Chinese firms among the largest global leaders in 
R&D is summarized in the table below. The number of Chinese firms among global R&D spending 
leaders increased significantly between 2005 and 2013, from 9 firms in 2005 to 94 firms in 2013. 
China was ranked the 19th nation in 2005 in terms of R&D focused firm numbers. From 2010 to 2011, 
with a rise from 37 to 72 firms, China moved from the 8th position to the 5th position. It is the 4th 
regarding the number of national R&D focused firms in 2014.  
The increase was continuous, with Chinese firms newly joining the ranking each year, except 
for the year 2006. 2007 and 2010 were two years of particularly strong growth (respectively +140 
percent in 2007 and + 95 percent in 2010). Over the same period, minimal average R&D spending 
has increased more slowly from 27 million euros in 2005 to 39 million euros in 2013. 
 
Table 6-1: 2005 – 2014. Historical presence of Chinese global firms among R&D leaders 
 Chinese firms in the world top 1400 R&D firm Repartition by industry (more than 10%) 
20
13
 
94 Chinese firms 
Incl. 2 in Hong Kong, 22 Cayman Island 
3 Bermuda 
+22 percent since 2012 
Auto& Parts (14%);  
Industrial Engineering (14%);  
Construction & Materials (13%);  
Technology Hardware & Equipment (12%);  
Software & Computer Services (12%);  
Electronic & Electrical Equipment (10%) 
 
20
12
 
78 Chinese firms 
Incl. 3 in Hong Kong, 23 Cayman Island 
1 Bermuda 
+8 percent since 2011 
Industrial Engineering (17%); 
Automobiles & Parts (16%);  
Technology Hardware & Equipment (15%); 
Construction & Materials (12%);  
Software & Computer Services (11%);  
 
                                                 
1 The scope of consolidation refers to the subsidiaries whose operations are reported in the consolidated income statement 
of the holding company. 
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20
11
 
72 Chinese firms 
Incl. 2 in Hong Kong, 16 in Cayman Island 
+95 percent since 2010 
Industrial Engineering (20%);  
Automobiles & Parts (13%);  
Construction & Materials (13%);  
Technology Hardware & Equipment (11%);  
Software & Computer Services (10%); 
 
20
10
 
37 Chinese firms 
Incl. 5 in Hong Kong, 12 in Cayman Island 
+23 percent since 2009 
Construction & Materials (13%);  
Semiconductors (10%); 
Internet (13%);  
Telecommunications equipment (13%); 
Automobiles & Parts (10%);  
20
09
 
30 Chinese firms 
Incl. 6 in Hong Kong, 3 in Cayman Island 
+43 percent since 2008 
Automobiles & Parts (17%); 
Construction & Materials (13%);  
Industrial machinery (10%) 
Internet (10%); 
Oil & gas producers (10%); 
Telecommunications equipment (10%); 
 
20
08
 
30 Chinese firms 
Incl. 5 in Hong Kong, 12 in Cayman Island 
+75 percent since 2007 
Automobiles & Parts (14%); 
Construction & Materials (14%);  
Oil & gas producers (14%); 
Industrial machinery (14%) 
 
20
07
 
30 Chinese firms 
Incl. 5 in Hong Kong, 12 in Cayman Island 
+150 percent since 2006 
Oil & gas producers (25%); 
Automobiles & Parts (17%); 
Telecommunications equipment (17%); 
 
20
06
 
5 Chinese firms 
Incl. 1 in Hong Kong 
-44 percent since 2005 
Oil & gas producers (40%); 
Telecommunications equipment (20%); 
Semiconductors (20%);  
Computer hardware (20%); 
 
20
05
 
9 Chinese firms 
Incl. 1 in Hong Kong, 2 in Cayman Island 
Oil & gas producers (33%); 
Telecommunications equipment (22%); 
Semiconductors (11%);  
Computer hardware (11%); 
Electronic equipment (11%); 
Fixed line telecommunications (11%); 
 
2.2. Is global R&D representative of national trends?  
The increase in the number of Chinese firms doing R&D is unique among emerging nations. 
This is illustrated by the comparison with Brazil, and India. Another country, Russia, is sometimes 
categorized along with Brazil, India, and China (under the acronym of BRIC). We do not integrate 
Russia in the comparison because the “emerging” nature of Russia is subject to discussion. In any 
case, we can however easily discard the Russian case, because there are very few Russian firms doing 
R&D at a global level. Between 2005 and 2013, only between 1 and 4 Russian firms are among the 
world 1400 R&D spenders.1 
  
                                                 
1 Gazprom (Oil & Gas), Lukoil (Oil & Gas), Rosneft (Oil equipment, services, and distribution, Scientific Production 
(Aerospace & Defence) – Source: World 2000 firms ranked by R&D, 2013 
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Table 6-2: 2005 - 2014. Contribution of China, India, and Brazil to global R&D firms 
 CHINA INDIA BRAZIL 
2013 94 Chinese firms 
 
13 firms 6 firms 
2012 78 Chinese firms 
 
15 firms 7 firms 
2011 72 Chinese firms 
 
13 firms 7 firms 
2010  
37 Chinese firms 
17 firms 9 firms 
2009 30 Chinese firms 
 
17 firms 8 firms 
2008 30 Chinese firms  
15 firms 
3 firms 
2007 30 Chinese firms  
15 firms 
3 firms 
2006 5 Chinese firms  
4 firms 
3 firms 
2005 9 Chinese firms 
 
4 firms 3 firms 
 
In 2013, for each Indian firm among the 1400 largest R&D spenders, there are eleven Chinese 
firms, and the ratio is even higher for Brazilian firms. The difference with China was not pronounced 
at the beginning of the decade: the gap appeared between Chinese firms, and Indian and Brazilian 
firms, between 2005 and 2013. In 2013, 13 Indian firms and 6 Brazilian firms were among the top 
1400 largest R&D spenders, respectively three and two times their 2005 levels, which is small 
compare to Chinese firms whose number was multiplied by 10.  
Based on these trends, China is not only a unique case among emerging countries, but is also 
“in advance” compared to what is expected on the basis of historical precedents. It was observed that 
when industrialised nations reached a certain level of economic development, the national R&D 
intensity abruptly increased from 1 percent to about 2-3 percent. This occurs when the average GDP 
by PPP per capita is around $80001. However, China’s S&T take-off started at a GDP per capita 
around $3600 in 2007 (Gao and Jefferson, 2007)2, with a national R&D intensity of approximately 
1,4 percent. This “advance” is explained by three main factors: the average level of education, the 
proximity with dynamic economic regions in Asia, and China’s market size that creates internal 
opportunities (Gao and Jefferson, 2007). In addition, it might be argued that it is because Chinese 
figures are artificially inflated. Indeed, part of the trend is exaggerated, and distorted by the quality 
of R&D data. Chinese firms tend to declare many activities as R&D costs for a fiscal reason. In 
addition, the increase of its R&D activities since 2006 is partially caused by the introduction of new 
accounting standards. It is, however, unlikely to account entirely for this trend. 
The importance of Chinese firms in terms of global R&D expenditures also reflects the way 
the Chinese economy is organized. To become R&D firms, firms need to be in an environment where 
                                                 
1 Depending on the year considered, small and medium firms represent between 0 percent and 33 percent of the Chinese 
firms in the top 1400 spenders. In 2013, on the 25 firms with less than 10 000 employees (or 26 percent of firms): 6 are 
subsidiaries of larger groups (in industrial engineering, automobiles & parts, fixed lined telecommunications and in 
construction). 8 firms are in the software & computer services industry (and are not included in the scope of the 
dissertation), 1 in the video games industry, and 3 seem to be start-ups in technology hardware & equipment.  
2 Including 199 firms headquartered in China, to which we added Chinese firms incorporated in Cayman Island (48 firms) 
and 10 Chinese firms in Bermuda 
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they can grow and develop their activities. The Chinese environment allowed, despite the importance 
of the state economy, the emergence of a diversity of corporate actors. The progressive integration of 
R&D activities by different types of Chinese firms explains the increasing proportion of Chinese 
firms among global R&D focused firms. While the growth in the number of Chinese firms was 
associated with a diversification of their profiles, there was no major change in Brazilian and Indian 
firms. In 2006, Brazilian firms which do R&D were three national firms, in resource industries (Vale, 
Petrobras) and aerospace (Embraer), among which two are former state-owned firms (in which the 
Brazilian state is still a shareholder), and one state-owned firm (Table 6-3, p. 115). This is quite a 
common pattern for firms from developing nations. By contrast, Indian firms have another profile. In 
2006, the four Indian firms listed among the top R&D firms were either subsidiaries of a larger 
conglomerate or smaller firms in R&D intensive sectors such as computer services and 
pharmaceuticals.  
At the time, all large Chinese firms capable of investing a large amount in R&D had a similar 
profile. In 2006, the five largest ones included Semiconductor Manufacturing, Lenovo, ZTE, China 
Petroleum & Chemical, and PetroChina. Those firms are state-owned enterprises or firms that derive 
from governmental organizations. Employing on average 221 000 employees, they were larger than 
Indian firms (30 000 employees) or Brazilian firms (36 000 employees). Since 2006, the situation 
(partly) stagnated for Indian and Brazilian ones. Kay et al., for instance, noted how two grand types 
of large players could be seen in Brazilian nanotechnology: national firms, and foreign firms (Kay et 
al., 2009). 
This was not true for China, where there was a change in the profiles of firms. From 2005 to 
2007, the trend was driven by large central state-owned firms (PetroChina, Sinopec & CNOOC in oil 
& gas, China Telecom…). Progressively, more modest large firms started doing R&D as well. The 
average size of Chinese firms that are part of the largest R&D spenders regularly decreases from 
140 586 employees in 2005 to 48 972 employees in 2013. This decrease is not caused by the 
progression of small high-tech firms or by a decrease in the employment level of firms that already 
had R&D (which are mostly “giant” firms), but by the progression of mid-sized and large firms in 
R&D. The average size of firms that employ less than 10 000 employees has remained stable during 
the period, with an average of 5037 employees.1 In contrast, among large firms, new large firms 
managed to increase their R&D efforts, the average size of large Chinese firms ranked among global 
R&D spenders decreases from 222 000 employees in 2005 to 65 000 employees in 2013. We can 
conclude that the newly R&D players have a different profile than those at the beginning of the period. 
The ability of the Chinese environment to allow firms to grow appears as an explicative factor for the 
                                                 
1 Provided by the 2014 scoreboard  
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growth in the participation of China in global corporate R&D. It shows that the increase in the 
intensity of R&D of large firms was no longer limited to the giant state-owned firms. 
  
Table 6-3: The largest R&D spenders in firms from emerging nations in 2006 
Firms Industry (ICB) Detail  
EMBRAER (Br) Aerospace & Defence Founded as a state-owned firm, privatized in 
1994 
19 265 employees 
86 million € in R&D (3% of net sales) 
 
Vale Do Rio Doce (Br) Mining Founded as a state-owned firm, privatized in 
1997 
52645 employees 
365 million euros (2,4% of net sales) 
 
Petroleo Brasiliero (Br) - Petrobras 
 
Oil & gas producers State-owned firm 
62266 employees 
551 million (1% of net sales) 
 
Semiconductor Manufacturing (Cn) Semiconductors Central state owned firm 
10 048 employees 
71 million euros in R&D (6,4% of net sales) 
 
Lenovo (Cn) Computer hardware Private firm (originate in the Chinese 
Academy of Science) 
25100 employees 
172 million euros in R&D (1,6% of net sales) 
 
ZTE (Cn) Telecommunications 
equipment 
Private firm 
39266 employees 
275 million euros in R&D (12,3% of net 
sales) 
 
China Petroleum & Chemical (Cn) 
- Sinopec 
Oil & gas producers Central state-owned enterprise 
340886 employees 
282 million euros in R&D (0,3% of net sales) 
 
PetroChina (Cn) Oil & gas producers Central state-owned enterprise 
446290 employees 
414 million euros in R&D (0,6% of net sales) 
 
Kpit Cummins & Chemical (In) Computer services Private firm founded in 1990 
3256 employees 
49 million euros in R&D (62,5% of net sales) 
 
Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (In) Pharmaceuticals Private firm founded in 1994 
9000 employees 
42 million euros in R&D (3,8% of net sales) 
 
Ranbaxy Laboratories (In) Pharmaceuticals Private firm now part of the Indian group Sun 
Pharma 
11343 employees 
68 million euros in R&D (6,5% of net sales) 
 
Tata Motors (In) Automobile & Parts Subsidiary of the private conglomerate 
TATA 
32610 employees 
137 million euros in R&D (2,5% of net sales) 
 
Source: author 
Another trend is observable: Chinese firms have entered global R&D rankings from the 
bottom-up of the ranking. In 2013, 10 percent of the 2500 firms that invest the most in R&D was 
Chinese, with R&D investments ranging from 15 million to 3.6 billion euros1. While China is in 4th 
position among the top 1400 R&D focused firms, it performs better and is in 3rd position if we extend 
                                                 
1 Huawei Technologies 
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to the 2500 first R&D spenders, after the United States and Japan (respectively 387 and 260 firms).1 
In contrast, China holds the 6th position among the top 500 world R&D firms, showing that firms can 
increase and maintain their level of R&D efforts. Finally, it is the 11th nation in the top 100 spenders 
with two firms: Huawei Technologies and PetroChina.  
On average, large Chinese firms are smaller and less profitable than other global firms; this 
partly explains that they are at the bottom of the ranking. Chinese firms are in the “second tier” and 
the “third tier” of global R&D firms. The fact that China ranks 4th globally with the highest number 
of firms among the largest spenders contrasts with a “catch-up” situation. With rare exceptions 
(Huawei, PetroChina, China railway, ZTE, see bow describing ZTE activities below), Chinese R&D 
firms’ R&D is below leading multinationals. We can illustrate that with the case of firms in the 
automotive sector. All nations included, large companies in the automobile sector, which is intensive 
in R&D, employ more than 70 000 employees, for €1.07 billion euros in R&D and profits of 1.53 
billion euros (data for the 70 world R&D firms in the automobile and employing more than 10 000 
employees). Large Chinese firms in the same sector employ on average 30 636 employees, spend 
€101 million in R&D and generate 173 million euros in profits. They are therefore smaller, and less 
intensive in R&D compared to the number of employees. Figures reflect striking differences. The 
largest Chinese automaker, Dongfeng (110 000 employees) invested 194 million euros in R&D in 
2013, against 12 billion euros for Volkswagen (572 000 employees).  
2.3. Persisting doubts on Chinese R&D  
In 1981, the Shanghai People’s Daily, reflecting the prevailing irony and defiance on Chinese 
ambitions in R&D at the time, wrote: “Many of these so-called institutes have been dubbed the ‘three 
no centres’ – no research subjects, no funds, and no personnel. Others have been dubbed the ‘three 
diminutive centres’ – one room, one seal, and one empty shelf. Others have been called the “three 
machine centres’ – one mimeograph, one stapler, and one telephone.” (Simon, 1981 p. 24, quoted by 
Fischer, 1983). In 2014, the general level of China’s technology and the quality of data considerably 
improved, but there a persisting defiance regarding the quality of R&D by Chinese firms, defiance 
particularly common among Chinese scholars. In 2009, Simon & Cao recognized persisting worries 
on the quality of S&T data, despite a substantial improvement in the last period. Nevertheless, they 
justified the use of Chinese data as an indispensable base for the analysis (Simon and Cao, 2009). 
                                                 
1 In addition to these three categories of criticisms, another element, that we mentioned briefly, is the change in the 
accounting standard in China. China issued new Accounting Standards in 2006: the new Chinese Accounting Standards 
N°6 made significant changes about the accounting treatment of R&D expenditures. According to the previous 
Accounting standard of China, there was no account like R&D costs or R&D investments. In response of the legal change, 
that aimed to harmonize Chinese standards with IFRS, firms progressively started to declare R&D costs in their income 
statement. This led to underestimate R&D costs in the preceding years, and to create a sudden increase in reported R&D 
expenditures.  
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This leads us to pay attention to the meaning of Chinese S&T data. R&D data reflects a 
transition towards innovation, but to what extent the official figures reflect the reality is uncertain. 
What is behind the increase in R&D spending has led to questioning the reality of the trend (Fischer 
and Von Zedtwitz, 2004; Walsh, 2007).  
There are three primary critics that can be addressed about the validity of R&D figures in 
China.1 The first one is the reliability of collected data on scientific and technological activities. 
Figures for R&D are inflated, but it is difficult to measure to which extent and to which degree it 
invalidates the analysis. The second category is research quality (qualification of researchers and 
engineers). Finally, the third category regroups questions concerning the relevance of R&D activities 
for effective innovations, emphasizing the ambiguous impact of state-led research programs (Chen 
and Naughton, 2011).  
Part of these critics directly or indirectly take their source in China’s incentive system for 
R&D. Since R&D became a political – and quantified – objective, firms are encouraged to do R&D. 
This includes incentives directly linked to the level of R&D (tax credit), and general incentives 
through mechanisms such as lowering the applicable corporate tax rate for approved high-tech firms 
with intensive R&D.  
In addition, firms are the beneficiaries of direct grants for their R&D projects, in the 
framework of national or local innovation programs. The grant system is not exempt of corruption. 
In 2015, Guangdong’s provincial science department’s deputy party secretary was investigated in the 
context of a case that includes more than 50 officials in Foshan City to take bribes from firms and 
research in exchange for R&D subsidies. It is estimated that they pocketed about 30 percent of the 
subsidies (“Research and embezzlement,” 2014). 
2.4. Conclusion 
China has emerged in global R&D dynamics and has taken off in science and technology. The 
take-off, as well as the surge of Chinese firms in global R&D, has raised questions about the nature 
of R&D activities and caught the attention of both competitors and various analysts. This is only one 
piece of the puzzle. The big challenge for China is not the emergence of large Chinese R&D focused 
firms, but rather the general transition of its economic structure toward innovation. This would 
guarantee China a participating role in global R&D dynamics. China is still a relatively poor nation, 
and some regions are underdeveloped. Nominal GDP per capita is $7589 in 2013 (IMF) against 
$36 268 for the European Union. Therefore, the commitment of large firms to R&D occurs in an 
economic context characterized by economic disparities across regions, and sectors. The dynamics 
                                                 
1 Huawei 
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behind the emergence of large Chinese firms as global R&D spenders can be either R&D commitment 
by a few centralized corporate actors, or be balanced across large Chinese firms.  
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The deployment of ZTE R&D strategies 
ZTE was created in 1985 as “Zhongxing Semiconductor Co Ltd.” by Hou Weiqi, and 
sponsored by the N°691 factory. The trajectory of its emergence follows the second path: new 
entrants after 1999. Its English name was then changed to Shenzhen ZTE Corporation, and finally 
ZTE Corporation. It is now listed on the Hong Kong and Shenzhen stock markets. ZTE works as 
an OEM and has more recently developed its own brand. It operates in three sectors: 
telecommunication equipment (4G stations, LTE), the mobile market (smartphones) and services. 
The importance of technological innovation for the firm is claimed and is demonstrated 
through various channels. Two corporate publications in English: ZTE Technologies, and ZTE 
Communications. The R&D strategy of ZTE is reflected in the number of patents it applies for. 
ZTE ranks first in 2011 as the world largest PCT applicant (with 2826 international applications in 
2011). ZTE includes in this strategy nanotechnology research, with 64 priority invention patents 
between 2000 and 2008. ZTE collaborates with universities.  
The firm’s R&D activities are organized around different centres. ZTE announces 27 100 
R&D personnel in 2013 (annual report 2014), which would represent 35,9 percent of the company, 
just followed by manufacturing (20 percent). However, the level of qualifications indicates that a 
considerable proportion of this R&D activities is development. 416 personnel have a doctorate in 
the firm, all divisions included. The general level of ZTE reflects the qualifications: 69 percent of 
the personnel in 2013 had, at least, a bachelor’s degree. The dominant model has changed 
progressively, with a growing market share of the high-end smartphones (39 percent in the first 
half 2015). 
The historical research centre is in Nanjing, where ZTE set up an R&D centre in 1993. At 
the moment of writing, the firm has 14 R&D centres around the world, of which the Nanjing R&D 
centre is one of the largest. ZTE's Nanjing R&D centre houses the main R&D departments of the 
Network Division, the Data Division, as well as the Central Academy and ZTESoft. ZTEsoft is a 
joint venture established in 2003 for the development of business operations support systems. The 
Nanjing R&D centre covers all aspects of R&D and also develops R&D for key projects of China's 
national technology development (863 Plan). The firm expanded its R&D abroad from 1998, 
starting in the United States. The firm inaugurated a dedicated R&D tower in Shenzhen in 2005 
(Shenzhen R&D ZTE building). 
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they have a visible patenting activity, but which do not provide R&D expenditures. However, the 
threshold of one million dollars is low and does not necessarily reflect advanced research activities. 
3.2. Distribution of R&D activities among Chinese large firms 
When we look closer at this corporate landscape, and notably when we focus on the 60 percent 
of firms with identified R&D activities, it is possible to observe several patterns according to the way 
R&D activities are distributed among different entities of a group. Firms follow different patterns of 
investments, which is dependent on the way they are structured (Table 6-4). 
 
Table 6-4: Summary of data available in R&D 
Category Description Number of firms Remarks 
Business 
groups 
Firms made of several entities 44 firms with 2 or more 
listed firms with R&D 
expenditures (13 
percent) 
Centrally state-owned firms 
Heterogeneity among the firms 
Listed 
groups 
Firms listed as a group. Consolidated 
income statement available. 
 
157 firms with 
available data on R&D 
intensity of the firm or 
one subsidiary (41 
percent) 
Private firms 
Various degree of R&D intensity 
Few firms: well-known 
champions  
Other 
firms 
 
Unlisted group with valid information on 
R&D 
Firms for which we have no solid data on 
R&D spending. Includes firms with visible 
R&D (patents) and without (no sign of 
technology) 
138 (41 percent) Local firms and private firms 
Generally indicate low R&D 
implications 
 Source: author 
 
For listed groups, the situation is simple. R&D intensity is given for 157 firms. Among them, 
136 firms directly invest in research or have a subsidiary that spent more than 1 million USD in R&D 
in 2013. The remaining 11 firms are non-listed firms for which reliable data were available. The 
profile of these firms is diversified: 59 local state-owned firms and 61 private firms. Most private and 
locally state-owned firms only have one subsidiary. There are 5 locally state-owned firms and 2 
private firms investing in R&D through more than 2 of their subsidiaries, which presents a contrast 
with figures of centrally state-owned firms.  
However, in the case of large business groups, different entities of a firm can do R&D in 
parallel. In 2013, 44 firms were in this case, with two or more of their listed subsidiaries with R&D 
activities. This pattern is common among centrally state-owned firms. Firms which have more than 3 
listed subsidiaries with R&D activities all depend on the central government. In turn, we observe that 
most centrally state-owned firms do R&D via at least one subsidiary: 64 firms out of a total of 79 
centrally state-owned firms have at least one of their subsidiaries with more than 1 million dollars in 
R&D, and more than half of these firms invest through 2 subsidiaries or more (34 firms). 
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Firms with the highest number of subsidiaries in R&D originally belong to sectors that are 
more intensive in R&D (aerospace & defense, and electronics). The Chinese group with the highest 
number of subsidiaries in R&D is Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). 18 of the 20 listed 
firms under AVIC we identified spend more than 1 million dollars in R&D.  
 
Table 6-5: Intra-group variation and differentiated R&D commitments 
Group Subsidiaries R&D intensity 
aviation industry corporation of china 
(avic) 18 
0,58 percent (aircraft manufacturing) to 48 percent (glass) 
China Electronics Corporation (CEC) 9 
From 0,20 percent (computer, communication and other 
equipment manufacturing) to 19,89 percent (software and 
information technology services 
China North Industries Group 
Corporation 7 
 
From 0.16 (oil & gas) to 4.45 (auto & parts) 
china electronics technology group 
corporation 6 
 
From 0,82 percent to 10,39 percent (both software and 
information technology services) 
Manufacturing only: 1,56 percent and 5,61 percent 
(computer, communication and other equipment 
manufacturing) 
china minmetals corporation 6 0,17 to 1,23 (nonferrous metal foundries and press) 
china national machinery industry 
corporation (sinomach) 6 
0,11 percent (civil engineering work construction) to 3,62 
percent (special equipment machinery) 
China South Industries Group 
Corporation 6 
1,19 percent (other traffic equipment manufacturing) to 
5,03 percent 
China Aerospace Science and Industry 
Corporation 5 
From 0,98 percent (computer, communication and other 
equipment manufacturing) to 9,69 percent (computer, 
communication and other equipment manufacturing) 
china national materials group 
corporation (sinoma) 5 
0,53 percent to 5,78 percent (both in non-metal mineral 
products) 
china petrochemical corporation 
(sinopec) 5 
From 0,6 percent (oil processing and refining) to 3,43 
percent (special equipment manufacturing) 
china faw group corporation 4 
From 0,81 percent (automobile manufacturing) to 6,96 
percent (information and software technology service) 
china national building materials group 
corporation 4 
1,31 percent to 2,87 percent (both in non-metal mineral 
products) 
china national chemical corporation 
(chemchina) 4 
0,90 percent to 3,22 percent in chemical materials and 
products 
china resources 4 0,87 to 2,77 percent (medicine manufacturing)  
Harbin Electric Corporation 4 
0,82 percent (electric equipment and parts) to 5,08 percent 
(special equipment manufacturing) 
Source: author 
 
Each individual entity does not allocate the similar proportion of its sales to research. The 
aircraft manufacturer AVIC which is present in different industries presents the largest variation, from 
0,2 percent to 40 percent. This partly reflects the trajectories of centrally state-owned firms. Large 
centrally state-owned firms grew through the extension of existing facilities and restructuration of 
state assets. Most firms, however, operate in one main industrial sector. The central state-owned firm 
AVIC is a typical example. Its core business is the aeronautic sector (more than 50 percent of its 
revenue in the 2013 annual report), it has specialized branches that progressively extended their 
123 
 
knowledge base towards neighbouring technological fields. For instance, Avic Sanxin, manufactures 
specialized glass, targeting the aircraft manufacturing industry, before diversifying the product line 
to other industries. 
To illustrate this argument, we detail the case of China South Industries Corporation, the group 
to which belongs Chang’An automobile. China South Industries Group Corporation was founded in 
1999 on the basis of the former 5th Machinery Industry, Ministry of Ordnance Industry, and 
Committee of Machinery Industry1. It defines itself as “defence-related science, technology and 
industry and one of the oversized military industry groups integrating military with civilian 
purposes.” China South Industries is composed of about 64 large and medium industrial enterprises, 
most of which belong to the automotive and parts sectors, and the firm employs 191 000 persons in 
total. Chang’an Automobile, Tianwei Group, Jialing group and Jianshe group are four listed 
subsidiaries of the group.2 
At central level of China South Industries, there is a department of science and technology 
(Department of Science Technology and Information), while research centres belong to the 
subsidiaries. Overall, according to the corporate website, the group supervises 13 research institutes. 
Three firms Chang’An, Jialing, and Jianshe belong to the same sector “Automobile and Parts.” Each 
division, however, puts different emphasis on R&D. Chang’An Automobile invests more in R&D 
than the other entities together: more than 1 billion RMB in R&D for Chang’An and only 18 million 
RMB for Jialing. In addition, Chang’An Automobile not only puts more resources in technological 
development than the other entities of China South Industries, but it also adapted its research 
organization. This is indicated by the restructuration of the original research institute into a modern 
R&D organization. In 1995, the General Engineering Research Institute of Chang’An Automobile 
was among the first validated technical enterprises (which mostly were former public research 
institutes). It extended its activities to Shanghai in 2004 (automobile integration, engineering design), 
to Europe in 2006 (styling design, body, interior & exterior parts), to Japan in 2008, to the UK 
(powertrain system research), to Beijing (research on advanced vehicle technology, new energy), to 
Harbin in 2010 (product development), and to Jiangxi and to Detroit in 2011 (chassis). This reflects 
the development of a network of R&D departments with specialized competences. In contrast, the 
other subsidiaries seemingly put less efforts in extending their competences. Jianshe relies on its 
technical centre that is in operation since 1991. Jialing possesses the Institute of engineering 
technology and relies on its cooperation with Honda since 1981.  
                                                 
1 In addition, it also is the controlling shareholder of Lida Optical & Electronical. 
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Pharma. The R&D intensity at the level of the whole group Fosun is 1 percent (on the basis of 
consolidated figures) while the R&D intensity of its subsidiary reaches 4,4 percent. Both percentages 
are below the standards of its main industry “Pharmaceuticals & Biotech”, as we shall develop, but 
they strongly differ with one another and reflect a different image of the firm.  
In this case, how to position Fosun regarding its competitors? Fosun Pharma – even though it 
belongs to the top 1400 global R&D spenders in 2013 – invests little in R&D in comparison to a 
global average R&D intensity of 12 percent in pharmaceuticals & biotech. This is, however, above 
R&D intensity given on the basis of consolidated figures given for the whole group Fosun 
International. It is also a better proxy of concrete operations, and as such should be the one used for 
comparison.  
A second element complicates the comparison. Fosun Pharma is in the industry of generic 
pharmaceuticals: “At the end of the reporting period [2014], Fosun Pharma had 125 pipeline drug, 
generic drug, generic biopharmaceutical drug and vaccine projects” (Annual Report, 2014). 
Accordingly, an R&D intensity of 4,4 percent places Fosun Pharma in the same range than the US-
based firm Perrigo: Perrigo invests 4,5 percent of its net sales in R&D and is specialized in generic 
medicine. In that perspective, the conglomerate Fosun invests as much as its competitors. Of course, 
R&D intensity is only an indicator among others: the US firm makes more profit and more than twice 
in sales with fewer employees. However, the interpretation somewhat differs. In this case, what 
appears is not so much the lack of capabilities of Fosun, but the absence of Chinese firms on the 
upstream side of the pharmaceutical market. This is consistent with all studies on Chinese 
pharmaceuticals. 
4.2. R&D performance by Chinese firms across industries 
The previous example shows the need to pay attention to intra-group dynamics of R&D, and 
to use subsidiary-level R&D data rather than group-level data. Therefore, this is what we do, and we 
compare R&D intensity of each Chinese subsidiary to international benchmarks of R&D spending1.  
The table below shows how the subsidiaries of large firms are positioned by looking at each 
industry. For each industry, we indicate the sectoral R&D intensity and the average R&D intensity 
for large firms only (more than 10 000 employees). For Chinese firms, we indicate the average R&D 
intensity, as well as the minimal and maximal values of R&D intensity. In the left column, we indicate 
how many Chinese entities invest a proportion of their sales in research and development that is 
superior to the average benchmark. The maximum R&D intensity and the proportion of firms above 
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global average give an accurate point of comparison for these Chinese entities. 
In addition, we indicated the minimum and average R&D intensity but this information is 
difficult to interpret. Minimum R&D intensity is directly determined by the threshold we chose of 
R&D expenditures superior to a low threshold of one million dollars, and therefore, does not say 
much. This choice also impacts on the average value. We kept this information as it gives an idea of 
the repartition of the R&D intensity among firms in one same sector, thus emphasizing the diversity 
of situations. 
When they do R&D, large Chinese firms are less intensive in R&D than the average of firms 
with an average of 2,4 percent of their net sales invested in R&D. There are, however, contrasting 
situations regarding the R&D intensity of the sectors in which they operate. In low R&D intensity 
sectors, there are Chinese entities above average in every industry, and all Chinese average R&D 
intensity is superior or equal to global average (oil and gas, paper, mining, industrial metals and 
mining, construction, and materials). In the medium-low R&D intensity (from 1 to 2 percent) 
industries, there are entities above average in one industry (food production). Similarly, Chinese 
average R&D intensity is superior to the average of the food production industry. In the medium-high 
(between 2 percent and 5 percent), some firms invest more in R&D than the average. For instance, 
38 percent of large Chinese firms in the chemical sector invest more in R&D than the average level 
of R&D expenditures by global firms in chemicals.  
Chinese firms are above global average in 3 industries (Household goods & home 
Construction, industrial engineering, and general industrials). Finally, in industries with high R&D 
intensity (superior to 5 percent), there is only one firm that invests more than the global average in 
one industry (Huawei), and the Chinese average is always inferior to the global average of R&D 
intensity. 
 
Table 6-7: R&D intensity: Comparison of Chinese entities with global benchmarks  
 
Benchmark 
Chinese firms Repartition 
R&D intensity 
 Industry Ind. Large    
Low 
R&D 
intensity 
(inferior 
to 1 %) 
 
 
Oil & Gas producers 0,40 % 0,40 % 
4 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 0,40 % 
Min: 0,06 % Max: 0,76 % 
2 companies 
above average 
(50 %) 
Forestry & Paper 1,40 % 0,80 % 
4 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 1,47 % 
Min: 0,23 % Max: 3,38 % 
2 entities 
above global 
average (50 %) 
Mining 6,50 % 0,80 % 
13 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 0,80 % 
Min: 0,00 % Max: 4,18 % 
3 companies 
above global 
average (23 %) 
Industrial metals & 
Mining 
1,40 % 1,00 % 
36 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 1,02 % 
Min: 0,03 % Max: 3,56 % 
14 entities 
above average 
(39 %) 
Construction & 1,90 % 1,50 % 21 entities 10 entities 
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Materials Average R&D intensity: 8,70 % 
Min: 0,11 % Max: 99,98 % 
above global 
average (43 %) 
 
Medium-
low 
R&D 
intensity 
(from 1 
to 2 %)  
 
 
Electricity 1,00 % 0,60 % 
4 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 1.75 % 
Min: 0,09 % Max: 5 % 
2 companies 
above global 
average (50 %) 
Food producers 2,00 % 1,20 % 
9 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 0,64 % 
Min: 0,003 % Max: 3,23 % 
2 companies 
above global 
average (22 %) 
Beverages 1,10 % 3,70 % 
2 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 0,03 % 
Min: 0,03 % Max: 0,04 % 
No company 
above global 
average 
Medium-
high 
between 
2 % and 
5 %  
 
 
Chemicals 3,90 % 1,70 % 
19 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 1,16 % 
Min: 0,01 % Max: 5,09 % 
5 companies 
above global 
average (26 %) 
Household goods & 
home Construction 
3,00 % 1,80 % 
2 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 3,52 % 
Min: 0,93 % Max: 6,10 % 
1 company 
above global 
average (50 %) 
Personal goods 2,90 % 2,30 % 
8 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 1,77 % 
Min: 0,28 % Max: 4,15 % 
3 companies 
above global 
average (38 %) 
Industrial engineering 3,90 % 2,70 % 
42 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 3,02 % 
Min: 0,02 % Max :12,13 % 
25 companies 
above global 
average (60 %) 
General Industrials 3,80 % 3,20 % 
2 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 3,62 % 
Min: 1,09 % Max: 6,15 % 
1 company 
above average 
(50 %) 
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment 
7,40 % 3,90 % 
21 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 3,28 % 
Min: 0,25 % Max: 8,51 % 
9 companies 
above global 
average (43 %) 
Alternative energy 5,30 % 4 % [2] 
5 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 2,54 % 
Min: 0,81 % Max: 5,96 % 
1 company 
above global 
average (20 %) 
Automobile & Parts 4,30 % 5,10 % 
34 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 2,37 % 
Min: 0,18 % Max: 5,86 % 
3 entities 
above global 
average (9 %) 
High 
R&D 
intensity 
- 
superior 
to 5 %  
 
  
Aerospace & Defence 5,30 % 5,50 % 
9 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 1,89 % 
Min: 0,57 % Max: 4,64 % 
No company 
above global 
average, one 
third of 
companies 
with more than 
3 % 
Leisure Goods 9.3 % 6,70 % 
1 entity 
R&D intensity: 3,29 % 
No company 
above global 
average 
Technology hardware & 
Equipment 
16,50 % 9,80 % 
32 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 5,06 % 
Min: 0,20 % Max: 16,60 % 
5 companies 
above global 
average (16 %) 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
11,60 % 10,90 % 
13 entities 
Average R&D intensity: 1,67 % 
Min: 0,01 % Max: 4,41% 
No company 
above global 
average 
General 
Average 
 4.4 % 3.4 % 2.4 % 30 %1 
Source: EU Industrial Scoreboard 2014, author’s own calculations 
 
Distinctive patterns are therefore associated with industrial sectors. Chinese firms tend to 
                                                 
1 This number reflects the weight of the low- intensive R&D 
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firms and to be less effective in doing so. In the case of China, this is emphasized by the twin 
governance structure in state-owned enterprises with the political governance (the Chinese 
communist party) along with the legal governance system (Wang, 2014), which explains why many 
strategic corporate decisions tend not to be R&D oriented. There is, in addition, a common belief that 
state-owned firms are the main beneficiaries of R&D subsidies, thus “wasting” financial resources 
allocated for R&D.  
A previous study on the effect of R&D subsidies for the period 2001 – 2006 reveals a more 
nuanced picture: private firms and minority state-owned firms actually have higher chances to receive 
grants than majority owned state firms (Boeing, 2014). A determinant factor for a firm to receive 
R&D subsidies appears to be minority state shares. The author explains this result by the prominent 
role of local governments in innovation policies and the fact that these governments are more likely 
to distribute resources to firms in which they held shares (Boeing, 2014). We cannot see this trend in 
our data as firms are classified according to their controlling shareholders, and therefore no distinction 
is made between private firms with or without state participation.  
However, what we describe is the respective propensity of the firms to engage in R&D, and 
the relative amounts they allocate to research and development. In our data, centrally state-owned 
firms and locally state-owned firms are numerous to invest: we find 163 subsidiaries of centrally 
state-owned firms, 66 of locally state-owned firms and 61 of private firms that invested more than 1 
million euros. The greater number of entities under centrally state-owned firms reflects the fact that 
they are larger than other firms.  
Private groups are smaller than state firms and in particular than centrally state-owned firms, 
with a size closer to that of local firms. They are in proportion investing more in R&D. On average, 
R&D intensity of private firms reaches 2,5 percent, which is superior to that of centrally state-owned 
firms: 2,40 percent (3,7 percent including outliers with a ratio superior to 50 percent), and to locally 
state-owned firms, with 1,81 percent of the net sales in R&D expenditures. Private firms do not make 
a uniform group, though. Their performance is driven by firms in technology hardware & equipment, 
and in particular by Huawei Technologies (13 percent). 
The commitment of private firms to R&D is coherent with other sources. Indeed, private firms 
see R&D as strategic to upgrade their technological level. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, based 
on a survey of the top 500 private firms in 2013 indicates: “Data show that in 2013 there are 389 
companies to upgrade and develop a detailed plan, accounting for up to 77.8 percent, an increase of 
30 over last year, of which 83.8 percent of the enterprises that significantly accelerate the pace of 
transformation and upgrading. Upgrade has become the consensus of large-scale private enterprises. 
Research shows that the adjustment of enterprise development strategy and planning, increase talent 
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Several dimensions attached to R&D such as R&D incentive system, innovation programs, are quite 
documented in the perspective of the analysis of China’s innovation system. There are however 
uncertainties and gaps to fill. R&D in Chinese firms are not well understood and are the object of 
very contrasting analysis1. Among case studies of large firms, the most studied of all, Huawei 
Technologies, might as well be an exception other firms want to emulate than representative of them.  
In this chapter, our contribution was to draw attention on the difficult task of analysing global 
R&D dynamics, even at the level of one group only. Based on quantitative data, it appears important 
to look at industrial sectors that, on average, are less intensive in R&D. We shall add that R&D covers 
a variety of firms’ activities that go from pure science, basic research, applied research to exploratory 
development all the way to advanced development (Amsden and Tschang, 2003). Most large Chinese 
firms that master advanced manufacturing processes, are (at least) engaged in the development and 
production of prototypes for manufacture, declaring part of the development costs as R&D costs. 
Whether they extend their knowledge towards basic research is the subject of the next chapters. 
  
                                                 
1 It is a general concern of all non-Chinese actors that we met in China, many of them recognize their inability to 
understand current trends within Chinese firms ‘we know things are happening, but we do not know what”. In contrast, 
Chinese actors emphasize the weaknesses of the R&D by the same firms. 
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2.2. The end of the twentieth century: emerging nanotechnology in China 
2.2.1. The absence of large firms doing nanotechnology research 
In the 1980s, when IBM’s research teams were working on the cutting-edge scanning 
tunnelling and atomic force microscopes, the gap between leading firms and large Chinese latecomers 
was huge, with a substantial gap in technological and organizational capabilities. China’s economic 
growth was driven by low-added value production and foreign investment, and technological learning 
essentially happened through interactions with their foreign customers. In the perspective of the 
catch-up framework introduced in Chapter 2, Chinese firms were still at the first staged, the phased 
of “technology acquisition” and “technological assimilation” (Kim, 1997).  
At that time, there were few large Chinese firms, and all of them were national firms. These 
firms were created before 1978, originating in a Soviet-style industrial planning and still exist now 
of writing. We wish to bring attention to an element: 2013’s large firms originate in the restructuring 
of firms existing prior 1978 or are new entrants in the reform and opening period. Because it was in 
the 1990s that many of the latter, including local state and private firms, were founded or formally 
created, more than half of 2013’s largest industrial firms did not exist in the 1990s. Private firms, 
which already existed, had a modest size, and their development is recent. For instance, the food-
processing company, Sichuan Gaojin Food, among the largest private employers in 2015 (175 000 
employees), was founded in 19961 
During the period, China was at the beginning of a period of market transition that was still 
not associated with a diversification of the profiles of large firms.2 State-owned firms composed the 
totality of the large firms. It is, thus, no surprise to see that they were the first to do research including 
nanometric dimensions in the 1990s. Their weak patenting activity hardly reflects a real involvement 
in emerging technologies, though (92 patent applications over the decade all types of firms included).3  
Nevertheless, the patenting activity of these firms at that time is explained by the fact that they 
were part of the planned system of research and production, and as such had access to public research 
infrastructures.4 Research including nanometric dimension was done within research units or 
organizations under the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, and the Ministry of Metallurgy (or their 
                                                 
1 Sichuan Gaojin Food Co., Ltd. 
2 Economic development was rather driven by collective and smaller firms. 
3 Including priority and non-priority patents 
4Because the system was restructured at the end of the nineties, part of the patents preceded the incorporation of research 
teams into a firm.  
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equivalents).1 It aimed at improving processes in the petrochemical and steel production industries. 
Firms with the largest number of nano-patent applications included the oil and gas firm Sinopec, and 
the steel makers Baosteel, and Angang Steel, that were respectively restructured from the Ministry of 
the Petroleum Industry, and under the control of the Ministry of Metallurgy until 1998.2 Besides 
research done within the scope of these firms, central research institutes under the same ministries 
were also among the early contributors to nanotechnology research. Large central research institutes 
are independent and directly placed under the ministry. The Central Iron & Steel Research Institute 
(CISRI) under the Ministry of Metallurgy, based in Beijing, appears to be the largest applicant.  
In the previous paragraphs, we used the term “research including nanometric dimension” 
instead of “nanotechnology research” on purpose. Labelling research from these institutes as 
“nanotechnology research” would suggest higher research quality that what the data can tell us. 
Indeed, China’s patent system suffered from many lacks until 2000, and patent data quality cannot be 
trusted.3 In addition, the scientific and technological infrastructure was known to be poor. Public 
institutes and research institutes linked to state-owned firms had outdated research infrastructures, 
lacked qualified engineers and scientists, and the level of scientific production lagged far behind that 
of leading countries (Fischer and Von Zedtwitz, 2004; Kostoff et al., 2006). 
2.2.2. Production of nano-powders and nano-particles  
What do these patents reflect? We suppose that early nanotechnology patenting in China 
reflects activities aimed at improving nanopowders’ and nanoparticles’ production process, which did 
not present important technological complexity. Our data, as well as alternative sources, support this 
idea. First, the production of nanopowder was the main industrial activity related to nanotechnology 
development. In his review of the state of nanotechnology in China, Prof. Bai Chunli, a Chinese 
nanoscientist, probably one of the most knowledgeable persons on Chinese nanotechnology, 
identified 20 production lines with ton-capacity to produce and prepare nanopowders (Bai, 2001). He 
gives an estimate of 100 enterprises in nanotechnology for the year 2000. The nature of the firms he 
                                                 
1In 1955, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI), under the authority of the State Council was given primary 
responsibility for the development of China’s oil industry. In 1978, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI) was re-
established and became a separate body from the Ministry of Chemical Industry, which was responsible for the 
downstream segment of the oil industry. Another set of institutional changes followed in 1980 as the State Energy 
Commission was established to handle the Ministries of Petroleum and Chemical Industries and the Ministry of Electrical 
Power.  
2 Boundaries between these large firms are therefore difficult to determine. In particular, some of Sinopec’s assets were 
swapped with those of PetroChina. More specifically, the two firms swapped part of their subsidiaries in an attempt to 
rationalize the division between south and north China, in the context of 1998’s restructuring of the national oil industry. 
Petrochina (CNPC) acquired 19 companies from China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), while Sinopec acquired 12 
of CNPC's companies. The existence of such arrangement makes determining firm’s boundaries complex. (Lewis, 2007) 
3 With the exception of the present section, we only consider patent applications posterior to 2000 or 2001 in the 
dissertation. 
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refers to, is however not clear. An alternative estimate by the Chinese Academy of Sciences gives a 
figure of 300 enterprises in nanoscience in 2002 (Xinhua, 2002). 
The content of patents reflects efforts for improving materials’ production process, as this is 
further suggested by a lexical analysis of the content of the patented inventions (  
137 
 
Figure 7-1).1 This analysis is built on the analysis of the keywords that most often appear in 
patents’ English abstracts before 2001. What appears is the absence of specialized technological 
vocabulary related to nanotechnology. Keywords are concentrated around a few concepts: production 
methods; acid, technological process, and belong to a non-specialized vocabulary of metallurgy (steel, 
and aluminium production) or linked to the preparation and production process of materials like 
carbon, and it is quite difficult to find a clear structuration of a field on this basis.  
Carbon nanotubes do not appear, while they are one of the Chinese strengths and one of the 
building blocks of nanotechnology. “Carbon nanotubes (CNTs) are extended tubes of rolled grapheme 
sheets, single-walled and multi-walled types. CNTs have assumed an important role in the context of 
nanomaterials, because of their novel chemical, physical and electrical properties. They are 
mechanically very strong as stiff as diamond, flexible about their axis and can conduct electricity 
extremely well. All of these remarkable properties give CNTs a range of potential applications: for 
example, in reinforced composites, sensors, nanoelectronics and display devices, etc” (Miyazaki and 
Islam, 2007). As previously mentioned, in the 1990s, nanomaterials and nanoparticles, and in 
particular carbon nanotubes, were already considered as a major strength of China’s nanotechnology 
(Bai, 2001, 2005), but the absence of reference to them in the abstracts of corporate patents suggests 
that this was limited to research in non-corporate institutions. The absence of nanodevice related 
terms is less surprising, as investigations in this field were relatively weak and lacked originality (Bai, 
2001).  
  
                                                 
1 The analysis was performed by the author using tools developed by the digital platform of IFRIS, Cortext. 
http://www.cortext.net/ 
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produced 30 percent more than China all nano-fields, reflecting the thematic orientation of China 
(Kostoff et al., 2007).1 
2.2.4. An early interest for nanoscience by scientists and the Government 
Despite the relative absence of research in nanotechnology before 2000, the question of 
supporting the development of nanoscience and, to some lesser extent, nanotechnology, was taken 
seriously. In particular, China’s scientific community and the Government showed an early interest 
for nanoscience (Bai, 2005; Huang and Wu, 2012). Chinese institutions contributed to the 
organization of international scientific events. This includes the organization of several academic 
international conferences in China. China hosted the 7thInternational Conference on Nanometer 
Science and Technology in 1993, with Prof. Bai Chunli as the Chairman of the Program Committee 
and Secretary General. We can also mention the 4th International Conference of Nanometer Scale 
Science and Technology in 1996 (Bai, 2005; Huang and Wu, 2012).2 
This is also visible in the antecedents to China’s national nanotechnology program. The 
Ministry of Science and Technology (or its predecessor the State Science and Technology 
Commission) funded nearly 1000 projects, and another 1000 small-scale grants were approved by the 
National Natural Science Foundation between 1990 to 2002 (Huang and Wu, 2012; Niosi and Reid, 
2007). 
2.3. The construction of skills in nanoscience since 2001 
2.3.1. A general framework that supports nanotechnology development 
The turn of the twenty-first century witnessed a change in China, but also in other nations, 
where nanotechnology received governmental support. Most national governments prioritized 
nanotechnology as a component of their innovation policies by doing a dedicated national program 
which took form at the beginning of the decade: the US National Nanotechnology Initiative was 
launched in January 2001. Among other nanotechnology contributors, Korea launched its national 
nanotechnology initiative in 2001 (Ahn, 2012).3 Japan selected nanotechnology and materials as one 
of four fields for priority promotion in the Second and Third Basic Plans for Science and Technology 
(2001-2005, 2006-2010) (Center for Research and Development Strategy, Japan Science and 
Technology Agency, 2016). Germany is an exception, as the country did not adopt a national 
nanotechnology initiative until 2006 (Clunan and Rodine-Hardy, 2014) . 
                                                 
1 2015 database 
2 Bai Chunli: Member of International Program Committee 
3 Countries which launched their national programs in 2001 include South Korea, Singapore, Romania, Mexico, Japan, 
Israel, Ireland, Estonia, China (Clunan and Rodine-Hardy, 2014, p. 34) 
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Nanotechnology has also grown in importance in China at the same time, where it has been 
part of the development strategy of the country. Indeed, the support to nanotechnology has been part 
of a general effort to improve the level of sciences, as well as to promote emerging sciences as part 
of China’s economic development. Nanotechnology, along with others emerging sciences and 
technologies, was considered as an opportunity and priority. President Jiang Zemin emphasized it for 
instance during the 5th plenary session of the fifteenth party central committee in October 2000: We 
should concentrate our efforts to make breakthroughs on such fields as genome science, information 
science, nano-science, life science, and geosciences.1 
Formalization of China’s nanotechnology initiatives occurred at the same period. The 
National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology was set up in 2000 by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the State Development and Planning Commission, the Ministry 
of Education, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the 
National Natural Science Foundation of China, all six organizations dependent on the State Council. 
China launched its national strategy for nanotechnology, drafted by the committee, in 2001, the 
following year.2  
 
Another important factor that shapes the development of nanotechnology in China is the role 
of standardization. China is among the few countries involved in the elaboration of standards in 
nanotechnology, and the most active emerging country. Standardization is crucial for technological 
leadership and, the adoption of formal standards reflects the support to the leadership strategy of 
China. Standards played a role in Korea’s innovation transition, notably in the information and 
communication industry (Choung et al., 2011a) 
China was the first country to issue national standards for nanotechnology in 2005. The 
country initiated the process in 2003, covering various nanomaterial types and measures. In 2005, the 
Standardization Administration of China (SAC) established the National Technical Committee on 
Nanotechnology (SAC/TC279), which was located at the National centre for Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnology (Guston, 2010). This led China to actively participate in the elaboration of standards 
of the International Organization for Standardization, ISO technical Committee 229, responsible for 
developing international guidelines for nanotechnology (Bhattacharya et al., 2011), notably through 
the coordination of the working group on nanomaterial specification for professionals (the WG4) 
(Delemarle, 2012). This working group was created in 2008 in response to previous suggestions of 
the Standardization Administration of China in 2007 for new TC 229 activities (Bhattacharya et al., 
                                                 
1(NIBC 2006, p. 14 in (Kay et al., 2009).  
2 http://www.most.gov.cn/fggw/zfwj/zfwj2001/200512/t20051214_55037.htm 
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2011). Large firms also participated in these working groups (e.g. Baosteel) (interview # 2). 
 
Finally, a general factor in favour of the development of nanotechnology is the support to 
military-related research, because of the vast range of potential applications of nanotechnology for 
military purpose (Altmann, 2004). At first, by contrast with Russia, and to some degree India, which 
insists more on potential military applications, China appears to be much more focused on the 
economic growth potential of nanotech than on its military applications (Clunan and Rodine-Hardy, 
2014, p. 33). This shall however be interpreted at the light of the dual research system adopted by 
China, and reinforced under Hu Jintao which promotes civil-military integrations of research as a 
way to leverage national science and technological resources, in particular in strategic emerging 
technologies (Lafferty et al., 2013). 
2.3.2. The growing contribution of Chinese institutions to nanoscience 
i. The increased visibility of Chinese nanotechnology 
Interest in nanoscience and nanotechnology is visible since the publication of a first review of 
the state of the art in 2001 already mentioned (Bai, 2001). It can be added to this element the increased 
perception of the Chinese society on nanotechnology, and efforts made on “nano-education” (Wu et 
al., 2014). There was a hype both in the industry and in the public for whom nanotechnology was at 
first popular. Many “nano” products were commercialized, with “nano” considered as a sign of 
advanced technology even though some products did not include any nanoscale related dimension. 
Moreover, this happens, contrary to other countries while the general public appears quite 
knowledgeable (Hu, 2012): according to a survey mentioned by the author, a majority of people have 
an understanding of what nanotechnology recovers (ibid). 
ii. The increase in the Chinese scientific publications 
Globally, the rapid growth of scientific publications began about 1990 (Zucker and Darby, 
2005). While China first was not among the countries to be scrutinized, the breadth of the contribution 
of China to nanotechnology development shed light on it, in particular in scientific publications in 
materials and nanostructures (Kostoff et al., 2007).  
In the mid-2000s, scholars looking at global nanotechnology trends noticed the high level of 
China’s R&D investments (Lux Research, 2008), or its contribution to scientific publications (Kostoff 
et al., 2007; Larédo et al., 2010; Miyazaki and Islam, 2007; Zucker and Darby, 2005), which led to 
dedicated research on the country (Guan and Ma, 2007; Tang and Shapira, 2011; Zhou and 
Leydesdorff, 2006). Since then, a myriad of innovation studies or scientometric research, based on 
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different samples of scientific publications, converge to indicate a surge in the number of Chinese 
scientific publications.  
Part of the trend comes from low-impact scientific publications (Kostoff et al., 2007). 
However, the increase of China’s participation in international collaborations and publication in high 
quality journals in nanotechnology indicates its capacity. Zhou & Leydesdorff analyze China’s 
performance in nanotechnology based on the number of Chinese publications in international and 
domestic journals, categorized in two sets of journals: in 3 core nanotechnology journals (‘Journal of 
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology’, ‘Nano Letters’, and ‘Nanotechnology’), and in 85 nano-relevant 
journals (e.g, Journal of Chemistry). Their results reflect an increase in the level of China’ science. 
While authors from the United-States and from the UK published in ‘Nanotechnology’ (the unique 
specialized journal at that time) since the beginning in 1994, Chinese authors started to be visible in 
core nanotechnology journals only in 2000, and their number has continued to grow exponentially. In 
2004, China was the second largest contributor of the three core nanotechnology journals (Zhou and 
Leydesdorff, 2006).  
Alternative sources give similar trends. In 1998, Huang and Wu calculate that 1875 
publications were coming from China, against 4423 from Japan, and 9468 from the United States 
(Huang and Wu, 2012). On the basis of the same sample of publications, China’s proportion of 
publications grew from 6 percent in 1998 to 23 percent in 2008, with an annual growth rate of 92 
percent.1 Guan and Ma perform an analysis on the participation of China to nano-publications on the 
period 1985 - 2004. 2 They found that China became the second contributor in 2002. According to 
their data, China does research before 2000, but the Chinese number of publications grew faster than 
in other nations, and doubled every 2.1 years during the period 1995-2004 (Guan and Ma, 2007). In 
addition, Chinese authors contributed in a greater proportion to the world’s “nano-relevant” 
publications (8,3 percent) than to all publications (6.5 percent) (ibid). 
These trends were driven by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and to some lesser, extent by 
universities. Public research institutes were the most prolific institutions in nano-related scientific 
publications between 1985 and 2004 (Guan and Ma, 2007). 
iii. From nanoscience to nanotechnology 
Scientific publications reflect the significant contribution of China to the development of 
nanosciences. There is however contrasted evidence regarding the degree of technological advances 
                                                 
1 Data source: MERIT Database of Worldwide Nanotechnology Scientific Publications 
2 As a method to delineate nanotechnology, the authors searched in scientific papers keywords containing “nano” prefix 
(with some exceptions) 
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in nanotechnology.1 Traditionally, patents are considered closer to technological developments and 
the market than to publications. China’s contribution to patent applications in nanotechnology is 
lower than its contribution to scientific publications. In addition, patenting in nanotechnology is 
initiated by academic research in universities and public research institutions, and it is weakly linked 
to the technology demand and the high-tech industries (Huang and Wu, 2012).  
We shall detail the contribution of firms in the next section. 
2.3.3. The relative contribution of Chinese firms to nanotechnology development 
i. Modalities of support to the industrialization of nanotechnology 
Early, the Chinese Government recognized the strategic dimension of nanotechnology for 
industrial development. The national strategy in nanotechnology, decided at the central level, is 
deployed at the provincial and sub-provincial levels by local officials.  
Two main approaches were adopted to support nanotechnology development by firms. The 
first approach consists in supporting the start-up ecology, with a focus on young innovative firms. 
Such policies include various types of interventions, which encompass seed funding, subsidies, or 
broader support to the development of clusters by proposing attractive conditions and talent programs: 
a major example of the latter is the support for the creation of a nanotechnology cluster in Suzhou2.  
The second approach, which also targets large firms, aims to support the construction of skills 
by fostering the development of nanotechnology R&D. This support to industrialization is notably 
part of the role attributed to the national centres for nanotechnology: The Nanotech Industrialization 
Base of China located in Tianjin and founded by Ministry of Science and Technology in 2000, 
Shanghai Nanotechnology Promotion Centre, the National Centre for Nanoscience and Technology 
created in 2003 and located in the Institute of Chemistry of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 
Beijing, as well as the National Centre for Nanoengineering created the same year (Guston, 2010). 
The Shanghai Nanotechnology Promotion Centre, under the Shanghai Municipal Science & 
Technology Commission, was set up in 2001 to coordinate R&D projects and to promote “nanotech 
industrialization” in the area. In addition to support small firms in getting funds, through an incubator 
for start-ups, and through its association with Shanghai Nanotech Association (interview # 3), the 
Shanghai Nanotechnology Promotion Centre organizes as well the training of participants in the use 
                                                 
1 Given the size of the country, one can name a series of technological successes, for instance the development of a nano-
enabled space suit in the space industry (Clunan and Rodine-Hardy, 2014, p. 15). 
2 Suzhou Industrial Park integrates research institutes, universities and firms, and is one of the innovation park that focus 
on biotechnology and nanotechnology. It benefits from the support of the local, provincial (Jiangsu Province) and central 
governments. In 2013, the technological park Biobay housed 42 firms in “nanotechnology-related materials 
nanotechnology, optoelectronics, biomedicine, micro and nano system manufacturing, and energy-saving and the 
environment” (Cao et al., 2013, pp. 59–61) 
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of infrastructures and materials.  
ii. Going beyond the nanotechnology commercialization challenge 
Previous studies have emphasized the weaknesses of the contribution of Chinese firms to 
nanotechnology development. For instance during the period 1985-2004, firms represented 0,5 
percent of Chinese nano-publications, a proportion which is below the level of other nations(Guan 
and Ma, 2007) .1 This modest contribution of firms in national dynamics is also visible globally. In 
fact, in 2006 China was ranked 5th in corporate R&D investment, which represented 3 percent of the 
global private R&D investments in nanotechnology in the world (Lux Research, 2008).  
This might lead to think that the nanotechnology-related research in the corporate sector lags 
behind other research institutions (Cao et al., 2013). This idea, which is true, shall however be 
nuanced. The fact that public institutions drive the trend, does not mean that firms are absent. Indeed, 
since 2000 a growing number of firms have developed research in nanotechnology. During the period 
2001 - 2008, the relative contribution of firms to the total has remained stable, with a proportion 
varying between 29 percent and 35 percent of total Chinese nanotechnology patents.  
Another element that was evidenced as a barrier to nanotechnology development is the 
decoupling between scientific institutions and industries (Huang and Wu, 2012; Shapira and Wang, 
2009). The situation is explained by a differential of competences between the industry and the 
research institutions (Huang and Wu, 2012), and by the geographical distance (Motoyama et al., 
2014). Looking at this question more closely, we observe that the commercialization of 
nanotechnology is associated with two distinct challenges. The first one is linked to the promotion of 
new firms and start-ups in nanotech (Shapira and Wang, 2009). However, the technological regime 
associated with nanotechnology does not promote the creation of new industry, and the start-ups 
rather follow a ‘business to research’ model (Larédo et al., 2010), by providing services or 
intermediary goods such as nanoparticles used for research. This idea is shared by actors themselves 
who consider the notion of “nanotechnology industrialization” as misleading (interview # 2). It results 
that the development of start-ups act as a support for the diffusion of nanotechnology within 
industries.  
The second challenge is the diffusion of nanosciences and nanotechnology in the industry. A 
major channel of nanotechnology diffusion (or knowledge acquisition from the firm perspective) is 
through the training and hiring of qualified human resources to work within research departments of 
firms (Lee and Allen, 1982). The availability of qualified engineers and technicians has a direct 
impact on nanotechnology industrialization. In that perspective, the predominance of scientific 
                                                 
1 Authors do not provide detailed figures at the exception of the Chinese percentage. 
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be reminded that the 325 large industrial firms forming part of the observed population are neither 
selected on the basis of innovation criteria such as patents, R&D or new products nor on any 
alternative indicators of economic or financial performances. In addition, the trend is notable for at 
least half of them. Indeed, there are important variations in the depth of nanotechnology research 
among these firms with nanotechnology patenting. Half of them have a “low” (only one patent 
application) or limited (between two to four patents) commitment to nanotechnology research. 
However, the other half’s contribution is more important, as it concerns firms that have applied for 
five patent applications and more. This shows that the repartition of firms among these four categories 
is balanced. 28 firms (18 percent) have only one patent application, which reflects a low investment 
in nanotechnology research. Another group of 47 firms (30 percent) falls in the category of “limited” 
number of patents, which implies that around half of the large firms has moderately integrated 
nanoscale dimension in their research activities (48 percent). By contrast, the remaining 52 percent 
of the studied firms have a significant patenting activity, 47 firms have between five and fourteen 
patent applications, or a substantial patent activity, 35 firms have at least fifteen patent applications.  
In addition, the characteristics of the largest applicants (Table 7-1) show that some firms have 
a substantial nanotechnology patenting activity. They, together, contribute to a great proportion of 
nanotechnology patents. Eight firms, representing 2.5 percent of the large industrial firms, account 
for 59 percent of all patent applications. The most productive firms include, by decreasing number of 
patent applications: the firm Sinopec (916 patents), the firm Aluminum Corp (317 patents), the firm 
BYD (202 patents), the firm PetroChina (187 patents), the firm Datang Telecom (186 patents), the 
Baosteel Group (168 patents), the firm BOE (115 patents), and Huawei Technologies (113 patents). 
They are among the largest firms, with an average size of 195 000 employees higher than the average 
size of all patenting firms (79 929 employees). The smallest firms of the group are the locally state-
owned firm BOE Technology which employs 35 165 persons, and Datang Telecom with 23 305 
employees. The six other firms employ more than 100 000 employees.  
Table 7-1: Eight largest filer of patents in nanotechnology 2001 - 2009 
Rk  Firm Industry sector Number of  
patent applications 
Yr Employees Ownership  
1  Sinopec Oil & Gas 
producers 
 916 2000 268 953 Central State Owned  
2  aluminum 
corporation of 
china (chinalco) 
Industrial 
metals & 
Mining 
 317 2001 192 272 Central State Owned  
3  BYD company 
limited 
Electronic & 
Electrical 
Equipment 
 202 1995 159 000 Privately Owned  
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4  china national 
petroleum 
corporation 
(Petrochina) 
Oil & Gas 
producers 
 188 1999 544 083 Central State Owned  
5  Datang Telecom 
Technology & 
Industry Group 
Technology 
hardware & 
Equipment 
 186 1994 23 305 Central State Owned  
6  Baosteel group 
corporation 
Industrial 
metals & 
Mining 
 168 1978 195 307 Central State Owned  
7  BOE technology 
group co Ltd 
Electronic & 
Electrical 
Equipment 
 115 1993 35 615 Local State Owned  
8  Huawei Technology 
hardware & 
Equipment 
 113 1988 150 000 Privately Owned  
Source: author 
 
3.2. China’s trends are similar to world’s trends 
This section focuses on the importance of China’s nanotechnology research and compares 
China to the leading countries that participate in the “nanotechnology race” such as the United-States 
(Dong et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2016; Kostoff, 2012; Liu and Guan, 2016), or Germany (Preschitschek 
and Bresser, 2010). How do China’s trends compare to global trends? The fact that about half of large 
Chinese firms have applied for patents in nanotechnology needs to be put in perspective with 
dynamics of nanotechnology research within research laboratories of technological leaders of the 
world economy.1 
Technological leaders ie multinationals and firms with important level of R&D investments 
from advanced economies were already engaged in nanotechnology research by 2008. Among these 
firms, some were particularly active. During the period 1980 – 2004, in addition to be at the origin of 
nanotechnology instrumentation, IBM was the most prolific applicant; it was followed by Genentech, 
Motorola, Micron Technology, and Xerox (Shea et al., 2011).  
In addition, the trend is notable by its breadth. The majority of R&D firms had engaged in 
nanotechnology research by 2008 (Larédo et al., 2010).2 The trend was notable: 88 percent of firms 
applied for at least two nano-patents in chemicals, 68 percent in electronics and electrical, 74 percent 
in the oil, gas and electricity sector, and 69 percent in automotive & transport. This trend is also 
visible in industries less demanding in R&D: 76 percent of firms in the construction & materials 
sector, and 47 percent of firms in industrial engineering have applied for nanotechnology patents. An 
                                                 
1The landscape of the large industrial firms is given by existing rankings based on S&T indicators such as R&D 
expenditures (European Innovation Scoreboard), patents, or a combination of both (Corporate Innovation Board). 
2 These figures include firms with more than two patent applications 
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average of 64 percent of global R&D firms had applied for patents through industries by 2008. This 
goes to show the engagement in nanotechnology research among industries in all countries.1  
The importance of nanotechnology research by established firms is also visible in the case of 
China, where 48 percent of established large Chinese firms had applied for patent by 2009. How 
Chinese firms compare with other firms vary. Indeed, the comparison between China and the rest of 
the world (Table 7-2) suggests two distinctive cases: industries in which Chinese tends to be less 
engaged in nanotechnology research than technological leaders (among which automobile, chemicals, 
construction and materials) and industries in which Chinese firms are particularly engaged. The 
differences observed in oil and gas, aerospace and defence industries are not conclusive because they 
are state monopolies with a very limited number of actors. 
Table 7-2: Proportion of large firms with nanotechnology research 
Industry Number of firms in 
DTI R&D 
scoreboard2 
Of which have two nano-
patent applications  
Proportion of large Chinese firms 
with nano-patent applications  
Chemicals 96 firms 88 percent (84 firms) 56 percent (9 firms) 
Electronics & electrical 
equipment 
103 68 percent (70 firms) 56 percent (14 firms) 
Oil & gas, electricity 53 74 percent (39 firms) 100 percent (3 firms) oil & gaz 
Electricity  
Automobile & transport 86 69 percent (59 firms) 29 percent (9 firms) 
Tech hardware & equipment 225 66 percent (150 firms) 76 percent (13 firms) 
Construction & materials 55 76 percent (42 firms) 34 percent (10 firms) 
Aerospace & defense 35 56 percent (24 firms) 100 percent (4 firms) 
Pharmaceuticals & biotech 153 48 percent (73 firms) 86 percent (6 firms) 
Alternative energy NR NR 50 percent (1 firms) 
General industrials 38 76 percent (24 firms) 48 percent (11 firms) 
Industrial engineering 70 47 percent (33 firms) 71 percent (23 firms) 
   11 percent (2 firms) Personal goods 
Household goods & personal 
goods 
40 53 percent (21 firms) Household goods & home 
construction 
Food producer (incl 
beverage) 
32  50 percent (16 firms) Incl. 
food producer: 31 percent (5 firms)  
beverage: 60 percent (3 firms)  
Conglomerate NR NR  
ALL 986 635 (64 percent) 48 percent (157) 
Source: author’s calculations, (Larédo et al., 2010) 
                                                 
1 In a practical way, these percentages offer an indicative world “benchmark” by quantifying industrial orientations 
towards nanotechnology research. The relatively low patenting activity of large Chinese firms compared to the global 
average cannot be interpreted directly though because of the selection criteria that differs from one populations of firms 
to another. It is expected to find a higher proportion of nanotechnology research among the population of global R&D 
firm, which was selected based on their level of R&D expenditures. Inversely, the figures obtained for global R&D firms 
only count those with more than two patent applications and do not include only large firms. This creates a selection bias 
as some small firms that invest already important sums in R&D (pharmaceuticals & biotech sectors) are also included. 
2 Source: DTI scoreboard and Nanobench/ Nanotrenchart project, 2009 (Larédo et al., 2010) 
149 
 
3.3. A diversified group of firms in nanotechnology research 
3.3.1. The persisting driving force of national firms 
About the composition of the 157 firms who have patents in nanotechnology, two observations 
can be made. The first observation relates to the variety regarding ownership. Our results indicate 69 
centrally-owned state firms, 57 locally-owned state firms and 30 private firms that have applied for 
nano-patents This suggests that corporate nanotechnology research has been driven by the three 
categories of firms. In addition, the historical evolution of the entries of these firms into 
nanotechnology research (Figure 7-2) suggests a relative stability in their respective contribution to 
nanotechnology patents over the years. 
A second observation relates to the importance of the contribution of state-owned firms to the 
trend. This partly reflects the composititon of the group of 325 firms. Indeed, private firms are 
underrepresented among the large firms group in China compared to the weight of the private sector 
in the economy. They represent 32 percent of the whole group of firms (see p. 97).  
The fact that they constitute only 19 percent of firms with nanotechnology research reflect a 
lesser engagement of private firms into research. This lower proportion reflects different patterns. 
Indeed, some private firms were early engaged. Seven of them have realized nanotechnology research 
by 2001.1 Among them, we find two firms that have close links with some public research institutions. 
This is the case of Lenovo (PC maker). Indeed, Lenovo started as a spin-off company from the 
Chinese Academy of Science.2 The company Tsinghua Tongfang is also attached to a public research 
institution, Tsinghua University (China’s Ministry of Education).  
The contribution of state firms is largely imputable to centrally-owned firms: one out of four 
depends on the Central Government. Centrally state-owned firms have been the most productive 
patentors: and they contribute to 72 percent of the large firms’ patent applications (2673 patent 
applications). Whereas, the local and private firms represent each 14 percent of the total of all patent 
applications. This suggests, therefore, that they apply to a greater number of patents than the others. 
It should be nuanced though. First, it is partly caused by the large contribution of the firm Sinopec, 
which represents by itself about a fourth of the total (916 patents). Nevertheless, Sinopec only 
explains part of the trend. Figure 7-2 illustrates the persistence of nanotechnology activity among 
centrally state-owned firms throughout the considered period, as well as the regular entry of state 
firms among new entrants in nanotechnology. Throughout the observed period, there is a modest 
                                                 
1 Chongqing Lifan Industry (founded in 1992, automobile and parts), Huawei, Lenovo (1984), Technology hardware & 
Equipment), Tsinghua Tongfang (1997, Technology hardware & Equipment), Wanxiang Group (1969, automobile and 
parts), Zhejiang Sanhua Group, ZTE Corporation. 
2 that is still maintaining its shares in the company through a holding 
150 
 
variation towards the private firms and locally state-owned firms. 42 percent of the local state-owned 
firms have registered a patenting activity, but they represent a lesser proportion of the total. 
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3.3.2. Three groups of industries 
The table below illustrates the sectoral impact of nanotechnology variation among industries 
( 
Table 7-3). By considering two dimensions: - the proportion of firms which have 
nanotechnology patenting compared to all firms in one industrial sector, - and the overall sectoral 
contribution to patent applications realized by large firms, we can distinguish three patterns of 
nanotechnology research: leading sectors which contribute to the overall trend (and in which a 
majority of firms is engaged in nanotechnology patents), leading secondary sectors (in which a high 
proportion of firms does research but with a lower contribution to the total), and other sectors with 
both a moderate proportion of firms who do research and a low contribution to the total. 
 
Table 7-3: Categorization of industries by their patenting 
 
 Industry Nb 
Firms 
Sector 
nano 
Nb 
Firms 
Sector 
all 
% Total_N
bPatent 
Sector 
Sector 
contribution to 
China 
       
Leading sectors 
- Contribution to 
the overall trend 
- Pervasiveness 
across sectors 
Oil & Gas producers 3 3 100% 1144 31% 
Technology hardware & 
Equipment 
14 17 82% 440 12% 
Industrial metals & 
Mining 
27 43 63% 818 22% 
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment 
14 25 56% 461 12% 
       
Leading secondary 
sectors 
- Nanotechnology 
is pervasive 
- Modest 
contribution to 
patenting 
Aerospace & Defence 4 4 100% 124 3% 
Leasure goods 1 1 100% 2 0% 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
6 7 86% 27 1% 
Industrial engineering 17 21 81% 128 3% 
Beverages 3 5 60% 14 0% 
Chemicals 9 16 56% 120 3% 
Alternative energy 1 2 50% 2 0% 
General Industrials 11 23 48% 88 2% 
       
Other sectors 
- Significant 
investment in 
nanotechnology 
- Modest 
contribution to 
national trend 
 
 
Construction & Materials 10 29 34% 83 2% 
Mining 8 26 31% 20 1% 
Conglomerate 6 19 32% 37 1% 
      
Automobile & Parts 8 28 29% 22 1% 
Food producers 5 16 31% 29 1% 
Household goods & 
home Construction 
4 9 44% 54 1% 
      
Electricity 3 9 33% 30 1% 
Tobacco 1 2 50% 45 1% 
       
Absent or marginal 
sectors in 
nanotechnology 
Personal goods 2 18 11% 20 1% 
Forestry & Paper  2 0%  0% 
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Compilation of sources and author’s data  
i. Leading sectors: Oil & Gas, Technological hardware and equipment, industrial 
metal and mining, and electronic and electrical equipment 
A few industrial sectors are characterized by a high proportion of firms which have 
nanotechnology patenting, and a significant overall sectoral contribution to patent applications 
realized by large firms. Four industrial sectors, - oil and gas, - technological hardware and equipment, 
- industrial metals and mining, - and electronic and electrical equipment, make 77 percent of all patent 
applications by the group of large firms. These are also sectors in which firms are on average well 
engaged in nanotechnology research. 
The first sector, oil and gas, is a central state monopoly with three main firms under the State 
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission. These three main firms are PetroChina and 
Sinopec, which both operate onshore, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation, which operates 
offshore. They are global Fortune companies and, altogether, contribute to 31 percent of the total 
patent applications by large firms, this trend being largely due to the high contribution of Sinopec 
(916 patent applications). The importance of this sector in China’s patenting echoes to what is 
observed in other emerging economies. Sinopec and PetroChina are among China’s largest 
contributors (Table 2-1, p. 146). The producer of oil and gas Sinopec is by far, the largest patent 
applicant (916 patent applications) representing almost one-fourth of all nano-patent applications by 
firms. Similarly, Brazil’s Petrobras is the largest patent filer in nanotechnology of the country (Table 
7-5, p. 162). Indian Oil is also present among the firms that patent the most in India (even though its 
contribution remains modest, see p. 159). They also reflect the importance of nanotechnology-related 
research in oil and gas industries: Oil & gas producers have been an early adopter of nanotechnology. 
Fundamentally, the industry has been part of nanotechnology since the beginning because oil reserves 
are really just emulsions of oil, gas, and water that create nanoscale particles. More recently, 
however, nanoscale research and commercialization has transitioned to leveraging nanotechnology 
to improve their extraction processes (Ferris and Micromem Applied Sensor Technologies Inc., 
2014).  
Half of the eight largest applicants are central state-owned firms in resource-related industries: 
either in the production and transformation of oil and gas sector (Petrochina, Sinopec) or the 
metallurgical sector, aluminum and steel industries (Baosteel and Aluminum Corp). The importance 
of these national firms into nanotechnology patenting reflects two elements. They reflect both features 
of economic development and the weight of these industries in the economy. Industrial production 
requires energy and natural resources, that are strategic resources for the government and kept under 
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its control. It shall be noted that these four firms above-mentioned had filed patent applications before 
2001 (a period essentially characterized by improvement of the production processes of nanoparticles 
and nanopowders).  
The firms that compose the metallurgical sector display very different features. Locally-
owned state firms are the most active, which is associated to a high number of firms. 63 percent of 
firms in the mining and metal industries have applied for patents in nanotechnology: this represents 
27 firms of the total of 43 large firms in these sectors.  
Two other sectors among the leading industrial sectors include hardware & equipment sector 
(notably the telecommunication equipment companies), and electronic & electrical equipment sector, 
both high in R&D activities. Four of the eight largest applicants were in these two categories. Two 
firms are telecommunication equipment firms: Datang Telecom, and Huawei Technologies.1 Finally, 
two firms belong to the electronic & electrical equipment sector, both founded in the 1990s: the 
Beijing-based locally state-owned firm BOE Technology in the liquid crystal displays industry and 
BYD Company a private firm in the electric battery. 23 
ii. Secondary leading industrial sectors 
A second group is gathering industries that display significant nanotechnology pervasiveness 
i.e. a proportion of firms with nanotechnology above the general average, but with a smaller sectoral 
contribution to the total. These industries are - Aerospace and Defence, - Leasure Goods, 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Industrial engineering, Beverages, Chemicals, Alternative 
energy and general industrials. Globally, these sectors contribute to 12 percent of all the patent 
applications.  
This includes sectors intensive or highly intensive in R&D. Four centrally state-owned firms 
compose China’s Aerospace and Defense sector: China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp, 
Aviation Industry Corp of China, China North Industries Group Corp and China Aerospace Science 
and Industry. The four of them have already applied for patents.  
The cases of China’s chemicals and pharmaceutical & biotechnology sectors are also 
                                                 
1大唐电信(datang dianxin)Not to be confused with China Datang Corporation (中国大唐集团公司 zhongguo datang 
jituan gongsi) which is also a central state-owned enterprise, but in the power generation industry. Datang Telecom is 
controlled by its parent company, the China Academy of Telecommunications technology (CATT). It is known for its 
contribution to the 3G technology standard TD-SCDMA(Gao, 2014). While Huawei patents on the behalf of the group, 
the situation differs for Datang Telecom. Most patent applications under Datang Telecom, were made by the Shanghai-
based firm Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) in which Datang Telecom has controlling shares 
since 2011. 
2 1993 for BOE Technology and 1995 for BYD 
3Liquid crystals are a substance that bends and refracts light waves as they pass through them. With the addition of external 
electric charges, the property of light changes creating the various shades of color and shadow you see on the display 
(source BOE) 
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interesting as there are potential applications of nanotechnology in these industries. 86 percent of 
firms in pharmaceuticals & biotech, and 56 percent of firms in chemicals have already integrated 
nanoscale dimension in their research. However, the intensity of their participation remains modest. 
This is relatively surprising regarding the fact that the chemicals sectors are among the most dynamic 
in nanotechnology (88% of patents among technological leaders in that category, see section 3.2). 
iii. Industries: Laggards and absent of the trend 
In some others industries, nanotechnology research is still less diffused. There are two 
distinctive cases according the nature of industries concerned. Some industries are traditionnally less 
demanding in research, and they have been associated to lower pervasiveness of nanotechnology at 
the global level. For instance, there are no Chinese firms highly engaged in nanotechnology among 
the following industries: food production, personal goods, forestry & paper, but this is explained by 
the fact that these industries are traditionally less intensive in R&D. Large firms in the (forestry) and 
paper industry invest on average 0,8 percent of their sales in R&D. 
In contrast, the modesty of nanotechnology investment in sectors where firms from advanced 
economies have important nanotechnology research reflects the lag of Chinese firms. The automobile 
industry is traditionally demanding in R&D. The OECD uses to categorize the automobile industry 
as a medium to high R&D intensity, Here, the China’s automobile sector is showed to underperform 
in R&D (we found only the average of 2,3 percent of R&D intensity, see Table 6-4, p. 122). 69 percent 
of global firms in automobile and transport had nanotechnology patents. This is the case of a small 
proportion of 29 percent of Chinese firms. In addition, none of these firms make a noticeable 
contribution.  
3.4. Conclusion 
There are few if none corporate communications on nanotechnology research by large firms, 
exception made of the Shanghai-based steel producer Baosteel. We also found that a few other firms 
mention the use of nano-enhanced products: Shanghai Electric, and Hisense. In the press, articles that 
refer to nanotechnology mention either governmental programs where nanotechnology is perceived 
as an opportunity for technological breakthroughs, or research related activities in universities and 
research institutions. A research on Factiva, gathering all “Nanotechnology Weekly” between 2009 
and 2015 illustrates this absence of communication. 152 news articles in this Journal include the terms 
“China” and “firm” (or equivalently company, enterprise, business), against 33 143 articles that 
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4.2. Absence of Indian firms from nanotechnology patenting 
4.2.1. Weak patenting activity in India 
Compared to China, the relatively modest investment of Indian firms in R&D underlines their 
lesser capacity to invest and to develop skills in nanotechnology than Chinese firms. Indeed, a limited 
patenting activity suggests that there is a modest number of Indian firms with nano-related R&D. 
Wholly, the Indian institutions applied for 567 patent applications between 2000 – 2008, and almost 
the half of these patents was applied by individuals (which are generally not included in quantitative 
analysis as they are too difficult to interpret).1 The number of 567 patent applications contrasts sharply 
with the Chinese one where 51 258 nano invention were patented in the same period ( between 2001-
2008) This number is coherent with previous researches that notice the weak implications of India in 
nanotechnology patents (Bhattacharya and Shilpa, 2011). 
However, there has been in India, a continued national government support to the 
nanotechnology development. The first national nanotechnology initiative in India was decided in 
2001 with a short-term horizon: The Nanoscience and Technology Initiative (NSTM) running 
between 2001 and 2006. Later in 2007, NSTM program was engaged by the Indian Department of 
Science and Technology during five years with an annual allocation of around $5 million.  
The Indian firms are not absent from the nanotechnology research landscape (  
                                                 
1IFRIS NanoPat that covers the whole period till 2008 
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Table 7-4). In fact, nanotechnology patenting is dominated by firms. There is one exception, 
which is also the largest institutional applicant in India. The Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research is an independent organ mainly funded by the Indian government and ruling about 217 
nano-related patent applications.  
Furthermore, 22 Indian institutions out of the 25 top applicants in nanotechnology are mainly 
private firms, owning to the pharmaceutical and biotech sector (list provided by the table below). In 
total, the Indian firms represent 31 percent of the total patent applications activity, with 228 
nanotechnology patents registered at the Indian Office of Property Intellectuals (OPI) between 2000 
and 2008 (Patstat 2009).  
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Table 7-4: Top Indian patent applicants in nano (all years, more than 5 patents) 
Rank Name Nb Detail Sector 
R&D 
scoreboard 
1 
Council of Scientific & 
Industrial Research 
217 
Autonomous R&D organization 
mainly funded by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology 
  
2 
Ranbaxy Laboratories 
Limited 
32 Acquired by Sun Pharma in 2014 Pharma & Biotech  
3 
Dr. Reddy's 
Laboratories Ltd. 
27 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech 
525th largest 
R&D spender 
in 2014 (145 
million €) 
4 Biocon Limited 14 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech  
5 
Reliance Life Sciences 
Pvt. Ltd. 
14 
Belong to conglomerate Reliance 
Industries 
Pharma & Biotech 535th (143 M€) 
6 
Indian Oil Corporation 
Limited 
12 State-owned firms Oil & gas  
7 
Sun Pharmaceuticals 
Industries Ltd. 
12 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech 660th (110 M€) 
8 Cipla Limited 10 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech 1038th (60 M€) 
9 Eli Lilly and company 10 American firm Pharma & Biotech  
10 Panacea Biotec Ltd. 8 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech  
11 
Dr. Reddy's Research 
Foundation 
8 Belong to Dr. Reddy Industries Pharma & Biotech  
12 Lupin Limited 8 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech 686th (105 M€) 
13 
Indian Petrochemicals 
Corporation Limited 
7 Private Indian firm Chemicals  
14 
Nicholas Piramal India 
Limited 
7 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech 1523rd (35 M€) 
15 
Lakshmi Machine 
Works Limited 
7 Private Indian firm 
Industrial 
engineering 
 
16 
Birla Research Institute 
for Applied Sciences 
7 Privately-funded institute in 1969   
17 
Cadila Healthcare 
Limited 
7 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech 1175th (50 M€) 
18 Hetero Drugs Limited 7 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech  
19 
Glenmark 
Pharmaceuticals 
Limited 
6 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech 2405th (17 M€) 
20 
Sahajanand Medical 
Technologies PVT. Ltd 
6 Private Indian firm 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
 
21 
Galaxy Surfactants 
LTD 
6 Private Indian firm Chemicals  
22 
Torrent 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
5 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech  
23 USV Limited 5 Private Indian firm Pharma & Biotech  
24 
National Research 
Development 
Corporation 
5 
Government enterprise under the 
Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (Ministry of 
S&T) for technology transfer 
  
25 
Bharat Serums & 
Vaccines Ltd. 
5 Belong to conglomerate Bharat Pharma & Biotech  
Source: compilation of various sources by the author 
 
This low level of patenting activity by Indian firms can found several explanations. First, the 
160 
 
number of firms with internal R&D activities is relatively low: only 24 Indian firms were ranked 
among the top 2500 R&D firms in 2013, including small firms. Besides, many India’s R&D firms 
are operating in industrial sector where the nanotechnology has limited applications. Indeed, among 
the large 16 Indian firms ranked among the top 2500 R&D firms in 2013, only five of them have 
patents in nanotechnology (about one-third of the group) and six of them belong to the Software & 
Computer Services sector.1 A second explanation to the low nanotechnology activity in India is 
coming from the research organization modalities among the large Indian firms that might externalize 
part of their research activities.2 Finally, and alternative explanation might related to India’s national 
specificities regarding patents.3  
4.2.2. Nanotechnology and Patterns of industrial specialization across India 
Accurately, the diffusion of Indian nanotechnology patenting is limited. This fact is associated 
with the notable absence of industrial diversification in India among firms with nanotechnology 
patents. According to the list of the most prolific nano-patent firms, they belong mainly to the same 
sector activities. For instance 17 Indian firms belong to the Pharmaceuticals & biotechnology sector- 
a sector in which Indian firms are historical actors under the leadership of Ranbaxy Laboratories, Dr. 
Reddy and Cipla (Kale, 2012). Few others firms belong to some distinct industrial sectors: Indian Oil 
Corp Ltd a one state-owned oil and gas firm, Galaxy surfactants a chemical firm, Sahajanand Medical 
Technologies specialised on healthcare equipment and services, and Lakshmi Machine Works 
Limited an industrial engineering company. 
 Innovative Indian firms and their strategies have been as well studied and recognized to have 
reached the stage of innovating behind the technological frontier (Kale, 2012). Concerning the Indian 
firms that are the most studied regarding their innovation capacity, we identify the following firms, 
Ranbaxy the pharma Dr. Reddy and TATA subsidiaries, notably in the automobile sector. The WIPO 
(World Intellectual Property Office) says about Dr Reddy the following: The Indian firm, Dr Reddy 
appears to be a classic case of intellectual property and has successful caught up “Dr. Reddy himself 
so well describes, “Ours is a story about bringing affordable medicines to people in India, then moving 
on to compete in the advanced markets of the world, and finally, to drug discovery.” This 
transformation and the company’s R&D carried out by DRF, gave the company financial success on 
one hand and made a strong social impact on the other. Acting as a primary link, IPRs helped the 
company become the innovator that it is today.”(wipo, 2010).  
                                                 
1 There are 24 Indian firms, whose size is known for 17 of them. 16 with more than 10 000 employees. 
2 Large conglomerates invest in separate research institutes or in collaboration with universities 
3 ,For instance in the pharmaceutical sector in particular, Indian firms did not need to patent before 2005 (Chaudhuri, 
2005).  
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This suggests that national differences in patenting trend are not explained by individual 
performances of firms, but by national dynamics of firms  
4.3. Brazilian firms: a less pronounced trend than in China 
Concerning the diffusion of nanotechnology, Brazil offers a different example than India. 
Brazil presents a distinctive interest. Besides that it is the 5th world largest country, with an area of 
8,4-million square kilometers, Brazil leads nanotechnology development in Latin America area. 
According to (Kay and Shapira, 2009), the Brazil had contributed in 2006 to about half of all Latin 
American scientific publications. Brazil designed its own nanotechnology policies in the 2000s, - a 
few years after China. From fact, the Brazilian government has adopted a national nanotechnology 
program between 2004-2005, when nanotechnology was declared one of the eleven areas for strategic 
government investment (Clunan and Rodine-Hardy, 2014, p. 35).  
Furthermore, Brazilian nanotechnology is providing an interesting comparative view with 
China. Indeed, to some extent, the Brazilian case is presenting some similarities with China. Firstly, 
public research organizations and universities are driving nanotechnology patenting trend. In the top 
five of Brazilian applicants, three of them are universities (the State University of Campinas1, 
University of Mina Gerais, University of Sao Paolo) and one is a governmental institution (São Paulo 
Research Foundation). This reflects both the traditional emphasis of Brazil on basic research for 
economic development (Niosi and Reid, 2007), and the driving role of Brazilian universities in 
nanotechnology (Kay et al., 2009). The National Nuclear Energy Commission and the National 
Council for Scientific and Technological Development are also productive contributors. Another 
aspect similar to China is the role of foreign firms in nanotechnology patents. 
In parallel, the specificities of the Brazilian case is the degree of deployment of 
nanotechnology research among other actors. The weak patenting power of the Brazilian firms has 
already been identified. In a previous bibliometric analysis based on Georgia Tech’s nanotechnology 
database, Kay et al. have found that 95 percent of the 157 nanotechnology patents, belong to 
universities, and counted less than 80 firms in Brazil pursuing the development of the nanotechnology 
(Kay et al., 2009). In our data, 22 percent of the observed institutions are Brazilian, and the total 
number of their nano-patent is estimated around 3493 applications.2 
The table below (Table 7-5) reproduces the list of firms with more than 10 patents in 
nanotechnology. The firm Petrobras is the largest applicant with 190 patent applications in 
nanotechnology. In addition, formerly state-owned firms are also well represented in our data such as 
                                                 
1Universidade Estadual de Campinas – Unicamp. A public research university in Sao Paolo. 
2 the figure includes both foreign firms and Brazilian firms 
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Vale and Usiminas in mining and steel industry. The repartition of firms across industrial sectors 
seems to indicate less specialization than in the case of Indian firms. In contrast, greater importance 
is given to the primary sector (agriculture, resources) and related industries. This is further suggested 
by the fact that Brazilian R&D firms do develop knowledge in nanotechnology. In 2013 among the 
2500 global R&D spenders, seven firms out of the nine Brazilian firms have applied in the past decade 
for at least one patent related to nanotechnology.1 
 
Table 7-5: Top Brazilian patent applicants in nanotechnology (all years) 
Ran
k 
Name Nb Detail  Sector R&D 
scoreboard2 
1 Petrobras3 19
0 
State Brazilian firm Oil & Gas 135th (833,6 
million euros) 
2 dana industrial ltda 69 Private Brazilian firm Auto & Parts  
3 Vale doriodoce 50 Privatized national firm 
(1997) 
Mining 174th (880 
million euros) 
4 Embrapa - EmpresaBrasileira de 
Pesquisaagropecuaria 
45 Research Agency under 
Ministry of Agriculture4 
Agriculture 
research 
 
5 Semeato s.a. industria e comercio 44 Private Brazilian firm Agricultural 
machinery 
 
6 Empresa Brasileira de Compressores 
s. a. – embraco 
43 Brazilian firm 
 
Refrigeration 
compressors  
 
7 Usinassiderurgicas de minas Gerais s. 
a. - Usiminas 
39 Privatized national firm 
(1991) 
Mining & 
Metals 
 
8 Maquinasagricolasjacto s.a.. 29 Private Brazilian firm Agricultural 
equipment  
 
9 Brasilata s.a. embalagensmetalicas 19 Private Brazilian firm Packing 
Industry 
 
10 Duratex s.a. 18 Private Brazilian firm Paper & 
Forest 
 
11 Centrais eletricas do norte do brasil 
s.a. - eletronorte 
14 Belong to Electrobras Electricity  
12 Tigre s.a.. - tubos e conexoes 12 Private Brazilian firm PVC products  
13 Produquimica industria e comercio 
s.a. 
11 Private Brazilian firm Chemicals  
15 Cristaliaprodutosquimicosfarmaceuti
cosLtda 
11 Private Brazilian firm Pharma  
16 Itautec philco s.a.. - grupo itautec 
philco 
10 Belong to Itausa 
(conglomerate) 
IT & software 1831th (26 
million euros) 
17 Isoeste ind. e com. de isolantes 
termicos ltda 
10 Private Brazilian firm thermal 
insulation 
 
Source: compilation of various sources by the author 
4.4. The specific model of China and large Chinese firms 
The comparison of nanotechnology research between Chinese large firms with Indian and 
                                                 
1 The other two firms operate in the food industry (BRF), and in the software industry (TOTVS). 
2 Year 2013, 2014 ranking 
3petroleo brasileiro s.a 
4 The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) was founded on April 26, 1973, and is under the aegis of 
the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply. 
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Brazilian ones emphasized the specificities case of China. We find that the nanotechnology patenting 
activity in China is coherent with the nature of its industrial corporate landscape. What is remarkable 
in the comparison between China on the one hand, and Brazil and India on the other hand (Table 7-6), 
is both the diversity and the number of large firms applying for patents in nanotechnology in China 
compared to the other nations. Regarding the diversity: China’s case presents variety, in terms of 
ownership, and industries. The capacity of the Chinese institutional environment to allow Chinese 
firms to grow in significant number was noticed in the early 2000s (Nolan, 2001b). China’s large 
firms managed to emerge and to become global R&D firms. 
By contrast, there are fewer large firms in nanotechnology in India and Brazil in 
nanotechnology research. This is partly explained by national specificities in the industrial structure. 
For instance, India has a specialized profile for many Indian private firms are in the pharmaceutical 
and biotech industry. In Brazil, the large domestic firms with nanotechnology patents present more 
variety, but there are less numerous than in China. It also results from a lesser investment in Research 
in Development. This is consistent with our observations in the previous chapter about the 
investments of these countries’ firms in R&D. The result is that the large Chinese firms have invested 
more in nanotechnology research than India and Brazil.  
Consequently, the differences are not individual strategic approaches, but in the number of the 
firms engaged in the patenting process. Put differently; the difference is not due to the technological 
capabilities of individual firms, but to the dynamics of catch-up process among national firms. This 
puts the emphasis on the fact that patenting dynamics are national and not only linked to individual 
firm performances.  
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for patents in nanotechnology by 2008. Among which one-fourth had a nanotechnology patenting 
activity that might be considered as significant or important.  
This means that China was better positioned to seize opportunities in nanotechnology than it 
was during the previous technological waves. We illustrated this by putting two historical dynamics 
in perspective: the dynamics of technological learning of Chinese firms and the emergence of 
nanotechnology. 
This trajectory appears unique among emerging economies. The comparison of China with 
Brazil and India shows that the large Chinese firms distinguish themselves from other firms in 
emerging countries. Chinese large firms have entered the global rankings in terms of R&D 
expenditures, and in terms of research in nanotechnology. Such a differential can be explained in 
several ways. The first explanation is the difference in terms of technological capabilities between 
Chinese, Indian and Brazilian firms. Indeed, this explanation seems limited. There are no elements in 
individual case studies on Indian and Chinese firms that would be conclusive in this sense. 
A second explanation is suggested by the comparison of the identity of these countries’ largest 
shareholders. The comparison puts in evidence two primary features: the combination of the industrial 
diversification of large Chinese firms and of the great number of large firms is unique among 
emerging countries. This suggests that national differences in nanotechnology patenting activities 
cannot be explained only by the performance of individual firms, but essentially by the industrial 
structure of China.  
Additionally, the large Chinese firms present a profile closer to the “Western”model” of firms 
than what is observed in emerging countries. This echoes to the introduction we made of China’s 
firms in Chapter 5. Large Chinese firms operate in a broad scope of industries and have more varied 
ownership. Despite the existence of centrally state-owned firms, the model of large Chinese firms is 
neither a model of a planned economy characterized by the existence in each industry of one or two 
national champions, nor a model dominated by conglomerates like in other Asian countries such 
Korea and Japan.  
These firms are also similar to “Western” global firms in the sense that they invest in 
developing knowledge in new technologies by doing research. The breadth of nanotechnology 
patenting among large Chinese firms may underline the questions about the future development of 
their capabilities. This question requires further examinations of the dynamics associated with these 
patenting activities. 
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elements. The first element is the geography: the way firms do nanotechnology research is determined 
by the distribution of competences in nanotechnology in the Chinese territory. The second element is 
China’s historical legacy: one major feature of China is the existence of a prior research system, 
linked to state planning. This system is mobilized by large firms and, thus, structures the way a part 
of these large firms do research. 
2.2. The role of universities and public research institutions 
The role of localization for innovation has been widely studied and is encapsulated in concepts 
such as clusters or technological agglomerations. The importance of being localized close to 
knowledge centres is associated with a series of elements: availability of qualified human resources, 
collaborations, and knowledge spin-off, or access to technological structures (Robinson et al., 2007).  
In this section we will look at public research in nanotechnology. The presence of universities 
and research institutions involved in nano-related areas indicates education and training activities of 
qualified engineers. In that regard, the localization in a region with public research is a major 
determinant of a firm’s ability to do nanotechnology research by providing qualified personnel.  
One way to assess the intensity of nanotechnology research in one city is to look at the 
inventive activities, as measured by nanotechnology patents, of non-corporate research institutions. 
Indeed, the dynamism of a region in terms of research and the orientation of its activities are reflected 
in indicators such as scientific publications, and patents taken by public research institutes and 
universities. Mapping public research (Map 8-2, p. 170) shows that competences in nanotechnology 
are unequally distributed in the territory.1 There is a concentration of scientific and technological 
activities linked to public institutions in a limited number of cities. We find 29 cities where public 
institutions applied for more than 100 patents, among which five cities count more than 1000 patents: 
Shanghai, Beijing, Hangzhou, Nanjing, and Guangzhou.2  
                                                 
1 We base the measure of patenting activities on the declaration made by applicants as they filed their patent applications, 
and count the number of patents whose applicants are localized in each city. 
2 All maps in this chapter were done by the author. The maps were done with the software Philcarto (developed by Philippe 
Waniez) and available at http://philcarto.free.fr/ 
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environment for nanotechnology patenting activities: 51 groups headquartered in Beijing do 
nanotechnology research, and this is the case of 10 Shanghainese groups.  
On the basis of these figures, Beijing has a prevalent role. However, it must be emphasized 
that its weight in the total contribution of corporate patents might have to be relativized. As many 
headquarters are localized in Beijing, it is possible that in some cases, firms apply on behalf of their 
subsidiaries localized in other cities. This is particularly likely to be the case because centrally state-
owned firms are likely to centralize their patent applications in their headquarters in Beijing. In 
addition, the contribution of Shanghai shall be interpreted in light of its driving role in the Yangtze 
Delta areas. Shanghai is close to two other cities which are particularly active in nanotechnology 
research, as they are among the five cities with the highest number of patents: Nanjing and Hangzhou 
(Table 8-1). 
The situation of Shenzhen presents a more contrasted profile. Shenzhen houses nine firms 
including BYD Company, Huawei, ZTE Corp, Aviation Industry Corp, etc. As this is visible in Map 
8-3, Shenzhen is among the largest contributors to corporate nanotechnology by large firms (419 
patent applications) after Shanghai and Beijing. In contrast, the modest contribution in 
nanotechnology patenting (101 patents between 2001 and 2008) indicates the relatively low intensity 
of public research. This relative weakness is compensated by the integration in the Pearl River Delta 
Region, and the proximity to Guangzhou (and Hong Kong). This is not specific to nanotechnology, 
though, and has been characteristic of Guangdong Province where corporate R&D research is not 
linked to the presence of research institutions (Jastrabsky and Arvanitis, 2005). 
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Table 8-1: Profiles of the driving regions in nanotechnology research 
Geographic Areas Firms Public Research (patents applications by universities and 
research institutions) 1 
Shanghai 17 headquarters – 
10 firms with 
nanotechnology 
patents 
Top institutions: shanghai jiaotong university (943); Fudan 
University; 597); Donghua University (390); Shanghai University 
(371); Tongji University (339) 
4513 (78 percent Univ / 22 percent Gov) 
 
Beijing 67 headquarters – 
51 firms with 
nanotechnology 
patents 
Top institutions: Tsinghua university (1010); Beijing university of 
science and technology 358); institute of chemistry, cas (317); 
Beijing university of chemical technology (299); institute of 
physics, cas (208) 
4006 (67 percent Univ / 33 percent Gov) 
 
Hangzhou (Zhejiang) 10 headquarters-– 
2 with 
nanotechnology 
patents 
 
Top institutions: Zhejiang University (1082) 
1389 (97 percent univ) 
 
Nanjing (Jiangsu) 4 headquarters – 2 
with 
nanotechnology 
patents 
 
Top institutions: Nanjing university (393); southeast university 
(269), Nanjing university of technology (100) 
1120 (96 percent univ) 
 
Guangzhou (Guangdong) 6 headquarters – 2 
with 
nanotechnology 
patents 
Top institutions: South-China University of Technology (288); Sun 
Yat-Sen University (259) 
1057 (83 percent univ, 17 percent gov) 
 
Source: author 
2.2.2. Explaining corporate nanotechnology research in cities less intensive in public 
research: the role of local specialization 
A few firms who filed nanotechnology patents, directly or through subsidiaries, are in cities 
with barely any public nanotechnology research (  
                                                 
1 Top 5 institutions and institutions with more than 100 patent applications 
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Table 8-2). What implications does this have for the firms' access to resources?  
Let us limit our scope to cities where large firms applied for at least 20 patent applications, 
and look in detail what these cases uncover. 13 firms do part or the totality of their research in these 
cities. They include Fushun City, in Liaoning Province (108 patents, 2 firms), Zibo in Guangdong 
Province (60 patents, 4 firms), Luoyang in Henan Province (55 patents, 7 firms), Guiyang in Guizhou 
province (38 patents, 3 firms), Xianyang in Shanxi Province (33 patents, 3 firms), Yueyang City in 
Hunan Province (23 patents, 1 firm).  
 Localization of research in these areas follows various patterns, in which past choices and 
resources are determinant factors. The first relates to the historical development of central state firms. 
The localization of large firms’ research institutes and subsidiaries reflects historical choices of 
localization based on political, strategic, or military reasons (localization in inland areas). For 
instance, the localisation of seven firms in Luoyang (Henan) is explained by the fact that the city was 
one of the industrial base for the first 5-year plan, and part of the “third front” project, and by the 
persisting presence of the People’s Liberation Army (Tsai, 2004, p. 181): Luoyang was chosen for its 
localization as it lies in a river basin surrounded by mountains, which makes it “a safe place”.1 Second, 
the presence of natural resources has also been determinant (coal, petroleum, nonferrous metals, etc.). 
In addition, localization can also be linked to the history of acquisitions of firms. Such is the case of 
Shandong Energy Group, a local state-owned enterprise, that grew out of Zibo Mining, and further 
changed the localization of its headquarters from Zibo to Jinan, the provincial capital, but have kept 
facilities there. An alternative case is a state firm headquartered in Beijing, whose production base is 
localized: this is the case of the group IRICO, and suggests a proximity from production to research 
activities. 
These cases illustrate that each localization has its own individual story. In addition, the fact 
that they file nanotechnology patents suggests they have found resources to do so. The apparent 
disconnection between corporate research and public research and universities raises questions about 
the way they access nanotechnology skills. It suggests, in particular, the crucial role of the local links.  
The geographic proximity to a city with a more dynamic environment might be an element of 
explanation. This is the case of Fushun, which is close to Shenyang, or Xianyang, close to Xi’an.  
Another pattern is regional specialization. In this case, firms might benefit from an ecosystem 
                                                 
1 The “third front” refers to an industrial development program for the western and internal provinces that started in 1964. 
“As the worst of the post-Leap crisis ended, Mao pushed for the construction of the “Third Front.” The Third Front was 
a massive construction program focused on China’s inland provinces… The objective was to create an entire industrial 
base that would provide China with strategic independence. By building factories in remote and mountainous interior 
regions, Mao hoped to ensure that China’s industrial base would not be vulnerable to American or Soviet military 
pressure.” (Naughton, 2007, p. 74) 
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and have collaborations with a local university active in their field, even though there is not much 
research in the city. For instance, Fushun City (localized at about 40 kilometres of Shenyang) is home 
to the Liaoning University of Petroleum and Chemical Technology. We have identified two 
subsidiaries of large firms which do research there: Sinopec Fushun Research Institute of Petroleum, 
and a subsidiary of Aluminium Corp of China: Fushun Aluminun Co Ltd. While the university has 
applied for 10 patents (which constitutes the patenting activity of the city and remains quite limited) 
it is a university in the same field of specialization than Sinopec. This could explain the availability 
of research resources in the refining technologies. Indeed, the existence of links between institutions 
is further indicated by collaborative activities between them. More specifically, the existence of 
collaborations is further indicated by the existence of a joint venture with Liaoning Provincial 
People’s Government, Petrochina, Sinopec and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).1 
The importance of local specialization is also visible in Zibo (Shandong Province), where the 
historical orientation of the city towards industrial ceramics explains the patenting activity of 
Shandong research and design institute of industrial ceramics, and Sinoma advanced materials. The 
city has a history of “8500 years” in porcelain (China.org, a portal site established by the Chinese 
government), and is a cluster in ceramic (Yang and Qi, 2011).2 
 
  
                                                 
1 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 
2 http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Mar/9542.htm Accessed on 25/10/2016 
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Table 8-2: Research institutes of large firms outside innovative centres 
City Firms doing research in the city Public Research Remarks 
Fushun City Sinopec: Sinopec Fushun Research Institute of 
Petroleum 
Aluminium Corp of China: Fushun Aluminun Co 
Ltd 
liaoning university 
of petroleum and 
chemical technology 
(10 patents) 
 
Lioaning Province, 
close to Shenyang 
Proximity to Liaoning 
University of Petroleum 
Area formerly rich in 
coal. “The capital of 
Coal” 
Zibo City Sinopec: Sinopec qilu petrochemical corporation 
Sinoma1: Shandong research and design institute 
of industrial ceramics & sinoma advanced 
materials 
Aluminiun Corp of China: Shandong aluminium 
company 
Shandong Energy Group: Zibo Mining 
Shandong university 
of technology 
(24 patents) 
Shandong Province 
Abundant in petroleum 
and natural gas, and 
coal 
Industry: ceramics 
Luoyang City Sinopec: china petrochemical group Luoyang 
petrochemical engineering corporation & 
Luoyang institute of petrochemical equipment 
Sinosteel; Luoyang institute of refractories 
research of sinosteel corporation or Loyang 
refractory 
Sinoma; china luoyang float glass group co., ltd. 
China Shipbuilding Industry Corp: no.725 int 
CITIC: citic heavy machinery co ltd 
China Unicom: china unicom 
AVIC: china aviation optical-electrical 
technology co ltd 
henan university of 
science and 
technology 
(14 patents) 
Henan Province 
“Third Front” Project 
Guiyang City Aluminium Corp: Guiyang Aluminium & 
Magnesium design and research institute 
China Minmetals corp: Guizhou Minmetals 
Xinxing Cathay: Jihua 23537 shoe 
Guizhou university 
 (31 patents) 
Provincial capital of 
Guizhou Province 
Xianyang City Petrochina 
China Shipbuilding Industry: n°12 institute 
Irico Group Corp: several subsidiaries 
northwest a&f 
university (56) 
 
Main production base 
for Irico Group (HQ in 
Beijing) 
Close to Xi’an 
Yue yang City Sinopec: baling petrochemical ; changling 
petrochemical 
None Hunan Province 
Source: author 
 
This pattern is, however, specific to state firms, and specifically to centrally state-owned firms, 
under the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Among firms localized 
in these cities, one firm only is administrated by the government of Shandong. Therefore, only state 
firms, and especially centrally-owned firms, are localized outside the main innovative centres, unless 
they originate and have their headquarters there (which is also a frequent case).  
Most local and private firms set up their research centres in the city of their headquarters, or, 
in cities that present a more dynamic environment. This is the case of TCL, for instance. The firm 
originated in 1981 in Huizhou, part of the Pearl River Delta region, and that grew as a manufacturing 
company in consumer electronics, set up R&D in ten Chinese areas including Shenzhen city (where 
                                                 
1 China national materials group corporation (sinoma) 
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the table below (table 8-3).  
Interestingly, this refers to three different historical and geographic situations: we mentioned 
Tianjin in the close environment of Beijing. The second one, Wuhan is an important second-tier city, 
that has been a historically secondary economic centre, and is characterized by the presence of several 
universities (3 universities have filed more than 100 patent applications). Finally, Chengdu is in a 
western region of China, Sichuan. The fact that 5 large firms have nanotechnology research in 
Chengdu there suggests the creation, even if it is limited in number, of a cluster of innovative 
activities. Indeed, Chengdu, the provincial capital (since 1994) is one of the Western city that was 
paid continuous attention to in the perspective of rebalancing the country’s economic disparities 
towards the western region (Qin, 2015).  
The existence of these two cases illustrates the possibility for firms to develop outside the 
main centres, but in proportions that remain very modest. We could, to some extent, add Xi’an in this 
category. While Xi’an houses one firm with nanotechnology research, it is close to Xianyang where 
three firms do nanotechnology research. 
Table 8-3: Profiles of secondary centres in nanotechnology research 
Geographic Areas Firms Public Research (patents applications by universities and 
research institutions) 
Wuhan (Hubei 
Province) 
8 headquarters – 3 
with nanotechnology 
patents 
Top institutions: Wuhan University of technology (241), Wuhan 
University (235), Huazhong University of Science and Technology 
(143) 
986 patent applications in total 
Tianjin Municipality 7 headquarters – 4 
firms with 
nanotechnology 
Top institutions: Tianjin University (464); Nankai University (242) 
960 patent applications in total 
Chengdu (Sichuan 
Province) 
8 headquarters – 6 
firms with 
nanotechnology 
Top institutions: Sichuan University (317) 
559 patent applications in total 
Source: author 
 
In contrast, in other cities in that category, the absence of patent applications by large firms 
reflects the lack of absorptive capacity and/or lack of incentives by firms to engage in emerging 
technologies, at least during the period considered. This is the case of cities such as Shenyang and to 
some lesser extents, Changchun, Dalian, Harbin. 
2.3. Mobilizing existing research infrastructures within firms 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we consider two dimensions to be central to 
understand contemporary dynamics linked to nanotechnology research by large firms: the firms’ 
localisation close to public research centres, and the fact that China has been engaged in science and 
technologies since the 1950s.  
This second aspect, the structure of the previous research system is visible in the patent 
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applications of large firms in the 2000s. Indeed, the contribution of formerly public research institutes 
to nanotechnology research on behalf of large firms questions the impact they have had on the way 
firms structure their research activities. The trend is considerable. Between 2001 and 2008, 68 of 
these research institutes and 17 design and research institutes applied for nanotechnology patents, 
accounting for about one-third of nanotechnology patenting activities (31 percent).  
This is associated with the weight of centrally state-owned firms in the total of patent 
applications (see p. 149). The former research structure acts as a major source of research for central 
state firms. Almost half of centrally state-owned enterprise (44 percent) that do research on 
nanotechnology rely, at least partly, on these facilities which represent 42 patents of their patent 
applications. Indeed, the activity of these research institutes explains the contribution of centrally 
state-owned firms to the total number of patents in nanotechnology. It shows that the considerable 
number of nanotechnology patents filed by central state firms is not due to these large firms’ size, but 
to their access to productive (in terms of patents) research facilities. This is, for example, the case of 
Sinopec, which does a large proportion of its nanotechnology research in a limited number of 
institutes (see p. 191). These are large and comprehensive research centres ranging from several 
hundreds to thousands of persons, with about 200 Ph.D. in the largest ones that we could identify. 
They provide skills, resources and infrastructures for doing research on nanotechnology, and have 
privileged access to governmental spending. 
As we will observe later, the role of research institutes is not limited to centrally state-owned 
firms, however. Some locally state-owned firms and private firms have also integrated them into their 
organization, but their contribution to the total of nanotechnology patents is modest. In our data, 
research institutes respectively represent 7 percent and 2 percent of nanotechnology patenting by 
locally state-owned firms and by private firms.  
 
What is the history of these institutes? They partly inherit their current organizational forms 
from the Science &Technology structure established under Mao and restructured in the 1990s (Tang, 
2003). According to Liu & White, in the 1950s, during the first plan, the country created more than 
400 research units first focused on reversed engineering and that then evolved into three groups: one 
with more emphasis on basic research under the Chinese Academy of Science, one that aimed at 
training and research within universities and, finally, industry-specific institutes for the development 
of production technologies (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1097). The organizational structure of the 
production and research system is reproduced below (Figure 8-1). The figure reproduces the formal 
organization as it existed in the 1980s, and is similar in form to what was prevalent during the previous 
period.  
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We shall highlight two elements. The first one is that research institutes are attached at 
different governmental levels, and to different functions (basic or applied research). Some were 
research units under ministries or alike (national research institutes), under provincial and municipal 
bureaus, or associated with factories within state-owned firms. The dominant model was that of a 
mission oriented lab. Naughton describes them in these terms: “Leaders in China set a few key tasks, 
and planners then coordinated flexible multidisciplinary and multiskilled research groups—with 
plenty of money—to pursue those key goals” (Naughton, 2007, p. 356).  
Second, research institutes have gone through important changes, but the modality and breadth 
of changes have varied. China’s formal S&T system remained unchanged until the end of the 1990s 
where there was a large movement of restructuration of firms and of institutes, a trend which 
concerned both institutes associated with the production system, and the institutes of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (Tang, 2003). The destiny of these research institutes has been variable. A large 
proportion of research institutes have been transformed into firms, or have become part of larger 
firms, and only a limited number remained separated research institutes (Tang, 2003). To many 
extents, each institute has gone through a series of change, which might have been accompanied by 
the renaming of the organization and its incorporation.  
 
Figure 8-1: Organization of former S&T system borrowed to Fischer (Fischer, 1983)
 
 
This legacy structures the way large Chinese firms do research in several ways. A first notable 
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way has been through the incorporation of the largest institutes into the structure of state-owned firms. 
For instance, Aviation Industry of China (AVIC) uses as one of its core research institute the Beijing 
institute of aeronautical materials. This institute was founded in 1956 and specialized in advanced 
materials (13 patents). Now formally part of AVIC, it maintains strong direct links with governmental 
research projects. The institute houses “national key laboratories,” a national engineering laboratory, 
and local laboratories, and can confer doctoral degrees.1 It has set up companies dedicated to being 
the “main platforms” for transferring research results into production, under the umbrella of Baimtec 
Co Ltd.. This is particularly the case of ministry-level institutes. In addition, provincial formerly 
public research institutes have also influenced firms in various ways. Some former research institutes 
became firms, for instance, before being themselves acquired by a firm.  
2.4. Conclusion 
We have presented two elements that impact and define the modalities of engagement in 
research by large firms. These elements encompass two dimensions. The first one is the localization 
of firms in environments that provide them with resources to do research. We focused on the presence 
of public nanotechnology research, in universities and in research institutes, whose major impact is 
to be associated with the presence of trained personnel. According to whether firms are localized in 
firms with plenty or scarce resources, it is likely that their modality of research will vary. A second 
dimension we introduced is the legacy of the prior research structures. These have an impact on the 
way firms do research in two ways. First, in some cases, they have provided resources for doing 
research. Large formerly public research institutes integrated into large firms play this role. They 
have, however, a more subtle influence, due to the fact that they influence modern organizational 
structures. This was particularly the case when these research institutes were re-organized and 
reformed.  
We treated the question of the firms’ localisation separately from the question of the influence 
of the former research structure. It is notable, however, that these two dimensions are intimately 
linked. Both dimensions, the presence of universities and public research the research infrastructures 
share the same legacy. 
                                                 
1 http://www.biam.ac.cn/en/tabid/279/Default.aspx Accessed on 15/10/2016 
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subsidiaries operating in two provinces might be separated by a few thousand kilometres. 
The distribution of nanotechnology patents at the firm level across different locations gives 
an (imperfect) image of the existence of several “competence centres” in the territory.1 The 
distribution of these research centres among several localizations is characterized by two dimensions: 
the repartition of nanotechnology patenting activities in several localizations, and the dispersion or 
concentration of research around one centre, generally the corporate headquarters. On the basis of 
these two dimensions, we observe two dominant trends about how nanotechnology research is 
distributed (Table 8-4):  
First, concentration of nanotechnology research is dominant (84 percent of firms in this 
situation): The concentration of nanotechnology research into one unique or into one dominant 
localization is the prevalent model among large firms, including some very large firms. In most cases, 
this centre is also the unique one. 58 percent of firms only applied for patents in one city. This includes 
firms whose R&D is centralized (Haier in Qingdao, BOE in Beijing, Baotou Steel in Baotou, Inner 
Mongolia). It also includes firms whose R&D is organized around several R&D centres, but with one 
unique localization with nanotechnology patents (Weichai Power). Local firms are more likely than 
both centrally state-owned firms and private firms to be localized in one unique place, which is the 
jurisdiction of the local government. Indeed, 79 percent of locally state-owned firms do 
nanotechnology research in one localization, which is a higher proportion than for private firms (59 
percent of firms in one unique localization) while they are comparable in size. This is true for locally 
state-owned firms engaged in resource-based industry (78 percent), but also for locally state-owned 
firms that operate in specialised industrials sector (86 percent).  
Second, there is a relatively low dispersion of nanotechnology research within firms (42 
percent of firms concerned by the phenomena): Many firms have several research centres, but even 
in this case, the absence of a dominant centre is rare and concerns 16 percent of firms. These are 
                                                 
1 Caution is required for patents applications filed at the firms’ headquarters. The information contained on subsidiaries 
is more conclusive, because there is less reason for a subsidiary to apply on behalf of other departments or subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, the administrative process is as follows for many centrally state-owned firms is as follows: normally, the 
local subsidiary and the parent company jointly file patent applications. For instance, an application (CN200810225534) 
is filed jointly by China National Offshore Oil Corp and Cnooc Tianjin chemical research & design institute. Obviously, 
the first applicant is the parent company, but this means that research teams belong to the research & design institute in 
Tianjin. Otherwise, the institute would not appear in the patent application. In this case, we consider a unique localization, 
that of the subsidiary as the entity where research is done, and discard the headquarters as “administrative” applicants. In 
this particular example (but this is not always the case) , both institutions, are localized in the same city, Tianjin 
Municipality, but they do not share the same postal addresses, but this is not always the case.  
The total number of firms and patents that are concerned by that pattern is not negligible: it represents 763 patent 
applications and 22 groups: Sinopec (664, 42 percent of patents have been jointly applied between the headquarters and 
a subsidiary), Haier (22, 43 percent), PetroChina (20), CNOOC (17) and firms with less than 10 patents. This reflects the 
administrative centralization that occurs in firms. A solution in one other context could be to look at the address of 
individual inventions. These data are however not available. Similar cautions should be taken for subsidiaries themselves 
an entity with several localizations. 
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mostly central state owned firms. Many centrally state-owned firms have a national dimension i.e. 
they have research in several provinces, which explains greater dispersion of their competence 
centres. The largest firms, among which Sinopec, AVIC, Petrochina, or Aluminium Corp, do 
nanotechnology research through their subsidiaries in several provinces (map 7-5). This category 
represents most of the firms with relatively balanced nanotechnology in several centres (20 firms out 
of the 25 firms). It is, however, still possible to identify to identify the core research institutes.  
 
Table 8-4: Repartition of the model of nanotechnology distribution 
Distribution Dispersion Competence centres Number of Firms Total of patents  Examples of firms 
Distributed 
around 
several 
competence 
centres (42 
percent) 
Dispersed  Balanced with other 
centres 
(the most prolific centre 
represents between 25 
percent - 49 percent of the 
total patent applications) 25 (16 percent) 1377 
China electronics 
technology group  
Concentrated 
around one 
unique or 
dominant 
localisation (84 
percent) 
 Dominant localisation 
(>50 percent) 41 (26 percent) 1702 
Fosun 
TCL 
Huawei 
ZTE 
Centralized 
in one 
unique 
localisation 
Unique localisation (100 
percent) 91 (58 percent) 630 
Chery, 
Hongdou, 
Harbin Pharma 
Source: author 
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3.2.2. Integration of research: organizational aspects of China’s nanotechnology research 
To some extent, geographic proximity appears easier to characterize than organizational 
proximity. What can we tell about the degree of integration of Chinese firms on the organizational 
side? The composition of a research team is partly visible in the technological inventions they patent. 
Each invention refers to one or more technological fields. The International Patent Classification 
(IPC) was established by the Strasbourg Agreement in 1971 and provides for a hierarchical system of 
classification of the different areas of technology to which patents pertain.1 At the firm level, we 
might consider that the patents taken by a firm give indications on the orientation of its research, and, 
in turn, on the composition of its teams.2 The bigger the number of areas of technology a patent 
pertains to, the more it refers to general and interdisciplinary knowledge. In such configuration, it is 
more likely that the research team gathers people from different backgrounds (Avenel et al., 2007). 
The implication at the organizational level is that the firm is more “integrated”. By integration, 
we refer to what we previously mentioned, i.e. the circulation of knowledge among divisions and 
departments. We measure two dimensions in the patenting profile of firms: the diversity of the 
technological base, measuring the breadth of the firm’s nanotechnology R&D activities, i.e. their 
degree of spread over many fields, and the specialization of each patent.3 These indicators have 
limitations, but they provide a point of comparison between integration of large Chinese firms, and 
that of firms in other countries in nanotechnology. 
Indeed, the results we obtain (Table 8-5) suggest lesser integration of nanotechnology research 
in Chinese large firms, on average, which is consistent with their “latecomer status”.  
Prior research has shown that global firms tend to develop a specialized and integrated 
knowledge in nanotechnology (Avenel et al., 2007). Their knowledge base covers a broad scope of 
technological areas. However, each patent is specialized, with a limited number of fields. This reflects 
                                                 
1 See http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/  
2 For instance, Petrochina’s patents in nanotechnology refer to the following technological fields:Processes or means e.g. 
batteries for the direct conversion of chemical energy into electrical energy (22 percent) Devices or arrangements, the 
optical operation of which is modified by changing the optical properties of the medium of the devices or arrangements 
of the intensity, colour, phase, polarisation or direction of light e.g. switching, gating, modulating or demodulating; 
frequency-changing optics; non-linear optics: optical logic elements; optical analogue/digital converters (14 percent) 
and Non-metallic elements (11 percent). This shows a different technological base than Huawei Technologies, which is 
more concentrated (one technological field represents 74 percent of IPC), and in other technological fields: Devices or 
arrangements, the optical operation of which is modified by changing the optical properties of the medium of the devices 
or arrangements of the intensity, colour, phase, polarisation or direction of light e.g. switching, gating, modulating or 
demodulating; frequency-changing optics; non-linear optics: optical logic elements; optical analogue/digital converters 
(74 percent) Telephonic communication (9 percent) Transmission of digital information (47 percent), Transmission (11 
percent), Selecting (10 percent). 
3 To measure the diversity of the technology base of a firm, we follow the authors and use a normalized Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (commonly used to measure market concentration) to measure the concentration in technology areas - 
Thus we calculate the sum of the squares of the proportion of each IPC of the patent applications within each firm -. An 
index of 1 indicating a maximum concentration in the number of technological fields, we take 1 minus the Herfindahl 
index as the measure of diversity: the greater the number the greater the diversity. 
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a collection of independent scientific and technological fields and the integration of knowledge at the 
corporate level. We do not find similar patterns in large Chinese firms though. Patents are on average 
less specialized - each patent refers to more than 3 technological areas, against 2 for global firms. At 
the firm level, patents are also less concentrated towards technological fields, which means a greater 
diversity of their technological knowledge base in nanotechnology.  
These results can be interpreted by the fact, as above mentioned, that nanotechnology research 
is “performed by teams grouping together researchers and engineers from widely different 
backgrounds” (ibid, p.865) but that they are not integrated at the firm level. A low integration of 
knowledge at the firm level suggests the absence of circulation and interactions between research 
centres. 
This would reflect that the repartition in different localizations of nanotechnology research is 
not associated with a network of research units, but rather with research by parallel teams. A further 
element goes in that sense. Table 8-5 indicates that there are no striking differences regarding the two 
indicators between types of firms. The factor that seems to impact on the degree of integration is the 
fact that nanotechnology patenting is in one unique location (0,76). Such interpretation has to be taken 
with caution. This would indicate that the existence of dispersed centres is not associated with an 
integrated strategy of research, but with parallel research activities. We also find that the diversity 
increases with the intensity of patent applications. This suggests that the increase in patents does not 
mean the consolidation of the firms’ existing technological areas. 
Table 8-5: Profile of the technological bases of large Chinese firms 
 
Measure of diversity of the firms’ 
technological base  
(average) 
Patent specialization 
 (average) 
Large Chinese firms 0,83 3,19 
Among which   
Centrally state-owned firms 0,88 3,36 
Locally state-owned firms 0,79 2,90 
Private Firms 0,83 3,31 
Among which   
Balanced with other centres 0,93 3,34 
Slightly dominant localization 0,92 3,73 
Dominant localization 0,95 3,15 
Unique Localization 0,76 3,02 
Among which   
Important nano patenting activity >15 p 0,93 3,32 
Significant (> 4) 0,92 3,21 
Limited (2-4) 0,79 3,34 
Low (1)  0,57 2,75 
Global norm (data Avenel & al – 
2007) 0,51* 2,08 
Source: author’s calculations 
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3.3. Conclusion of the first two sections 
The way firms have emerged conditions their access to nanotechnology research. We 
introduced two major dimensions: the role of their localisation in the Chinese territory; and the 
influence of the past research structures. In addition, recognizing that a major difficulty was to 
integrate research results in the scope of the firms’ activities, we looked at two indicators of the degree 
of integration of research within firms, and we proposed to measure the degree of integration 
regarding two dimensions: the geographic dispersion of nanotechnology research, and its content 
(using indicators based on the technological fields to which patents pertain). These two measures, 
though difficult to interpret, give indications, and allow further characterisation of the different 
modalities of integration of research into the large firms.  
We see that nanotechnology research by large Chinese firms tends to be concentrated around 
a dominant localization within firms, but that this is associated in many cases with the existence of 
secondary localisations. This is however not associated with the existence of integrated research at 
the firm level. Another crucial element is the role of local roots and histories of firms. 
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Table 8-6: Profile of firms according to their engagement in nanotechnology research 
Categories   Patent Indicators  Firms’ features 
Type Examples Description  Dominant 
Number of 
Patents 
Geographic 
scope of nano 
patents 
Repartition – weight 
most important 
localization** 
 Dominant 
ownership type 
Firm’s size* 
Large 
‘sectorial 
‘firms (41) 
Large sectorial firm 
organized around 
parallel business 
entities  
(Sinopec) 
No integration of 
R&D 
 Important or 
Significant  
National or Local 25 percent < ~ < 75 
percent  
 Central state Very Large  
(>= 100 000 employees) 
 
Localized central 
state-owned firms 
(Baosteel) 
Limited integration of 
R&D 
 Important or 
Significant  
Local > 50 percent (slightly 
dominant 
localization) 
 Central state Large & Very Large  
(>= 34 000) 
Conglomerate 
(15) 
Fosun Integration of R&D in 
some subsidiaries 
 Low to significant  National or 
Regional 
> 50 percent (slightly 
dominant 
localization) 
 Central state, Private Large & very large 
(>= 34 000) 
Global 
industrial 
firms (20) 
Huawei 
 
Integrated & 
international R&D 
network with 
dominant localization 
 Limited to 
important  
Local >75 percent 
(dominant) 
 
 Local state, private Large & very large 
(>= 34 000) 
 
 
 
Industrial 
specialized 
firms (49) 
 
Yurun Food 
Upgrading strategy 
using local resources 
(university, research 
institutes) 
 Low or Limited  Local > 50 percent (slightly 
dominant 
localization) 
 Local state, private 
firms 
Small and Medium 
(< 34 000) 
Shanghai Huayi Integrated R&D  
Leverage local 
resources 
Domestic R&D 
 Significant 
 
Local > 50 percent (slightly 
dominant 
localization) 
 Local state, private 
firm 
Small and Medium 
(< 34 000) 
Firms in 
resource-
based 
industries 
(32) 
Hebei Iron & Steel Upgrading strategy 
through local 
resources 
 Limited or 
Significant 
Local > 50 percent (slightly 
dominant 
localization) 
 Local state Medium, large 
(16 000 – 100 000) 
*Calculated according to data distribution (quartile)  ** For firms with nano research at more than 2 localizations 
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4.2. Large business groups1 
4.2.1. Large sectorial firm organized around parallel business entities 
Large business groups are divided into three sub-categories.  
The first profile we introduce ‘Large sectorial firm organized around parallel business 
entities’ gathers centrally state-owned firms that mostly come from the restructuration of the 
production system. These firms operate on a national scale, in different provinces, and do 
research across China. Keeping in mind that the average Chinese province is about 40 million 
people, we find that these firms have research institutes with nanotechnology patents in 2 to 12 
different provinces.  
Large sectorial firms appear among the largest applicants. However, when looking more 
precisely at where research is done within firms, we see that most of the research in 
nanotechnology is done in research institutes that are not integrated in the firm.  
i. The case of Sinopec: doing research in parallel institutes 
The oil producer Sinopec is one characteristic example. Sinopec can hardly be 
considered an innovative firm. However, its number of patent applications in nanotechnology 
approaches one thousand between 2001 and 2008, which makes it the largest applicant of the 
entire group.  
The firm Sinopec does its core research in its research institutes, which are organized 
by specialized scientific and technological fields. The largest contributors in patent applications 
are its research institutes in Beijing: Research Institute of Petroleum Processing, and in 
Shanghai; the Shanghai research institute of petrochemical technology. The two institutes 
constitute two of its core centres in nanotechnology. They used to be ministry-level institutes 
built in the late 1950s. The Research Institute of Petroleum Processing was created in 1956 and 
                                                 
1 Large sectorial groups (excluding conglomerates) 
Sinopec ; aluminium corporation of china; petrochina ; Datang Telecom Technology & Industry Group ; baosteel 
group corporation ; pangang group ; china electronics technology group corporation; china aerospace science and 
technology corporation Angang group ; china national building materials group corporation ; aviation industry 
corporation of china ; china national chemical corporation; China National Tobacco Corporation ; china national 
offshore oil corporation ; china shipbuilding industrial corp ;china metallurgical group corporation (mcc) ; state 
grid corporation of china ; china north industries group corporation ; china national materials group corporation ; 
sinochem corporation ; sinosteel corp ; china state shipbuilding corporation; china national nuclear corporation ; 
china national machinery industry corporation ; china minmetals corporation ; china cnr corporation limited ; china 
communications construction company ; China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation ; China National Coal 
Group Corporation ; china southern power grid ; China Electronics Corporation ; china national salt industry corp 
; China state construction engineering corporation ; CSR Corp ; China National Chemical Engineering Corp ; 
china telecommunications corporation ; Shenhua Group ; china mobile communications corp ; china national gold 
group corporation ; China Railway Construction Corporation ; china unicom (group) co ltd ; 
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is a large R&D organization focused on refining technologies, with a growing focus on new 
alternative fuel and energy sources. Based in Beijing, at the time of writing, it has 17 research 
departments. employing 1299 people, of which 221 have Ph.D. degrees and 256 master degrees. 
The second one, the Shanghai Research Institute of Petrochemical Technology (SRIPT) was 
created in 1960 and specializes in petrochemicals, also for refining technologies. It includes 
research facilities in different localizations (Nanjing, Yueyang, Tianjin, Yizheng, and 
Chongqing).  
Beijing Research Institute of Petroleum Processing (RIPP) and Shanghai Research 
Institute of Petrochemical Technology (RIPT), with respectively 284 and 157 patent 
applications, contribute the most to nanotechnology research. Other research institutes are also 
active though. Sinopec Fushun research institute of petroleum and petrochemicals was created 
in 1953. Fushun city, close to Shenyang in Liaoning Province, is rich in natural resources and 
originally oriented on coal mining, until the Fushun Government changed its strategy to focus 
on petroleum processing, and on paper making. The institute is focused on refining techniques 
such as hydro-cracking.1 We should also mention the Beijing Research Institute of Chemical 
Industry, created in 1958, for which we find 86 patent applications in nanotechnology between 
2001 and 2008.2 In 2010, it set up three branches: Qilu Branch, Yangzi Branch, and Yanshan 
Resin Branch.3  
Altogether, they constitute a large proportion of Sinopec’s patents. Reading the 
description of their activities – by the research institutes and by Sinopec themselves – one 
understands that they are considered as “independent” entities on both the administrative and 
operational sides. The relation of research institutes to Sinopec, therefore, does not reflect an 
integrated research structure (which would consist of research activities linked to the production 
system of the group), but rather as a technology provider to the group (see descriptions next 
page p.191). They often focus on process innovations and operate through sales. They provide 
technologies that are directly commercialized, and their scope is not limited to refining 
subsidiaries of Sinopec Their clients include Chinese refining enterprises and plants as well as 
foreign units. This explains for example the fact that Shanghai Research Institute of Petroleum 
                                                 
1 There are several techniques to refine petroleum by cracking the molecules (i.e. to break the molecules into 
simpler molecules): Fluid catalytic cracking produces a high yield of petrol and LPG, while hydrocracking is a 
major source of jet fuel, Diesel fuel, naphtha, and again yields LPG. 
2 According to Sinopec’s website, “the history can be traced to the August of 1922 when the famous patriotic 
industrialist Mr. Fan Xudong and the famous scientist Dr. Hou Debang founded the Huanghai Research Institute 
of Chemical Industry in Tanggu, Tianjin.” It is actually a privately invested research institute at that time (Morgan, 
2004) 
3 On the basis of the existing structure, which means that previous research facilities at these localizations were 
integrated within the scope of BRICI 
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Technology is part of the “going out” strategy of the firm.  
They play a role in the improvement of the processes of Sinopec through the sales of 
new techniques, but as they have external customers, the respective advantage that it gives to 
Sinopec is difficult to measure.1 
 
The Beijing Research Institute of 
Petroleum Processing “has now successfully 
developed and commercialized many 
technologies, such as the production of clean 
gasoline and diesel fuels, deep processing of 
heavy crudes, increasing the yield of light oil, 
the processing of sour crudes, high total acid 
number (TAN) crudes, heavy crude and 
refractory crudes. …. These technologies have 
state proprietary intellectual property and meet 
the requirement of Chinese refining units, which 
made Chinese oil refining enterprises upgrade 
gasoline in a comparatively short period with 
less investment and lower cost, and contributed 
a remarkable economic and social benefits as 
well while confronting great challenges.” 
(Sinopec Website2) 
 
Shanghai Research Institute of 
Petrochemical Technology: “Now, a portfolio 
of the advanced petrochemicals technologies 
have been developed and commercialized by 
SRIPT […]. Both the catalysts and technology 
                                                 
1 Similar patterns are observed at the lower level of the pyramidal structure of the group. We can take the example 
of the Research Institute of Sinopec Nanjing Chemical Industrial Group. Specialized on methanol synthesis 
catalysis, the institute’s activities are not directly related to the refining businesses. It originates in the Chemical 
Industrial Research Institute of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, created in Nanjing in 1958, and holds 25 
nanotechnology patent applications.  
2 http://english.sinopec.com/about_sinopec/subsidiaries/research_institutions/20080326/3088.shtml Accessed on 
15/10/2016 
3 http://english.sinopec.com/about_sinopec/subsidiaries/research_institutions/20080326/3092.shtml Accessed on 
15/10/2016 
4 http://english.sinopec.com/about_sinopec/subsidiaries/research_institutions/20080326/3091.shtml Accessed on 
15/10/2016 
packages developed by SRIPT … are 
commercially licensed to and used in the large 
and medium scale plants at home and abroad.”3 
 
Sinopec Fushun research institute of 
petroleum and petrochemicals “has developed 
several hydrocracking processes […] FRIPP 
also has developed high-grade road asphalt, 
emulsified asphalt and high quality 
construction asphalt production technologies 
and over 100 kinds of specialty waxes used in, 
electronics, rubber, agriculture, machinery, 
automobile, daily chemistry etc., part of them 
have been applied worldwide. […] FRIPP has 
developed series of technologies for treating 
waste gas, wastewater and waste residue in oil 
fields and petrochemical plants…” 
4
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ii. A case not specific to resource-based industries 
To what extent these ways of organizing research is specific to large national resource 
firms? Indeed, the industrial specialization might explain part of the organization around 
independent research institutes. Because research aims at improving the refining / exploitation 
process, strong links are not necessary between production and research. Indeed, we observe 
that we tend to find the same thing in the case of aluminium.  
The core activities of Aluminium Corp of China consist of extracting aluminum oxide 
and processing it to produce aluminum, thus encompassing little added-value activities. 
Nanotechnology patenting is observed in this firm’s institutes, among which one fourth (23 
percent) are localized within two research institutes, with respectively 40 and 35 patents. The 
first, the Guiyang Aluminium Magnesium Design & Research Institute was established in 1958. 
It was successively placed under the administration of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
(1958, 1983), under the China Non-ferrous Metal Industry Corporation (1983 – 1998), under 
the State Non-Ferrous Metal Industry Bureau (1998, 2000) and finally Guizhou Provincial 
People ‘s Government (2000 – 2001). It was transferred to Aluminium Corporation of China 
(2001 – 2003), and located into China Aluminium International Engineering since 2003. It is 
focused on light-metal smelting design & research and acts as a provider of technology for 
Aluminium Corp and other international aluminium companies. In particular, it maintains 
collaborations with “aluminum companies from USA, Japan, UK, Germany and etc. And 
GAMI’s proprietary technology has been applied in some countries such as India, Kazakhstan, 
Brazil, Malaysia, etc. to win the very high technical reputation” (China Aluminium 
International Engineering Corporation Website).1 Shenyang Aluminium & Magnesium 
Engineering & Research Institute exhibits a similar history and profile: founded in 1951, it was 
put under China Aluminium Industry Group in 1999. 2 
 
This modality of organization might be extended towards other industrial sectors, as is 
shown by two cases: one in a traditional industry, chemistry, by the company Sinochem, and 
the other in high-tech industries, illustrated by the case of the China Electronics Technology 
Group.  
Sinochem is a large chemical manufacturer. Its level of patenting activities is significant 
                                                 
1 http://www.chalieco.in/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=63&id=57 Accessed on 15/10/2016 
2 The predecessor of SAMI was the Civil Construction Engineering Company of Ministry of Industry of Northeast 
People’s Govement. It was created in 1951 in Harbin. 
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but very modest regarding its specialization. The firm applied for 14 patents between 2000 and 
2008, at the level of its research institutes or of its subsidiaries. We identify research institutes 
as applicants in about one-third of patent applications (36 percent).  
One of them, the Shenyang Research Institute of Chemical Industry, established in 1949, 
became an independent technological firm under the central government in 1999. It was 
reorganized in 2007 as a subsidiary of Sinochem Group. The institute includes an Engineering 
Research centre, state key laboratories, is accredited to give Master degrees, and localizes its 
activities at the light of public intervention: “During the past 60 years, SYRICI has gained 
glorious success. … Additionally, the institute has completed a remarkable 149 National Key 
Science and Technology Projects during the 6th to 11th "Five-year's Plan" and set up more than 
1000 national and industrial standards” (SYRICI institute website).1. The research institute is 
engaged in commercialization and technology transfer through specialized firms. It set up three 
subsidiaries which aim for technology transfer in their respective fields of competence, as well 
as commercial developments.2 In addition, two such firms indicate exporting chemical products 
abroad, which suggest that they oversee technical and commercial development based on the 
research results of the institute. 
We find example in other industries as well. China Electronics Technology Group 
Corporation is a state firm in the electronic and information industry, engaged in both civil and 
military sides, with important research on nanotechnology, through several subsidiaries. The 
group, headquartered in Beijing, was created in 1962, and operates in the electronic industry 
(control system, radar products, electronic warfare and intelligence system, communication 
systems and equipment, anti-terrorism and security products, electronic optic devices, test 
equipment, electronic materials and components, electronic processing equipment, computer 
equipment, and radio and television equipment – source: Bloomberg).  
We find 12 research institutes localized in 8 different cities with nanotechnology patents. 
This reflects a particular organization: The firm appears to be a collection of independent 
research institutes, each focused on developing different technologies. These institutes 
represent 94 percent of patent applications by the group. It appears that the formal organization 
has remained the same since the firm was corporatized. Research institutes have kept their 
original name and are designed by their number. The research institutes N° 18, 13, 55, 2, 46 
have more than 3 patent applications.  
                                                 
1 http://www.syrici.com/english/about.asp?lan=Overview&zlan=About Accessed on 15/10/2016 
2 Design Engineering Co., Ltd, Shenyang Cenkey Chemical Co., LTD, Shenyang Bomeida Chemical Co., Ltd. 
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4.2.2. Other centrally state-owned firms: The existence of alternative trajectories 
The second categories, while still gathering central state-owned firms, have adopted 
another mode of research. While in the preceding case, firms have incorporated formerly public 
research institutes as comprehensive entities that mostly act as a technology provider, the 
second category of central state-owned firms indicate more integrated research, and has a 
corporate research department centre. 
We shall present the case of Baogang (Baosteel Group), which is a Shanghai-based steel 
producer under the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission. Baosteel is 
considered as a steel producer with “world-class capacity”. It is an iron & steel company created 
in 1978 and employs 130 000 people at the time of writing.  
It presents a specific interest as it is explicitly engaged in nanotechnology and 
nanomaterials research. Baosteel has adopted the discourse on the transformation of the Chinese 
economy through frontier technology, including nanotechnology. “We attach great importance 
to the cutting-edge research in the steel industry by developing frontier technologies like strip 
casting, NANO technology, non-BF iron making, jet-spray forming and vacuum coating etc.; ... 
We also aim at strategic newly-rising industries and technological hot spots; actively cultivate 
our future competitive advantage; actively carry out technology source searching and 
discretion in strategic newly-rising industries like new energy, new material and new-energy 
automobiles etc.” (Baosteel website).1 The firm is also engaged in scientific and technological 
collaborations with a university’s research centre in nanomaterials in Shanghai to which it 
provides funds (interview # 4).  
This is associated with concrete research outputs in patents: we find 174 patent 
applications in nanotech between 2001 and 2008. These patent applications, however, weigh 
little in the whole patent portfolio of the firm (1688 patent applications in 2012 alone including 
priority and non-priority patents). The repartition of nanotechnology research is as follows. 
There are two main types of research activities: the core activities of the firm under Baosteel 
Group, and based in Shanghai Baoshan District, and research done by its acquired subsidiaries 
that was not integrated. The geographic distribution of the nano-patent applications reflects both 
the firm’s local implantation and its geographic expansion through the acquisition of steel 
capacity in China.2 Several subsidiaries applied for nano-patents, but most of them are localized 
                                                 
1 http://www.baosteel.com/group_en/contents/2887/40017.html Accessed on 15/10/2016 
2 The acquisition strategy of Baosteel Group is to be understood at the light of the ongoing consolidation of the 
steel industrial sector, which is very fragmented, with many local actors, and that is undertaken under national 
leadership. Instead of the present categorization we adopt, we could have chosen to include all firms operating in 
this sector in the same category of ‘resource-based firms’, but the size and central ownership make it a specific 
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in Shanghai: 163 patent applications have a Shanghainese address. The remaining patent 
applications were filed by acquired subsidiaries: in the surrounding provinces but also much 
farther, Xinjiang Bayi in Urumqi, some of them prior to their acquisition by Baosteel. 12 
 
At the corporate level, research is supposed to aim to improve its production process as 
illustrated by an article in Mena Report (2013, July 24th) “A nano-spray coating technology can 
prolong the on-line working time and life span of working rolls effectively, reduce the roll 
changing time and lower the roll repairing cost…. the pulling-straightening roll which uses 
nano spray coating technology has been successfully used in the plant's pickling line, saving 
the coat of more than 490,000 yuan annually. It is also the first time that the nano-coating 
pulling-straightening roll is successfully applied to Baosteel Cold Rolling.” (Mena Report, 
2013).3 
Notwithstanding the case reported above, it appears that in many cases, results are not 
used by the firm. For instance, the firm does not use research results of joint-project with a 
university. We have some collaboration with Baosteel. There are permanent researchers [paid 
by Baosteel] because there is money every year. They do not apply recent research in their 
applications (interview # 4). It is not the quality of research done with Baosteel that is under 
question, but the absence of utilization of research results.  
The activities of the research institute of the firm are oriented towards the firm’s 
activities (rather than being a technology provider). This, however, does not mean that there is 
no issue related to the integration of research results. Indeed, the integration of research results 
into their own production process does not always appear so straightforward. In their research 
collaborations, Baosteel looks for “ready to use” products rather than technologies. They do not 
use research results in their products, to use them to commercialize the technology. “While large 
state-owned firms develop technology and research in nanotechnology, they do not use them in 
                                                 
case. 
1 Ningbo Baoxin Stainless Steel in Ningbo, Shanghai Meishan Iron & Steel in Nanjing, and Baosteel Changzhou 
roll manufacturing company 
2 Xinjiang Bayi Iron & Steel was created in 1951, and was acquired in 2007 by Baosteel. It has the complete 
process of production from mining to steel making and steel rolling. Ningbo Iron and Steel was acquired in 2009, 
in the context of “Steel Industry revival plan”. These acquisitions obey generally governmental injunctions. 
Baosteel finally became the main shareholder of Guangdong Shaoguan Iron & Steel, established in 1966, in 2011. 
In addition, it re-organized its business units: Baosteel Stainless Steel Co Ltd, and Baosteel Special Steel Co Ltd. 
Baosteel stainless steel was established in 2012 on the basis of the former Stainless Steel Business Unit 
Xinjiang Bayi did research on nanotechnology and applied for patents in 2004, 2005 and 2007, before it was 
acquired by Baosteel in 2007. In Shanghai, besides patents taken at the level of the headquarter Baoshan Iron & 
Steel Co Ltd, there are other subsidiaries: Shanghai Baosheng Iron & Steel Metallurgical Charge Co Ltd (12 patent 
applications). 
3 Mena Report: business news source established in 2001 and run by Al Bawaba (Amman, Jordan, and Dubai). 
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their products. They also tend to prefer “ready to use” products [when working with 
universities].” (interview # 4).1 
 
However, this is a different configuration than that of previous firms whose research 
was done by research institutes (like in Sinopec). Baosteel Group has reorganized its research 
organization. More specifically, it formally re-organizes Central Research Institute in 2012: For 
adapting to Baosteel’s strategic transformation from iron and steel to materials and 
strengthening the sharing and synergy of R&D resources at the Group level, Baosteel Central 
Research Institute was set up on June 19th, 2012 on the foundation of the existing R&D platform 
(CSR Report, Baosteel 2012). This reflects that the research done is considered in the wider 
scope of the firms. The institute is divided into several departments. Departments include a 
testing centre, energy and environment institute, a refractory division, a research institute of 
stainless steel, a central research institute, an automation department, a metallurgical process 
department.  
It is, according to the company website, responsible for “R&D of key, cutting-edge, and 
fundamental technology, particularly new products, new process, new technology and new 
equipment, in order to resolve all kinds of quality and technical problems arising from 
production practices, and providing strong technical support to major project and customer 
service. The institute is an R&D base features high-level, outstanding performance, multi-
discipline, multi-function and openness, it combines technology development and application, 
and it is also a high-tech talents pool.” Independently of the ambition of these proclaimed 
objectives, they somehow contrast with the mission attributed to research institutes in firms in 
the previous category.2  
4.2.3. Conglomerate-type large firms3 
Another profile of firms gathers firms that are organized around different entities, in 
                                                 
1 This might be related to the fact that research by centrally state-owned firms is not driven by corporate strategies, 
but also follows administrative decisions that obey a non-strategic external incentive - which includes local and 
national innovation programs, as well as political objectives, notably through the Party’s participation (Cho and 
Huang, 2012). The obedience to political objectives is explicit: “a lot of its key innovation achievements have been 
commended by the state, province, city and industry, among which "Research on the varieties, production and 
application technologies of Baosteel high grade automotive sheets" was awarded the first prize of National Award 
for Science and Technology Progress" 1 http://www.baosteel.com/group_en/contents/2887/40017.html Accessed 
on 15/10/2016 
2 http://www.baosteel.com/plc_e/05development/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=28 Accessed 15/10/2016 
3 Firms in that category: Shanshan Group ; Fosun Group; tsinghua tongfang co ltd ; Citic Group ; Guosheng Group; 
shandong xiwang sugar co ltd ; china merchants group ; founder group ; midea holding co ltd; China South 
Industries Group Corporation ; Hongdou group ; Xinxing Cathay International Group Co., Ltd; china faw group 
corporation ; China Resources Holdings ; suzhou chuangyuan invest development (group) co ltd 
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different industries. They are large firms organized in several industries, and operating in a 
broader range of industrial and non-industrial sectors compared to the firms hitherto studied. In 
these firms, the construction of technological capabilities deployed at sectoral level may differ 
widely from one subsidiary to another, depending on the way an individual entity deploys its 
research. The way they do research follows differentiated strategies in these entities.  
A characteristic of the ‘conglomerate’ group is that it includes both state companies, 
including local and centrally state-owned firms, and, private firms. We discuss two cases, Fosun 
Group, and Shanshan Group (a conglomerate that was privatized). We selected these cases for 
two reasons. Firstly, they illustrate the existence of differentiated technological strategies in the 
firms’ subsidiaries. Second, they also illustrate alternative ways in which the previous research 
system influences the way firms do research. The fact that they are both private firms show that 
the legacy that constitutes formerly public research institutes is not limited to state firms. 
 
Table 8-7: List of conglomerates with nanotechnology research (more than 5 patents) 
Firm Nano Localization Yr Employees Ownership Headquarter 
Shougang 
group 
Important 
(30) 
Dominant loc. 1919 75 000 
Local 
government 
Beijing 
Fosun Group 
Significant 
(14) 
 1992 34 218 Private Shanghai 
Shanshan  
Important 
(15) 
Slightly 
dominant loc. 
1980 11 713 Private Ningbo 
Shandong 
Xiwang sugar 
co ltd 
Significant 
(7) 
Slightly 
dominant 
1986 10 000 Private Zouping 
Source: author 
i. Fosun Group 
Fosun Group is among the 31 private firms involved in nanotechnology research. It is a 
diversified conglomerate created in the 1990s doing market research that then extended towards 
real estate, tourism, pharma, and is known for its international acquisition strategy in different 
sectors abroad.1 
We have identified nanotechnology research within two industrial activities, biopharma 
and the steel industry. The most productive activity is in the biopharmaceutical sector; Fosun 
Pharma is among the country’s large pharmaceutical manufacturers. Specialized in generic 
drugs, its R&D intensity is inferior to the sectoral average, but like that of its foreign 
                                                 
1 “Guo’s [GUO Guangchang, Fosun CEO] purchases include a stake in French tourism firm Club Med, Greek 
jewellery and fashion brand Folli Follie and most recently, a bid for control of Portugal’s biggest insurer Caixa 
Seguros. In 2016 Fosun’s healthcare unit announced a $1.3 billion deal to buy Indian drugmaker Gland 
Pharmaceutical. Other acquisitions made in the same year include English football club Wolverhampton 
Wanderers, Brazilian asset manager Rio Bravo and British handbag maker Aspinal” (Week in China, 2016, p. 82) 
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competitors with similar strategies on the generic market (See chapter 5 on R&D, Section 4.1). 
Its R&D activities, employing 766 pharmaceutical R&D employees, are dispersed in two main 
Chinese localizations, Shanghai and Chongqing, and Fosun Pharma also has research capacity 
in the United States.1 R&D is centralized under “Fosun Pharma Industry Research Institute” 
around four main lines of research that reflect the different operating businesses: generics, small 
molecule chemical innovative drugs, large molecule biopharmaceutical drugs and specialized 
formulations. It is done under the umbrella of four legal subsidiaries. Two of them are in 
Chongqing (Chongqing Pharmaceutical Research Institute Co Ltd. Chongqing Fochon 
Pharmaceutical Research Co Ltd), and two of them are localized in Shanghai (Shanghai 
SunTech Pharmaceutical Co Ltd, and Shanghai Henlius Biotech Co Ltd (See Map 6). One of 
the firms in Chongqing integrates nanotechnology research: Chongqing Institute of 
Pharmaceutical Industry Co., Ltd, applied for 14 patents between 2004 and 2008, often in 
association with a small invested Shanghai-based firm (Shanghai Kelong Biology Gaojishu 
Limited Company). Patent applications in nanotech position Fosun among pharmaceutical 
firms actively doing research, along with the local firm Guangzhou Baiyunshan Pharmaceutical 
(13 patent applications between 2002 and 2007). Nanotechnology research by Fosun Pharma 
suggests a concrete implementation of the firm’s proclaimed strategy, which aims to both target 
generic market and to integrate more advanced research.  
In addition, it illustrates some dynamics characteristic of the ways firms develop their 
technological capabilities. A first notable element is the acquisition of a state-owned former 
research structure by a private firm to develop research skills and do early stage research. In 
this case, Fosun Pharma uses the resources from a former research institute specialized in 
pharma R&D acquired in 2001. Chongqing Pharmaceutical Research Institute Co., Ltd., was 
originally a research laboratory subordinated to a military pharmaceutical factory created in 
1950. Its above-mentioned collaboration with a Shanghai-based firm invested by Fosun further 
indicates the effective construction of collaborations and links between the former state-owned 
unit and other subsidiaries of the company after the acquisition, despite the geographic distance 
(1700 km).  
                                                 
1 Fosun Pharma has R&D operations in San Franciso, through the extension of the Shanghai based entities. 
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2007 and 2008, but it is not possible to determine whether they were all taken at the firm level 
or at the level of its parent company. In the present case, Fosun has kept the model of research 
specific to locally state-owned firms.  
The case of Fosun Group illustrates that the firm pursues mixed strategies through its 
subsidiaries. Investments in R&D and emerging technologies are operationalized through the 
opportunistic acquisition of resources. Fosun as a private firm uses existing resources, state-
owned firms or institutes in China, and high-tech firms abroad that it acquires, transforms or 
extends.  
ii. Shanshan Group 
Shanshan Group is also a private conglomerate that operates in several industrial sectors. 
Its trajectory differs from Fosun Group; it was originally a state-owned firm founded in 1989 
in Ningbo as a garment company (a firm rapidly named the Yonggang costume factory, based 
on the name of Zheng Yonggang).1 The firm was privatized in 1991 when Zheng Yonggang 
bought the state shares. Diversification occurred ten years later, in 1999, while the company 
moved its headquarters to Shanghai and included high-tech industries in the framework of the 
national development strategy. 1999 is the year of the creation of Shanghai Shanshan Science 
& Technology Co Ltd aimed at doing research in the fields of new energy and materials. The 
entry on the market of Li-ion battery anode materials, one important part of the firm, was done 
through the acquisition of the Changchun-based China-Kinwa High Technology Co Ltd in 
2002. This move reflects the influence of former research institutions. China Kinwa High 
Technology was a company held by Changchun Applied Chemistry Research Institute, 
affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Science (Sanders and Yang, 2007). 
The conglomerate Shanshan Group has grown through acquisitions of state assets.2 On 
the manufacturing side, there are two main industries: the garment industry, which is Shanshan 
Group’s original core business, and the battery material industry, that has become central to its 
activities. The R&D base in li-ion battery materials was developed in 2006 on the basis of the 
existing production site. Shanshan Group applied for 16 nano-patents between 2002 and 2008, 
through three legal subsidiaries that are all connected to the energy material business. It 
emphasizes a frontier strategy, here characterized as the “Japanese block”: The company 
possesses a high quality and well-experienced R&D team specializing in multiple industries 
and fields including electrochemistry, carbon powder process and chemical engineering. With 
                                                 
1 He later renamed it Shanshan Group Source: Week in China (Week in China, 2016) 
2 For example, it bought in 2004, 24.92 percent of Songjiang Copper Industry 
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the support from National Post-doc research station and the scientific research platform 
provided by the company, the company now owns 19 national technological invention patents 
and more than 30 invention patents in progress. […] Shanshan has broken the technological 
block of Japan in the field of Lithium-ion battery anode material and its market monopoly 
(Shanshan Technology’s website).1 In that sector, we find research in nanotechnology in 
Shanshan’s subsidiary engaged in solar cell industry.2 Ningbo Ulica Solar Science & 
Technology has applied for three patents in nanotechnology. 
Nanotechnology research, by contrast, is absent in the garment industry, a second 
manufacturing activity of Shanshan.  
4.2.4. Conclusion 
In this section, we have focused on the largest groups. We have distinguished three main 
cases regarding the way they organize their nanotechnology research, which pertains to the 
organization of the group. We paid a specific interest in distinguishing profiles in this group 
because they represent an important proportion of nanotechnology patents. Indeed, 69 centrally-
state owned firms alone represent 72 percent of patent applications taken by large firms between 
2001 and 2008. 
The first category refers to large groups that operate in a sector (for which we can 
identify a core sector): Sinopec, Aluminium, Sinochem and China Electronics Technology 
Group operate in industries more or less demanding in R&D, and of different nature (resource 
processing, manufacturing of chemical products, or electronics). They use formely public 
research institutes for their research, and in our case, in the deployment of nanotechnology 
research. These institutes operate independently and their research seems not integrated as part 
of a group’s strategy. Instead, it seems to be part of a national or sectoral strategy. It also 
suggests that the intensity of nanotechnology research attributed to one such firm is not 
associated with the intensity of its overall technological orientation, but to the intensity of 
research within research institutes it has access.  
This is however not the only model. Alternatively, a smaller number of central state-
owned firms are associated with more integrated research at the group level.  
In addition, a third profile gathers firms that follow internal differentiated strategies. 
                                                 
1 http://www.shanshantech.com 
2 It produces solar cells, solar modules. 17 patents were obtained, among which N-type mono-crystalline silicon 
solar cell is awarded as a National Torch Program. Ulica is a National Hi-tech Enterprise and an engineering centre 
of Ningbo city, it is also cooperating closely with Ningbo Material Technology& Engineering Institution of 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shanghai Donghua University. 
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One might argue that differentiated strategies characterize both state and private firms.1 We 
have already presented the case of China South Industries and showed existing disparities 
between its different subsidiaries ( 
Table 6-6: R&D by subsidiaries of China South Industries Group Corp. (2013), p. 124). 
One subsidiary, Chang’An Automobile invests in R&D and has re-organized the way it does 
research. In contrast, Jianshe, another subsidiary of China South Industries also engaged in the 
automobile and part sector did not significantly reorganize or invest in its R&D.  
4.3. Global industrial firms with integrated R&D2 
4.3.1. Introduction 
This category of firms is among the most studied of Chinese firms, for their 
technological strategies (Larcon, 2009, pp. 175–202), and for R&D-related topics such as their 
internationalization (Von Zedtwitz, 2006).  
China’s global industrial firms are characterized by the fact that they engage in research 
by adopting similar models of organization centred around domestic R&D departments and an 
international R&D network. To some extent, the trajectories followed by these global industrial 
firms are comparable to that of global firms. Their international networks of R&D centres 
include China-based research institutes as well as R&D institutes abroad, including in advanced 
economies: Europe, USA, Japan. This internationalization appears to be a way for Chinese 
firms to access to the local market, and access to local technology and skills (von Zedtwitz and 
Gassmann, 2002).  
We can, however, add one element to previous research on the organization of R&D by 
these firms. The data we obtained suggest the importance of centralization of nanotechnology 
research in one main Chinese localisation.  
The characteristics of these firms (Table 8-8 for the largest applicants) reflect the private 
sector is well represented. Nine global firms with nanotechnology research are privately owned, 
                                                 
1 Another observation is that private conglomerates are generally associated to a strong individual personality. This 
was the case of Guo Guangchang in Fosun and Zheng Yonggang for Shanshan. This is not the case for state groups. 
In the case of some private conglomerates, the distinction between some conglomerates and investment companies 
is not so clear. This is the case of Fosun Group, considered as a global investment company. This most likely 
conditions its mode of management which indirectly impacts the ways individual entities do research. 
2 Firms with international R&D 
byd company limited ; boe technology group co ltd; huawei ; zte corporation ; haier group ; hisense ; tcl corp ; 
lenovo (beijing) co ltd ;; fuyao group ; sany heavy industry co ltd; wanxiang group corp ; chery automobile co ltd; 
SAIC Motor ;; Changzhou trina solar ltd ;Suntech Power ; Weichai Power ; dongfeng automobile co ltd ; zoomlion 
(Including 2 specific cases: alcatel-lucent shanghai bell co ltd Shenzhen Skyworth rgb electronics co ltd (R&D 
center in Hongkong)) 
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and ten have a local government as the controlling shareholder, often at the city or municipal 
level (which contrasts with firms in resource based industries for which there is a broader 
engagement of provincial governments). Firms in this category cover a quite large range of 
industries: electronic and electrical equipment (5); technology hardware & equipment (4); 
automobile & parts (3); industrial engineering (2); and household goods and home construction 
(2). We note the absence of two traditional industries: chemicals or textile industries. 
These firms invest in research, and they have set up R&D departments, even though 
they are not all part of the largest world R&D spenders. Two main paths are associated with 
R&D; that reflects alternative strategies during technological catch-up. A few firms considered 
R&D central for their development since the beginning. These firms started R&D early and 
have backed their research on state research institutes (Lenovo, Huawei).1 In contrast, other 
firms focused on manufacturing activity, and active technological learning in the initial stage 
(BOE, BYD). They started their research activities later, with a progressive integration of 
further technological complexities.2  
 
Table 8-8: Global leader firms in nanotech (more than 15 patents) 
Firm Nanotechnology Localization of 
research 
Industry Employee
s 
Ownership Headquarters 
byd company Important (202) Dominant loc. Electronic & 
Electrical Equipment 
159 000 Private Shenzhen 
boe 
technology 
group 
Important (115) Unique loc. Electronic & 
Electrical Equipment 
26 922 Local 
government 
Beijing 
Huawei Important (113) Dominant loc. Tech. hardware & 
Equipment 
150 000 Private Shenzhen 
ZTE corp. Important (62) Dominant loc. 
Tech. hardware & 
Equipment 69 093 Private Shenzhen 
Haier group Important (24) Unique loc. Household goods & 
home Construction 
55 762 Local 
government 
Qingdao 
Hisense Important (24) Dominant loc. Household goods & 
home Construction 
33 090 Local 
government 
Shunde 
TCL corp Important (17) 
Slightly 
dominant 
Electronic & 
Electrical Equipment 75 233 
Local 
government Huizhou 
Lenovo Important (16) Unique loc. Tech. hardware & 
Equipment 
54 000 Private Beijing 
                                                 
1 Naughton notices the interesting trajectory of Lenovo which despite being backed by a high-profile institution 
started in low-tech manufacturing. Lenovo was a spin off from the Institute for Computer Technology of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1984 (Naughton, 2007, p. 359). 
2 BOE Technology Group, formerly Beijing Orient Technology Group, was created in 1993. It started as a 
manufacturer of LCD (liquid crystal displays), and its main industry is LCD for TVs and computers, and 
semiconductor displays. More than 70 percent of revenue comes from foreign countries. BOE’s R&D expenses 
amounted to 1 904 million RMB (2013), which represents 5,64 percent of its operating revenues. The level of 
R&D increases and reaches 2,477 million RMB in 2014 (6,73 percent). BYD (189,000 employees) was founded 
in Shenzhen in 1995 as a cell phone battery maker. BYD rapidly expanded to become a leader in the electric energy 
storage market and a new entrant in the electric vehicle business, through external growth. 
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Source: author 
4.3.2. Centralization of nanotechnology research 
The central laboratory is a dominant model among Chinese industries and is particularly 
favoured by locally-owned central firms. Most firms have established an R&D base to 
centralize their activities, sometimes associated with the construction of a dedicated building 
for R&D (ZTE R&D building, Huawei R&D.). This is reflected in the concentration of 
nanotechnology research in one Chinese location by these firms.  
i. Centralization of all activities: Haier  
Haier originated in a refrigerator factory in Qingdao in 1984. At first, it produced one 
model of household refrigerator, today it is a global leader in home appliances and electronics. 
The firm has only one Chinese localization in Qingdao, which houses all the firms’ activities: 
Hai’er Street 1, in the Haier building, where operations and research are carried in the firm’s 
different business units (refrigeration, electronics). The main research institute is the “Haier 
Central Research Institute.” Developed at the same time than the factory, it was recognized 
officially as a national technological centre by the State Economic and Trade Commission in 
1993. 
 All nanotechnology research is done at Qingdao. Haier’s centralization of R&D is 
interesting; Haier is among the largest firms with more than 50 000 employees and is present 
in different nations through its network of R&D centres abroad. It is also part of a contrasted 
strategy. The firm emphasizes the importance of “open innovation” for the group’s innovation 
strategy, with a particular focus given to innovation partnerships with start-ups and to the role 
of users, and to a flat organization (Duysters et al., 2009). Centralized R&D, in contrast, is often 
linked to lesser interaction with people and organisations external to the firms.  
The firm’s 24 patent applications by 2008 reflect nanotechnology research in different 
technological fields, with research that also involves different entities working together. The 
existence of a company dedicated to nanotechnology development, in collaboration with a local 
university of science and technology, reflects both the open innovation model promoted by 
Haier and its commitment to emerging technologies.1 This subsidiary is associated with another 
one that is the Qingdao institute of refrigeration technology (3 co-patents in 2002).  
                                                 
1 qingdao haier gust nano technology development co., ltd 
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ii. R&D network and centralization of nanotechnology research 
Haier, with a single R&D centre, is an exception. Most of the largest firms that operate 
in global markets have set up R&D centres in different cities in China.  
This does not mean that nanotechnology research is organized around dispersed research 
centres; there is a dominant centre for nanotechnology patenting (Map 8-7). This is partly 
explained by administrative reasons– patent applications filed by the headquarters, but, also 
reflects the rarity of dispersed R&D without corporate R&D centre as an organisation mode. 
Most firms have corporate R&D at the level of the parent company, with activities localized 
close to the headquarters that are the historical localization of a firm. These firms patent in 
nanotechnology in one centre. There are some indicators of nanotechnology research in other 
cities, indicated by a few patent applications outside the headquarter (Shanghai for a Shenzhen-
based firm or Shenzhen otherwise), but it is a very modest trend.  
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observe the centralization of their nanotechnology research. For instance, Huawei is, with its 
direct competitor ZTE, among the world’s largest patent applicants (Kang, 2014). It applied for 
113 patents in nanotechnology between 2001 and 2008. Nanotechnology research seems largely 
centralized in Shenzhen, where its central R&D building is also located.1 BYD, automobile 
company and a major battery manufacturer, is a smaller firm than Huawei. Now one of the 
leading groups in the electric vehicle industry, it is a private company that was created in 1995 
in Shenzhen. With more than 200 patent applications, it is among the most productive firms. 
Patents in nanotech are centralized in Shenzhen, which also coincides with the fact that BYD’s 
central research institute is based in Shenzhen.2 
4.3.3. What about global industrial firms with few nanotechnology patents? 
Some firms in the category of global industrial firms, including R&D focused ones, have 
a low or a limited number of patent applications. Patents’ quantity is difficult to interpret, but 
important differences between competitors in the same industry might suggest differences in 
the intensity of nanotechnology research. For instance, Weichai Power is a local government 
firm created in 2002 in Shandong Province in the automobile sector. It employs more than forty 
thousand people with several manufacturing sites and brands, and set up R&D centres in 
national and international locations (R&D centres in the United States, Europe (Austria) and 
Weifang, Shanghai, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Yangzhou, Xi’an in china). It has applied for two 
patents, which reflects a limited commitment to nanotechnology research. Other local state and 
private firms are in the same case. This includes Wanxiang, Chery, Zoomlion, Suntech and 
SAIC Motor. Their limited contribution to nanotechnology patenting might be due to the period 
considered, which may be too early in their learning history. We checked this hypothesis by 
looking at nanotechnology patents taken by these 325 large firms in an alternative patent 
database, which covers a more recent period.3 In most cases, there was not a significant increase 
                                                 
1 In addition, Shanghai Huawei, where there is an R&D department, also applied for one patent in nanotechnology-
related fields. We can wonder to that extent this pattern is significant. The number of patent applications taken by 
the Shanghainese subsidiary is low but might reflect alternative situations: a difference in the research 
specialization of the two localizations or the fact that research is a marginal activity in Shanghai. In both cases, it 
indicates a relative decentralization in nanotechnology research. 
2 Shanghai appears as an alternative localization, even though it is limited in the number of patents. BYD has a 
central research institute, and two adjunct research institutes organized in different subfields (automobile, 
electronic).  
A similar trend is observable for ZTE. ZTE have also two different localizations for patenting its nanotechnology 
research. 
3 These data, however, does not provide information on the subsidiaries of firms that patent. It can therefore only 
give an estimated figure. It is, however, more representative for global industrial firms that have centralized 
nanotechnology research than for firms organized in business groups with independent entities. 
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in the level of nanotechnology patent applications. 1  
In this case, the absence of nanotechnology patents might suggest that firms focus their 
R&D activities towards applied or engineering research, and are not engaged in leadership 
strategies. 
In contrast, firms have appeared since then among the most prolific applicants at the end 
of the decade. This is the case of Chery Automobile, which had applied for 3 patent applications 
in the period 2001 – 2008 in our main database, and had applied for 71 patents by 2013. This 
change in the number of patent applications reflects a change of strategy in terms of research 
over the years, as well as the time required to deploy it efficiently. 
                                                 
1 We find that most firms stay in the same range of nanotechnology patents. By 2013, Wanxiang had 10 patent 
applications, SAIC Motor 10, Suntech 3, Weichai Power 3, Zoomlion 6 patent applications. These figures reflect 
there has not been an intensification of nanotechnology research at the end of the 2000s. 
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4.4. Other large firms in resource based industries1 
This category covers 32 firms involved in the mining and processing of resources. It 
includes firms that mine and extract natural resources such as coal, iron non-ferrous metals 
(aluminium, copper, nickel, cobalt, platinum…), or transform and manufacture these resources 
into intermediary products used by other firms (mostly steel makers). It is interesting to note 
the significant presence of miners of natural resources among firms which do nanotechnology 
patenting. 
Their presence might be explained by the capacity of firms to leverage their access to 
resources. One of the firms with the largest number of patents in this category is Jinchuan 
Group, headquartered in Jinchang, in Gansu Province. Specialized in the production of nickel, 
copper, and cobalt, it benefits from its localisation in Gansu Province (which is endowed with 
rich natural resources). The importance of its patenting activity (30 patents) suggests Jinchuan 
Group’s ability to leverage its access to natural resources to support technological development, 
despite not being in an environment dynamic in terms of public research. 
It is also explained by the important number of local actors, notably in the steel industry. 
Steel making refers to a vast range of activities that are more or less demanding in technology, 
have various types of customers and industrial use. China’s steel industry was particularly 
fragmented, so there are many local government steel producers.2  
There is, consequently, contrasting evidence on the level of technological capabilities. 
The degree of commitment to nanotechnology research varies from low to important, as well 
as their size (from small to very large) and their technological base profile. This shows that 
despite common features and similar patterns of development, they engaged, in technological 
innovations to various degrees. Sixteen firms (out of 32 firms in this category) with 
nanotechnology patenting are headquartered outside of the three main economic regions (Bohai 
Rim region, Pearl River Delta region, or Yangtze River Delta area).  
Local steel makers generally use the technology centre located at their headquarters for 
                                                 
1 wuhan iron and steel (group) corp ; Jinchuan Group ; shougang group ; taiyuan iron and steel (group) co ltd ; 
ma'anshan iron and steel co ltd ; Shandong Iron and Steel Group Co., Ltd ; yunnan metallurgical group ; Hebei 
Iron and Steel ; baotou iron & steel corporation ; chongqing iron and steel (group) co ltd hunan valin steel ; zijin 
mining group ; xinjiang tianye (group) co ltd ; yankuang group company limited ; jiangsu shagang group co ltd ; 
shandong nanshan aluminium co ltd ; Shandong Energy Group; BBMG; tangshan sanyou group ; hangzhou iron 
and steel (group) co; jiuquan iron and steel (group) co ltd ;shenzhen zhongjin linnan nonfemet company limited ; 
xinyu iron and steel co ltd ; Datong Coal Mining Group ; daye non ferrous metals co ltd ; henan shenhuo ; jiangxi 
copper industry co ltd ; pingdingshan tianan coal mining co ltd ; qingdao iron and steel group co ltd ; Shandong 
Zhaojin Group Co Ltd ; taishan iron group co ltd ; Bohai Steel 
2 The large groups we have already presented, the centrally state-owned firm Baosteel, and the private firm Jiangsu 
Shagang, are exceptions and most steel producers are owned by local governments (provincial, municipal). 
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nanotechnology research, which appears as the applicant in patent applications. Even in the 
case of a firm which does research in several provinces, the local implantation remains 
dominant. For instance, Hebei Iron and Steel is not limited to Hebei Province, but it remains 
locally implanted. It is now the first Chinese steel firm in capacity since the acquisitions of 
Handan Iron and Steel and Wuyang Iron and Steel.1 Nanotechnology research is done within 
each subsidiary at the level of the subsidiary’s technical centre, and it is the Intellectual Property 
division that applies for patents. 
4.5. Other large specialized industrial firms  
Besides large state sectoral firms, and global firms, there are smaller, industrial firms 
localized in one geographic area. These firms include local state-owned firms or private firms 
specialized in one particular industry. This category gathers (relatively) small firms which are 
characterized by the fact that they have not extended their R&D abroad, by contrast with global 
industrial firms. To support their research, they use resources they can find in the national and 
local environment.2 Among these firms, we distinguish between firms with barely any research 
and firms with significant research activities in nanotechnology. 
4.5.1. Significant nanotechnology research: leveraging resources in R&D3 
Among them, 16 firms are especially active in nanotechnology patenting (five or more 
patents). Dominant industries in that category are chemicals (3 firms) and technology hardware 
and equipment (4 firms). The two largest patent applicants are firms that belong to electronic 
& electrical equipment and chemical industries.  
The chemical firm Shanghai Huayi, based in Shanghai, was estimated to spend 575 000 
million RMB in R&D in 2010. With 35 patent applications in nanotechnology, it is one of the 
most prolific chemical firms in nanotechnology research. Shanghai Huayi has seven 
subsidiaries localized in six different places, all in Shanghai city, with various distances between 
them. A second pharma firm for which we identified nanotechnology patents is Guangzhou 
                                                 
1 This is part of the national restructuration of the steel sector. In line with 1997’s new policy for industrial 
conglomerates, Handang Steel had to acquire Wuyang Iron and Steel which was heavily indebted (Huchet, 1999, 
p. 16) 
2 This, of course, includes all kinds of interactions with foreign firms based in China. 
3 Firms in that category (local and private specialized industrial firms, 5 patents and more 
irico group corporation ; shanghai huayi (group) company ; China Mengniu ; fiberhome technologies ; konka 
group co ltd ; guangzhou baiyunshan pharmaceutical co ltd ; shanghai electric (group) corp ; wuliangye group ; 
Tianjin Zhonghuan Electronic and Information (Group) Co Ltd ; shandong liuhe group co ltd ;sichuan chemical 
industry holding (group) co ltd ; tianjin bohai chemical industry co ltd ; Fasten Group ; sichuan changhong electric 
appliance co ltd ; north china pharmaceutical corp ; csg holding corp 
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Baiyunshan Pharma, based in Guangzhou in Guangdong Province.1 These two cases reflect the 
capacity of a firm to benefit from the localization in an environment with qualified S&T 
personnel, in cities like Shanghai, or Guangzhou. 
Regarding firms localized outside these centres, we can formulate the hypothesis that 
local industrial firms, in their deployment of nanotechnology research, need to have access to 
local resources, and notably local research. The modality of historical development of some 
cases of firms with nanotechnology and located in cities outside the main centres support this 
hypothesis. These firms benefited from their local resources, including in western regions.  
The Changhong Group is based in Mianyang, Sichuan. It originates in a factory that 
produced military radar equipment, created in 1958. It was in 2011 the biggest television set 
producer (Chen, 2011). That same year, the company represented about 40 percent of the city’s 
GDP, and could, as such, benefit from local support. This firm had applied for 6 nano-patents 
by 2008. According to Chen Minglu, the research capacity of the firm is made possible by the 
socialist legacy of the “third front project” in Mianyang City. The city was established as a 
centre of national defence technology during the Third Front period, and more recently as a 
centre of science and technology in western China (since 2000, the central government decided 
to make it a science and techno city). This allowed the presence of qualified S&T human 
resources, and provided an environment with universities and research institutes (Chen, 2011). 
 
There are also examples in industries not intensive in R&D of firms with significant 
nanotechnology patenting activities. For instance, Liuhe Group Co. Ltd was founded in 1995 
in Qingdao. This food producer owns more than 265 subsidiary companies nationwide and has 
about 50,000 employees. According to its website, the company has three technology centres, 
all three related to one of the business operations under the meat segment. A joint participation 
to one conference with Shandong Agricultural University suggests that the firm is engaged in 
research collaborations with local universities.2 Other food & beverage firms (Tsingtao, 
Yanjing) exhibit similar features.3 Liuhe Group had applied for eight patents by 2008. 
                                                 
1 Guangzhou Baiyunshan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. is a small local firm (around 11 000 employees) principally 
engaged in the pharmaceutical industry. The Company’s main businesses are the production of chemical raw 
medicines and pharmaceutical preparations, as well as the processing of traditional Chinese medical materials and 
Chinese traditional patent medicines. The company through its different subsidiaries has a significant patent 
portfolio: it applied for 62 invention patents in 2013 and obtained 33 patent licenses. In nanotechnology, the group 
– under its headquarters name – applied for 13 patents between 2002 and 2007. 
2 ‘Application of gelatin-based antimicrobial edible coatings on the preservation of chicken meat and prepared 
products’ (Liang et al., 2011) 
3 It should be mentioned, however, that some firms in that category grew by diversifying towards other businesses 
(Henan Shuanghui, China Mengniu, Wuliangye Group), and are increasingly adopting a conglomerate-type. 
214 
 
 
4.5.2. Moderate patenting activities: local resources for technological upgrading1 
Among industrial specialized firms, part of them applied for a limited number of patents 
between 2001 and 2008 (33 firms). Regarding the interpretation that can be made of their 
patenting activity, there are two distinctive cases depending on the nature of the industrial 
sectors they operate on.  
The first case is that of industries little demanding in R&D: food production (3 firms) 
or beverage production (2 firms), leisure good (1 firm), construction and materials (3 firms), 
industrial metals and mining (1 firm), household goods & home construction (1 firm). This is, 
for example, the case of the food industry. Most firms in the food and beverage industry have a 
low R&D intensity, which can be linked to a lower propensity to patent. They are local firms 
headquartered in the city or area where they originated, with a production base sometimes 
dispersed across the province and across the regions. Their technological centre is localized at 
the headquarters. An example of such firm in this industry is Yurun Food. Yurun Food is 
headquartered in Nanjing, in Jiangsu Province. It is a private meat supplier created in 1993 by 
Zhu Yicai. The production network is localized across China (65 factories in slaughtering 
business), but other functions are centralized in the historical headquarter. This includes the 
R&D team (that consists of 300 members according to the company’s website). Research on 
nanotechnology is limited, we find only one patent application by Yurun Food, but the limited 
number of patents can be related to the low intensity of research in the industry.  
However, the second case includes firms from industries traditionally more demanding 
in R&D like chemicals (3 firms), the electronic and electrical equipment industry (7 firms), 
pharmaceuticals (4 firms) and industrial engineering (5 firms), or the automobile & parts 
industry (2 firms). Firms in these industries with limited nanotechnology research usually have 
one technological centre that concentrates their technological activities. This can be interpreted 
as a relatively low commitment to technological learning through research. 
                                                 
1 Firms in that category (Local or private specialized firms, Small Central state firm. 4 patents or less) 
China Electric Equipment Group ; Dongfang Electric ; china national heavy duty truck group company limited; 
beijing dabeinong technology group co ltd ; ; hubei yihua group co ltd ; sichuan hongda co ltd; sichuan kelun 
pharmaceutical co ltd ; China Erzhong deyang ; shanghai delixi group co ltd; China Hualu Group Co. Ltd ; 
chongqing lifan industry (group) co ltd ; gree electric appliances inc of zhuhai ;harbin pharmaceutical group ; 
hefei meiling co ltd ; henan shuanghui investment and development co ltd ; tsingtao brewery group ; zhejiang 
sanhua group co ltd ; Shanghai Pharmaceuticals holding; tebian electric apparatus stock co., ltd. (tbea); china 
national pharmaceutical group corporation (sinopharm); China Railway Engineering Corporation; Beijing 
Yanjing Brewery; china first heavy industries (cfhi); china xidian electric co ltd; ;China Yaohua Glass Group 
Corp; jingwei textile machinery co ltd ; naijing yurun food co ltd; nanjiecun (group) co ltd henan prov ; Taiyuan 
Heavy Machinery Group Co Ltd ;Yuntianhua Group ; zhejiang chaowei power co ltd ; BENEFO; 
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4.6. Synthesis and conclusion 
Our chapter aimed to introduce the variety of profiles in nanotechnology research 
among the 157 firms that have filed nanotechnology patents. We have adopted a two-step 
approach to tackle this difficult task. First, we have assessed and described the weight of 
China’s innovation geography and the weight of the 'endowments', which are the legacy of the 
previous system, on the firms’ capacity to engage in nanotechnology research. In the second 
section, we have proposed to characterize different profiles of engagement in nanotechnology 
research around a series of examples.  
Based on these elements, we can make a series of comments. First, a determinant factor 
of the way firms engage in nanotechnology research is the firms’ size. Very large firms present 
specificities because they regroup entities with diverse technological trajectories. They are, 
therefore, characterized by differentiated trajectories among their subsidiaries: some 
subsidiaries might be engaged in R&D and nanotechnology research, whereas others rely on 
their original technical centers and do not engage in research. 
Second, the results we obtained show the need to account for China’s previous research 
system when looking at the technological trajectories of large Chinese firms. The latter have 
inherited from a research infrastructure that, despite being restructured and reorganized, 
influences the way they do research. This influence is not limited to state firms, even if it is 
more rare for private firms to exclusively rely on formerly public research institutes.  
Finally, it appears necessary to look at the modality of integration of research with the 
rest of the firms’ activities. This is especially crucial when research is done in a formerly public 
research unit. It results that the ‘intensity’ of nanotechnology research within a firm, as 
measured by the number of patents, might reflect the technological capabilities of these research 
institutes. They, however, do not necessarily reflect the level of capabilities available within the 
firms. 
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Chapter 9: Discussions and conclusion of the dissertation 
 
The question of the technological frontier in emerging countries has guided our doctoral 
research. This issue refers to national dynamics of development and to the possibility of the 
transformation of formerly developing countries into technological leaders of the world 
economy. The capacity of firms originating from these countries to position themselves among 
global firms conditions these national dynamics. Among the various dimensions of these 
dynamics, we focused in this dissertation on the possibility of firms to produce innovation based 
on advanced technology, notably through the opportunity to innovate and to produce 
breakthrough innovations, at the national level. 
To deal with this question, we observed the conditions of transition to the technology 
frontier obtaining for large Chinese industrial firms. Large Chinese firms are an important topic 
because of the position they have taken in the world during the last decade. There is one Chinese 
company out of five among the world’s 500 largest firms, which, indeed, is like China’s 
proportion of the world’s population. Also, our comparison with India and Brazil has shown 
that the emergence of China R&D firms, among global R&D firms, is unique and specific to 
China rather than being a trend shared by other emerging countries. The interest that the Chinese 
case represents goes beyond these considerations, however. Large firms in China propose an 
alternative to dynamics observed among large firms in other countries concerned with the 
technological transition. The situation differs from historical precedents, Japan, and South 
Korea. It also differs, on the other hand, from contemporary dynamics among other large 
emerging countries, with which China is often associated, India and to some lesser degree, 
Brazil.  
 
The particularity of China is based on three factors that are likely to have an impact on 
the modality of a transition. Before entering into the core results of our research, let us 
summarize them briefly. A first factor is structural, and refers to the composition of the group 
of the major Chinese firms. As our selection and description of firms illustrated, despite the 
presence of a few diversified groups, including private firms, such as Fosun Group or national 
firms, China’s industries are not dominated by business conglomerates. These only represent 
13 percent of the entire group, and their size is relatively modest. Instead, a high proportion of 
the large firms operates in a specific industrial sector, or even in a particular market segment. 
A second factor is their minor role in the production system. This minor role contrasts with 
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Korea in which Samsung alone represents 17 percent of the national GDP. Altogether, the 325 
industrial firms we observed play a limited role in terms of total employment: they employ 
about 16 million persons, which is a small proportion of a work force estimated at 700 million 
persons. Finally, a specificity of China is the existence of transversal conditions that transcend 
the specificities of the firms’ industrial sector or their ownership regime. Instead, the trajectory 
of firms is largely related to the territory in which they originate and their mode of operation is 
marked by disparities rooted in local conditions and in the availability of resources, as well as 
in the legacy of China's first period of industrialization.  
 
We have grounded the question of the technological frontier for large Chinese firms in 
innovation studies and catch-up literature. The use of the notion of innovation transition to look 
at current Chinese dynamics and its characterization in the literature has led us to formulate the 
hypothesis that large Chinese firms were investing in building tomorrow’s competences, in their 
own specific ways. Therefore, we looked at the modalities of their deployment towards an 
emerging technology among the most advanced in reference to scientific publications, as well 
as the breadth of this deployment with its potential impact on the entire industrial structure. 
Nanotechnology provides an ideal setting, not only because it corresponds to the conditions 
previously mentioned, (its general purpose character across industries, and its degree of 
advancement), but also by its modalities of technology diffusion. Existing firms, across all 
industries, have integrated nanotechnology into the scope of their research programs. 
Understanding the breadth and the eventual modalities of the deployment of research capacities 
in nanotechnology of these firms were our two guiding objectives. 
What then are our conclusions about the transition to the technological frontier by large 
Chinese firms then? A first response emphasizes the breadth of their deployment in 
nanotechnology research. It is this breadth which justifies the relevance of the mobilization of 
transition in the Chinese context. This deployment occurs in all types of firms. Indeed, we paid 
attention to the way we built our database of firms and selected large firms independently of 
their innovative capacities to avoid innovation bias. Our selection of large firms only relied on 
criteria of size, and excluded any technology or innovation related criteria. Despite this 
restrictive choice, an important proportion of firms, 157 firms, about 48 percent of the total had 
applied for patents in nano-related areas through at least one of their subsidiaries during the 
2000s. Two conclusions can be derived from these results. Large Chinese firms have already 
invested in developing technological capabilities. Their patenting in nanotechnology shows that 
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firms have integrated the latest techniques in emerging fields like nanotechnology. In that 
perspective, one might conclude that large Chinese firms are at the technological frontier.  
This, however, does not mean that they have reached the frontier in other aspects, 
notably regarding organizational capabilities. The lack of organizational capabilities, 
understood in its broad sense, is considered to be a major limitation for China. Conversely, we 
might consider that the development of technological capabilities drives and accelerates the 
acquisition of these organizational capabilities. An element that supports that hypothesis is the 
importance of China’s outward foreign investments. The breadth of the trend of the acquisition 
of foreign firms that goes beyond a strategic access to natural resources and includes large and 
high-technology targets reflects the capacity to choose strategic targets.  
 
The second series of results produced by our research concerns the modality of 
deployment of research of large Chinese firms. Thanks to a detailed analysis of the composition 
of the group of large industrial firms, and on the distribution of nanotechnology research among 
one or several centres, we have emphasized the variety of these modalities. Large Chinese firms 
have clearly followed differentiated pathways. 
Part of the firms deploy their research according to modalities that are similar to what 
can be observed in Europe or the United States. These globalized firms, among which we count 
the most studied ones, tend to do research across a network of research centres localized both 
in China and abroad. However, they only represent one modality of research deployment. The 
largest firms, especially centrally state-owned firms, follow another pathway. These firms use 
research institutes inherited from the research system, notably at the national and provincial 
levels, associated with the system established before 1978. These research institutes form a very 
heterogeneous group and their integration with other activities also differs considerably from 
one firm to the other. But they act as a structuring element of research done by large Chinese 
firms. The legacy of the previous period is not limited to state firms, however. Private 
conglomerates, which grew by acquiring distressed state-owned factories, have also acquired 
former research institutes as part of their acquisition strategy, which are now active in 
nanotechnology, and are part of the technological basis of the group.  
Conglomerates, like the largest multi-unit state-owned firms, display internally 
differentiated pathways to research. The trend is visible whether their entities operate in one 
core industry or are diversified. It is quite common that one group’s entity participates in R&D 
and nanotechnology research, while another has made fewer efforts in restructuring its research 
activities. We have shown this pattern among firms that operate in different sectors, in 
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conglomerates - here the case of Fosun was illustrative – or among entities which are in the 
same industrial sector, like in the case of China South Industries Group, in line to what is 
observed among Korean firms like Samsung. The existence of differentiated pathways shows 
that the largest firms have mixed strategies regarding their research capacity. It also reflects the 
legacy of the intervention of state towards the consolidation of industries, which obliged 
efficient state firms to acquire indebted and inefficient firms (Huchet, 1999).  
Also, some large industrial specialized firms have not globalized their operations. These 
firms are not as visible as firms previously described. They however illustrate another industrial 
phenomenon. A first limit of many studies is the differentiation between high-technology and 
low-technology industries. The attention paid to high-technology industries is easily explained 
by the visibility of global leaders, mostly in these industries. Half of the global firms are either 
in the electronic and electric equipment, or in the telecommunication industries. Specialized 
industrial firms also operate in these sectors (as described by us in the case of Changhong in 
Sichuan). But there are also firms in traditional industries such as chemicals and construction 
materials, or in the food sector that do research. Our industrial coverage shows that the 
deployment of research capacity is not limited to centrally state-owned firms and global leaders, 
even though these two categories do it in a more massive way. This modality of research 
deployment is linked to the inscription of firms in their local environment. Another contribution 
of our work was to look at firms, that are not central in innovation studies and include steel 
makers and producers of resources such as nonferrous metals or coal. The share of firms from 
those sectors for which we find nanotechnology patents suggests that resource industries play 
a role regarding the technological frontier. These firms have a particular trajectory in research, 
as they both leverage their access to natural resources, and more generally their local 
environment. It is noticeable that some of these resource-based industries suffer many problems 
that include overcapacity associated with a fragmentation among small actors. The development 
of technological capabilities thus operates in the context on ongoing restructuration of 
industries. 
 
The topic of the technological frontier for developing nations opens a vast range of 
questions, many of which are still unanswered. In our dissertation, we were only able to capture 
a small part of it, i.e. the modality of deployment of nanotechnology research in Chinese firms. 
In this regard, we need to emphasize one point. Our research design is original because we 
proposed a new type of indicator for the transition to technological leadership, based on an 
argument embedded in the existing theory. Indeed, we considered nanotechnology patents not 
220 
 
primarily as an indicator of technological capabilities, as is often the case, but above all as an 
indicator of dynamics of technological learning, i.e. an indicator of the dynamics of construction 
of technological capabilities in emerging technologies. We therefore provide an analytical tool 
to observe a nation’s industrial transformations, by focusing on nanotechnology. Our research 
design opens further possibilities, and shows the need for developing analytical tools and 
indicators specifically designed to follow technical changes in developing countries, in regard 
both to reasearch as ours, but also to production capabilities, and organizational features. The 
development of these tools also requires thinking about a more systematic way for integrating 
qualitative research with these indicators. 
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